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This 1986 University of Pittsburgh Law Review article examines who should own intellectual property rights in computer-generated output when no agreement explicitly allocates those rights. Pamela Samuelson evaluates ownership by computers, users, programmers, joint authors, or no one. She argues that allocating rights to the user best fits copyright doctrine, practical enforcement considerations, and incentives to bring works to market. She also contends that computer-generated output generally is not a derivative work of the generator program, while recognizing program owners’ rights when output incorporates substantial recognizable protected expression.

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ALLOCATING OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN COMPUTER- GENERATED WORKSt Pamela Samuelson * When computersoftware automaticallygenerates output that is not identical to its own text, some of which is potentially copyrightable and some of which is not, difficult problems arise in deciding to whom ownership rights in the output should be allocated. Applying the traditionalauthorshiptests of copyright law does notyield a clearsolution to thisproblem. In this Article, ProfessorSamuelson argues that allocatingrights in computer-generatedoutput to the user of the generatorprogram is the soundest solution to the dilemma because it is the one most compatible with traditionaldoctrine and the policies that underlie copyright law. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction ............................................ 1186 II. Can a Computer be an Author? ........................ 1192 III. Is the User of a Generator Program the Author of Computer-Generated Output? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 IV. Should the Programmer be Considered the Author of a Computer-Generated Work? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205 A. Direct Authorship in the Programmer ............. 1205 B. Ownership in the Programmer Based on the Derivative Works Right ...... ............... 1209 1. Doctrinal Basis for the Claim .................. 1209 2. Why Computer-Generated Works Might Seem to be Derivative Works ......................... 1211 3. Why Computer-Generated Works are Generally Not Derivative Works .......................... 1212 a. Congress Did Not Intend to Include All Computer Output in the Definition of Derivative Works ........................... 1212 b. In General, Computer-Generated Output Does Not Fall Within the Existing Definition of Derivative Works ........................ 1214 c. Useful Articles Made From Copyrighted Drawings Are Not Derivative Works ........ 1216 t © Copyright 1986, Pamela Samuelson. * Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The author would like to thank her research assistant David Lingenfelter for his intelligent and diligent assistance in the preparation of this Article. 1185 HeinOnline -- 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1185 1985-1986

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UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW d. What Happens If One Takes the Computer Out of the Problem? ...... .. ................ 1218 e. Congress Did Not Intend to Give Copyright Owners an Exclusive Right to Use a Copyrighted Work .......................... 1219 V. Should Both the User and the Programmer Be Considered Joint Authors of Computer Output? ......... 1221 VI. Why Give Anyone Ownership Rights in Computer- Generated Works? .......... ............................ 1224 I. INTRODUCTION As "artificial intelligence" 1 (AI) programs become increasingly sophisticated in their role as the "assistants" of humans in the crea- 1. "Artificial Intelligence" is a term used to describe a specialty field within computer science that is aimed at producing computers that exhibit intelligent conduct. See, eg., Shurkin, Expert Systems: The PracticalFace of Artificial Intelligence, 8 TECH.REv. 72 (1983). A system is judged to have the property of intelligence, based on observations of the sys- tem's behavior, if it can adapt itself to novel situations, has the capacity to reason, to understand the relationship between facts, to discover meanings, and to recognize the truth. Also, one expects an intelligent system to learn, i.e., to improve its level of perform- ance on the basis of past experiences. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 110-11 (A. Ralston 3d ed. 1983) (entry on "Artifi- cial Intelligence"). Although many people are profoundly skeptical about the ability of humans to design and build truly intelligent machines-machines capable of learning, of designing, of thinking, of solving com- plex problems-some very prominent scientists have undertaken the effort to investigate the possibil- ity. See, e.g., Minsky, Why People Think Computers Can't, 8 TECH. REV. 65 (1983); H. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (2d ed. 1981); B. WEBBER & N. NILSSON, READINGS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1981) (31 papers on various aspects and research concerning artificial intelligence). The investigation has less to do with advanced mechanical design and more to do with some deep theoretical assumptions about what rationality and thinking are all about: According to a central tradition in Western philosophy, thinking (intellection) essentially is rational manipulation of mental symbols (viz., ideas). Clocks and switchboards [for exam- ple] ... don't do anything like rational symbol manipulation. Computers, on the other hand, can manipulate arbitrary "tokens" in any specifiable manner whatever; so apparently we need only arrange for those tokens to be symbols, and the manipulations to be specified as rational to get a machine that thinks. In other words, Al is new and different because computers actually do something very like what minds are supposed to do. Indeed, if that traditional theory is correct, then our imagined computer ought to have "a mind of its own": a (genuine) artificialmind. J. HAUGELAND, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY IDEA 4 (1985) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the optimistic predictions about the future of artificial intelligence developments, see generally E. FEIGENBAUM & P. MCCORDUCK, THE FIFTH GENERATION: ARTIFICIAL INTELLI- GENCE AND JAPAN'S COMPUTER CHALLENGE TO THE WORLD (1983). For a more journalistic introduction to the work of a group of artificial intelligence researchers, see generally F. ROSE, INTO THE HEART OF THE MIND: AN AMERICAN QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1984). Con- cerning the potential and actual commercial implications of artificial intelligence research, see gener- 1186 [Vol. 47:1185 HeinOnline -- 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1186 1985-1986

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RIGHTS IN COMPUTER-GENERATED WORKS tion of a wide range of products-from music to architectural plans to computer chip designs to industrial products to chemical formulae2- the question of who will own what rights in the "output" of such programs 3 may well become a hotly contested issue.4 Because software is copyrightable, 5 and much software is now being copy- righted,6 copyright law may be the doctrinal forum for the debate. 7 ally THE Al BUSINESS: COMMERCIAL USES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (P. Winston & K. Prendergast ed. 1984). 2. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROP- ERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 69-73 (1986) [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT] (discussing intellectual property problems presented by what OTA calls interactive computing, by which they mean "any creative process in which a preliminary or final version of a work that is the result of interactions between a person and a programmed machine," id. at 69; giving numerous examples of programs that perform such functions, id. at 70-71, including a flowchart for a music generator program, id. at 71); Special Issue on Computer Music, 17 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 147-289 (1985); Blick, Computer-Assisted Chemical Synthesis Packages: Is this a New Problemfor Patentability?,I J. INFORMATION SCI. 227 (1979); Feuer, VLSI Design Auto- mation: An Introduction, 71 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 5 (1983); E. FEIGENBAUM & P. MC- CORDUCK, supra note 1, at 61-75 (discussion of some existing "expert system" programs); Posner, Architecture: Computers Do It Faster,'WallSt. J., Feb. 25, 1986, at 28, col. 1. 3. This Article will only consider the question of how ownership of intellectual property rights in computer output should be allocated in the absence of an explicit allocation of ownership rights in a sales or licensing agreement between the owner (or authorized distributor) of a generator program and the user. An agreement which simply gives to the owner of the copyrighted generator program the right to control the making of derivative works will not be considered an explicit allocation of ownership rights in computer-generated works. See infra text accompanying notes 86-144 for a discussion of the ambiguity of the derivative work right in this respect. 4. When one thinks of how widespread are uses of computer programs to generate other works-both written works and industrial products-one can see that the stakes of the allocation of ownership rights in computer-generated works are very high indeed. When the stakes are high and the statute ambiguous, the stage would seem to be set for a hot contest. 5. Computer programs in machine-readable form were explicitly added to the realm of copy- right subject matter by Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)). Although there have been numerous challenges to the copyrightability of computer programs, see, e.g., Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Il1. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), it is now generally accepted that computer programs are proper subject matter for copyright. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed per stipulation,464 U.S. 1033 (1984). But see Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programsin Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663; OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 132 (arguing that computer programs because of their functional character do not readily fit in the copyright system and may lead to transformation of the traditional rules of the system). 6. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 115. 7. The same kind of issue may surface in the patent system as well. See generally Blick, supra note 2; Milde, Can a ComputerBean "A uthor"oran '"nventor"?,51 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 378 (1969). One of the significant differences between copyright and patent law that may affect how patent law deals with the ownership issue is that patent law does not give the patentee the exclusive right to prepare derivative works whereas copyright law gives such a right to copyright owners. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982) with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Section IV.B., infra, will discuss the implications 11871986] HeinOnline -- 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1187 1985-1986

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UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW It is a new sort of problem for copyright law. Until software was admitted to its realm, copyright law had excluded utilitarian works- that is, works that had functions beyond the conveying of information or the displaying of some sort of appearance-from its domain.8 Of the wide diversity of copyrightable works, only software is capable of automatically generating "products," including many of a sort that copyright itself will not reach (e.g., an industrial product).9 Congress of the derivative work right in the copyright system as it affects the potential right of a programmer to claim control over the computer output. Although the patent doctrine of equivalents provides patentees with a basis for claiming rights in some derivative inventions, the range of derivatives that a patentee may control under patent law may be narrower than the copyright law allows because with patents, to be "equivalent," a derivative invention must do the same basic function in the same basic way. See 4 D. CHISUM, PATENrs § 18.04 (1986). 8. Traditionally, copyright protection has extended to works whose only "utility" was the con- veying of information or the displaying of some sort of appearance or sound. This principle is codi- fied in the copyright statute at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article"), id. § 113 (providing that useful articles embodying designs from copyrighted drawings do not infringe them) and id. § 102(b) (processes not copyrightable). Works having other kinds of utilities besides convey- ing information or displaying appearances-for example, chairs, television sets, and airplane wings-have been excluded from protection by copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT). See also infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text. When Congress decided in 1980 to extend copyright protection to computer programs, see supra note 5, this tradition was broken because computer programs, at least in machine-readable form, do more than "convey" information or "display" appearances: they perform useful tasks. The task that a program may perform may be the monitoring of the operation of a catalytic converter or the injection of fuel into a car's carburetor, as easily as it may be the generation of an image on a screen or a new piece of music. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 78-85. ("Computer programs, as hybrid functional works, describe and implement processes. They cause physical changes to occur in a machine and can interact with other programs or with an environment. A recipe encoded in a program language cannot only tell a programmer how to bake a cake, it can 'tell' the computer too. With the appropriate robotic apparatus, the recipe can cause the cake to be baked." Id at 80.) See generally Boraiko, The Chip, 162 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 421 (1982). While the "output" of a com- puter program may be of many sorts, in the vast majority of cases the output is a different work, that is, something different in kind-not just in form-from the program itself. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. While copyright has never had to cope with this kind of subject matter before, it is worth noting that at least one other form of intellectual property law has had some experience with dealing with ownership rights as to works produced through use of a protected work. Patent law has rules about who owns rights in the "output" generated through use of a patented machine. Just because a patentee has rights in the machine does not mean the patentee has rights in the output. A separate product patent is needed to give the patentee rights in the output. Because patent law has more experience with this type of problem, it may make sense to consider how this body of analogous law, and not just copyright, would deal with the issue when deciding how ownership rights to works generated through the use of a computer should be allocated. 9. The closest analogous subject matter to software in the copyright system seems to be the category of sound recordings. Sound recordings may consist either of grooves cut into plastic or magnetized segments of plastic tape that when used in conjunction with a machine (i.e., "played") produce sounds corresponding to the sounds one might have heard at the live performance when the recording was made. Neither the grooves nor the magnetized tape is precisely the same "work" as [Vol. 47:1185 HeinOnline -- 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1188 1985-1986

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1986] RIGHTS IN COMPUTER-GENERATED WORKS 1189 appears not to have understood that it was admitting a utilitarian sub- ject matter to copyright when it passed the amendment explicitly rec- ognizing the copyrightability of software.10 The computer-generated works problem may require courts to confront this utilitarian quality of software.II Within the framework of the copyright law, intellectual property ownership rights depend initially on "authorship." 12 That is, within the music that was recorded, and yet they are enough the same work that copyright law will protect the pattern of grooves or magnetization on tape in order to protect the value of the musical perform- ance that corresponds to the pattern. The grooves are simply an alternate (if somewhat fuller and richer) way of "recording" music than writing notes on paper. By contrast, a work generated by use of a computer and its programs may be different in kind, different in substance, and different in form from the original generator program. That is, there may not be the kind of one-to-one correspondence between program and output as there is between a sound recording and the sounds that may be heard when the recording is played. In fact, there may be no discernible correspondence at all. The text of the output may not match any part of the text of the program. Often it will be impossible to detect whether a particular computer-generated work was generated by a computer at all (and not written by a human), let alone generated from a particu- lar generator program. Computer-generation of output is thus significantly different from recorda- tion of music. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the useful nature of computer-generated output and note 144 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of computer programs. An analysis of the computer-generated works problem must focus on the ownership issue not only when the type of work generated by a computer is of a sort that has traditionally been assumed to be copyrightable (music, cartoons, statistical compilations), but also as to noncopyrightable sub- ject matter. Software generator programs can generate patentable subject matter, chip design subject matter, and unprotectable subject matter. See supra note 2 and infra notes 36-45 & 124-35 and accompanying text. 10. See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 727-49. 1I.Courts have tended to downplay or ignore the utilitarian character of software in cases which have raised the issue in the past. Compare the lower and appellate court decisions in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 823-24 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240, 1250-53 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed per stipulation,464 U.S. 1033 (1984). As the OTA Report indicates, the functional character of software is creating severe doctrinal problems in appli- cation of doctrine to software copyright cases. See OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 79-85. The courts, however, do not seem to be acknowledging their departure from traditional rules. Id at 81. 12. Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act provides that statutory copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). Professor Nimmer states that "author- ship is a sine qua non for any claim of copyright, be it statutory or (in the limited area remaining to it) common law. That is, the person claiming copyright must either himself be the author, or he must have succeeded to the rights of the author." 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIrHT § 5.01[A] at 5-3 (1985) (footnotes omitted). Neither "author" nor "authorship" is defined in the statute, but some examples of authorship are described therein. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (em- phasis added) which provides in part: Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1)literary works; (2) musi- cal works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accom- HeinOnline -- 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1189 1985-1986

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Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works is a 44-page documentcredited to Orson E. Sandford. This 1986 University of Pittsburgh Law Review article examines who should own intellectual property rights in computer-generated output when no agreement explicitly allocates those rights. Pamela Samuelson evaluates ownership by computers, users, programmers, joint authors, or no one. She argues that allocating rights to the user best fits copyright doctrine, practical enforcement considerations, and incentives to bring works to market. She also contends that computer-generated output generally is not a derivative work of the generator program, while recognizing program owners’ rights when output incorporates substantial recognizable protected expression. It appears in the Law & Legal Studies collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.

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    Copyright law

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  2. Part 2

    Computer-generated works

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  3. Part 3

    Intellectual property

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  4. Part 4

    Authorship

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    Derivative works

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    Joint authorship

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  8. Part 8

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