Dated October 17, 2013, this paper introduces CryptoNote, an electronic cash system proposed to address Bitcoin's limitations in transaction privacy, mining fairness, emission, protocol parameters, and scripting. It describes unlinkable payments using one-time public keys and untraceable transactions using one-time ring signatures, with key images for double-spending detection. It also proposes a memory-bound proof-of-work algorithm, smooth coin emission, adjustable difficulty and block-size limits, and a minimal scripting subsystem. An appendix presents security arguments for the ring signature scheme.
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CryptoNote v 2.0
Nicolas van Saberhagen
October 17, 2013
1 Introduction
“Bitcoin” [1] has been a successful implementation of the concept of p2p electronic cash. Both
professionals and the general public have come to appreciate the convenient combination of
public transactions and proof-of-work as a trust model. Today, the user base of electronic cash
is growing at a steady pace; customers are attracted to low fees and the anonymity provided
by electronic cash and merchants value its predicted and decentralized emission. Bitcoin has
effectively proved that electronic cash can be as simple as paper money and as convenient as
credit cards.
Unfortunately, Bitcoin suffers from several deficiencies. For example, the system’s distributed
nature is inflexible, preventing the implementation of new features until almost all of the net-
work users update their clients. Some critical flaws that cannot be fixed rapidly deter Bitcoin’s
widespread propagation. In such inflexible models, it is more efficient to roll-out a new project
rather than perpetually fix the original project.
In this paper, we study and propose solutions to the main deficiencies of Bitcoin. We believe
that a system taking into account the solutions we propose will lead to a healthy competition
among different electronic cash systems. We also propose our own electronic cash, “CryptoNote”,
a name emphasizing the next breakthrough in electronic cash.
2 Bitcoin drawbacks and some possible solutions
2.1 Traceability of transactions
Privacy and anonymity are the most important aspects of electronic cash. Peer-to-peer payments
seek to be concealed from third party’s view, a distinct difference when compared with traditional
banking. In particular, T. Okamoto and K. Ohta described six criteria of ideal electronic cash,
which included “privacy: relationship between the user and his purchases must be untraceable
by anyone” [30]. From their description, we derived two properties which a fully anonymous
electronic cash model must satisfy in order to comply with the requirements outlined by Okamoto
and Ohta:
Untraceability: for each incoming transaction all possible senders are equiprobable.
Unlinkability: for any two outgoing transactions it is impossible to prove they were sent to
the same person.
Unfortunately, Bitcoin does not satisfy the untraceability requirement. Since all the trans-
actions that take place between the network’s participants are public, any transaction can be
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unambiguously traced to a unique origin and final recipient. Even if two participants exchange
funds in an indirect way, a properly engineered path-finding method will reveal the origin and
final recipient.
It is also suspected that Bitcoin does not satisfy the second property. Some researchers
stated ([33, 35, 29, 31]) that a careful blockchain analysis may reveal a connection between
the users of the Bitcoin network and their transactions. Although a number of methods are
disputed [25], it is suspected that a lot of hidden personal information can be extracted from the
public database.
Bitcoin’s failure to satisfy the two properties outlined above leads us to conclude that it is
not an anonymous but a pseudo-anonymous electronic cash system. Users were quick to develop
solutions to circumvent this shortcoming. Two direct solutions were “laundering services” [2] and
the development of distributed methods [3, 4]. Both solutions are based on the idea of mixing
several public transactions and sending them through some intermediary address; which in turn
suffers the drawback of requiring a trusted third party.
Recently, a more creative scheme was proposed by I. Miers et al. [28]: “Zerocoin”. Zerocoin
utilizes a cryptographic one-way accumulators and zero-knoweldge proofs which permit users to
“convert” bitcoins to zerocoins and spend them using anonymous proof of ownership instead of
explicit public-key based digital signatures. However, such knowledge proofs have a constant
but inconvenient size - about 30kb (based on today’s Bitcoin limits), which makes the proposal
impractical. Authors admit that the protocol is unlikely to ever be accepted by the majority of
Bitcoin users [5].
2.2 The proof-of-work function
Bitcoin creator Satoshi Nakamoto described the majority decision making algorithm as “one-
CPU-one-vote” and used a CPU-bound pricing function (double SHA-256) for his proof-of-work
scheme. Since users vote for the single history of transactions order [1], the reasonableness and
consistency of this process are critical conditions for the whole system.
The security of this model suffers from two drawbacks. First, it requires 51% of the network’s
mining power to be under the control of honest users. Secondly, the system’s progress (bug fixes,
security fixes, etc...) require the overwhelming majority of users to support and agree to the
changes (this occurs when the users update their wallet software) [6].Finally this same voting
mechanism is also used for collective polls about implementation of some features [7].
This permits us to conjecture the properties that must be satisfied by the proof-of-work
pricing function. Such function must not enable a network participant to have a significant
advantage over another participant; it requires a parity between common hardware and high
cost of custom devices. From recent examples [8], we can see that the SHA-256 function used
in the Bitcoin architecture does not posses this property as mining becomes more efficient on
GPUs and ASIC devices when compared to high-end CPUs.
Therefore, Bitcoin creates favourable conditions for a large gap between the voting power of
participants as it violates the “one-CPU-one-vote” principle since GPU and ASIC owners posses
a much larger voting power when compared with CPU owners. It is a classical example of the
Pareto principle where 20% of a system’s participants control more than 80% of the votes.
One could argue that such inequality is not relevant to the network’s security since it is not
the small number of participants controlling the majority of the votes but the honesty of these
participants that matters. However, such argument is somewhat flawed since it is rather the
possibility of cheap specialized hardware appearing rather than the participants’ honesty which
poses a threat. To demonstrate this, let us take the following example. Suppose a malevolent
individual gains significant mining power by creating his own mining farm through the cheap
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hardware described previously. Suppose that the global hashrate decreases significantly, even for
a moment, he can now use his mining power to fork the chain and double-spend. As we shall see
later in this article, it is not unlikely for the previously described event to take place.
2.3 Irregular emission
Bitcoin has a predetermined emission rate: each solved block produces a fixed amount of coins.
Approximately every four years this reward is halved. The original intention was to create a
limited smooth emission with exponential decay, but in fact we have a piecewise linear emission
function whose breakpoints may cause problems to the Bitcoin infrastructure.
When the breakpoint occurs, miners start to receive only half of the value of their previous
reward. The absolute difference between 12.5 and 6.25 BTC (projected for the year 2020) may
seem tolerable. However, when examining the 50 to 25 BTC drop that took place on November
28 2012, felt inappropriate for a significant number of members of the mining community. Figure
1 shows a dramatic decrease in the network’s hashrate in the end of November, exactly when the
halving took place. This event could have been the perfect moment for the malevolent individual
described in the proof-of-work function section to carry-out a double spending attack [36].
Fig. 1. Bitcoin hashrate chart
(source: http://bitcoin.sipa.be)
2.4 Hardcoded constants
Bitcoin has many hard-coded limits, where some are natural elements of the original design (e.g.
block frequency, maximum amount of money supply, number of confirmations) whereas other
seem to be artificial constraints. It is not so much the limits, as the inability of quickly changing
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them if necessary that causes the main drawbacks. Unfortunately, it is hard to predict when the
constants may need to be changed and replacing them may lead to terrible consequences.
A good example of a hardcoded limit change leading to disastrous consequences is the block
size limit set to 250kb1. This limit was sufficient to hold about 10000 standard transactions. In
early 2013, this limit had almost been reached and an agreement was reached to increase the
limit. The change was implemented in wallet version 0.8 and ended with a 24-blocks chain split
and a successful double-spend attack [9]. While the bug was not in the Bitcoin protocol, but
rather in the database engine it could have been easily caught by a simple stress test if there was
no artificially introduced block size limit.
Constants also act as a form of centralization point. Despite the peer-to-peer nature of
Bitcoin, an overwhelming majority of nodes use the official reference client [10] developed by
a small group of people. This group makes the decision to implement changes to the protocol
and most people accept these changes irrespective of their “correctness”. Some decisions caused
heated discussions and even calls for boycott [11], which indicates that the community and the
developers may disagree on some important points. It therefore seems logical to have a protocol
with user-configurable and self-adjusting variables as a possible way to avoid these problems.
2.5 Bulky scripts
The scripting system in Bitcoin is a heavy and complex feature. It potentially allows one to create
sophisticated transactions [12], but some of its features are disabled due to security concerns and
some have never even been used [13]. The script (including both senders’ and receivers’ parts)
for the most popular transaction in Bitcoin looks like this:
<sig> <pubKey> OP DUP OP HASH160 <pubKeyHash> OP EQUALVERIFY OP CHECKSIG.
The script is 164 bytes long whereas its only purpose is to check if the receiver possess the
secret key required to verify his signature.
3 The CryptoNote Technology
Now that we have covered the limitations of the Bitcoin technology, we will concentrate on
presenting the features of CryptoNote.
4 Untraceable Transactions
In this section we propose a scheme of fully anonymous transactions satisfying both untraceability
and unlinkability conditions. An important feature of our solution is its autonomy: the sender
is not required to cooperate with other users or a trusted third party to make his transactions;
hence each participant produces a cover traffic independently.
4.1 Literature review
Our scheme relies on the cryptographic primitive called a group signature. First presented by
D. Chaum and E. van Heyst [19], it allows a user to sign his message on behalf of the group.
After signing the message the user provides (for verification purposes) not his own single public
1This is so-called “soft limit” — the reference client restriction for creating new blocks. Hard maximum of
possible blocksize was 1 MB
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key, but the keys of all the users of his group. A verifier is convinced that the real signer is a
member of the group, but cannot exclusively identify the signer.
The original protocol required a trusted third party (called the Group Manager), and he was
the only one who could trace the signer. The next version called a ring signature, introduced
by Rivest et al. in [34], was an autonomous scheme without Group Manager and anonymity
revocation. Various modifications of this scheme appeared later: linkable ring signature [26, 27,
17] allowed to determine if two signatures were produced by the same group member, traceable
ring signature [24, 23] limited excessive anonymity by providing possibility to trace the signer of
two messages with respect to the same metainformation (or “tag” in terms of [24]).
A similar cryptographic construction is also known as a ad-hoc group signature [16, 38]. It
emphasizes the arbitrary group formation, whereas group/ring signature schemes rather imply a
fixed set of members.
For the most part, our solution is based on the work “Traceable ring signature” by E. Fujisaki
and K. Suzuki [24]. In order to distinguish the original algorithm and our modification we will
call the latter a one-time ring signature, stressing the user’s capability to produce only one valid
signature under his private key. We weakened the traceability property and kept the linkability
only to provide one-timeness: the public key may appear in many foreign verifying sets and the
private key can be used for generating a unique anonymous signature. In case of a double spend
attempt these two signatures will be linked together, but revealing the signer is not necessary
for our purposes.
4.2 Definitions
4.2.1 Elliptic curve parameters
As our base signature algorithm we chose to use the fast scheme EdDSA, which is developed and
implemented by D.J. Bernstein et al. [18]. Like Bitcoin’s ECDSA it is based on the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem, so our scheme could also be applied to Bitcoin in future.
Common parameters are:
q: a prime number; q = 2255 − 19;
d: an element of Fq ; d = −121665/121666;
E: an elliptic curve equation; −x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2;
G: a base point; G = (x, −4/5);
l: a prime order of the base point; l = 2252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493;
Hs: a cryptographic hash function {0, 1}∗ → Fq ;
Hp: a deterministic hash function E(Fq ) → E(Fq ).
4.2.2 Terminology
Enhanced privacy requires a new terminology which should not be confused with Bitcoin entities.
private ec-key is a standard elliptic curve private key: a number a ∈ [1, l − 1];
public ec-key is a standard elliptic curve public key: a point A = aG;
one-time keypair is a pair of private and public ec-keys;
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CryptoNote v 2.0 is a 20-page documentcredited to Rhea M. Thackery. Dated October 17, 2013, this paper introduces CryptoNote, an electronic cash system proposed to address Bitcoin's limitations in transaction privacy, mining fairness, emission, protocol parameters, and scripting. It describes unlinkable payments using one-time public keys and untraceable transactions using one-time ring signatures, with key images for double-spending detection. It also proposes a memory-bound proof-of-work algorithm, smooth coin emission, adjustable difficulty and block-size limits, and a minimal scripting subsystem. An appendix presents security arguments for the ring signature scheme. It appears in the Technology & Security collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.
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Part 1
CryptoNote
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Part 2
Electronic cash
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Cryptography
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Part 4
Transaction privacy
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Ring signatures
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Proof-of-work
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Bitcoin
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Security proofs
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