This Defense Paper Series discussion paper argues that the 2025 National Defense Strategy should prioritize a culture of learning and adaptation across the Department of Defense. Mick Ryan examines an emerging knowledge-sharing bloc involving China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, drawing on lessons from Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East. He characterizes the adaptation competition and recommends risk-tolerant leadership, faster implementation of battlefield lessons, closer allied learning networks, an Indo-Pacific lessons-learned center, and tailored analytical AI to strengthen U.S. and allied adaptation.
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Defense
Paper SeriesAdaptation War - Confronting
the New Adversary Learning
and Adaptation BlocAustralian Major General (Ret.) Mick Ryan, SCSP Defense Sr.
Advisor
This paper series includes discussion papers written by SCSP advisors regarding the development of
the 2025 National Defense Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of SCSP.
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S P E C I A L C O M P E T I T I V E S T U D I E S P R OJ E C T: D E F E N S E PA P E R S E R I E S
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Introduction
When writing the next National Defense Strategy (NDS), the most important priority to emphasize
will be the need to cultivate a culture of adaptation across the Department of Defense. Without
such a transformation, none of the other urgent problems facing the Department – such as
preparing for great power competition against China, reforming the acquisition process,
harnessing emerging technologies, or modernizing the force, will be achievable. A defence
enterprise that remains risk-averse, rigid, and bureaucratic will struggle to implement even the
most well-conceived strategies, while one that embraces adaptation and innovation will be
capable of turning strategic intent into operational reality. In this sense, cultural change is not
simply another priority; it is the essential precondition for success across every other dimension of
national defence.
American adversaries have already learned this lesson. During the ongoing invasion of Ukraine,
Russia has
learned to learn more quickly and to disseminate lessons throughout their military and
industrial systems with increasing speed. While Ukrainian forces often outpace Russian innovation,
Russian forces have learned to be fast followers.1
This learning and adaptation enterprise spawned by the war in Ukraine, as well as the different
wars in the Middle East, has now metastasised into an international learning and adaptation
competition. A new adversary learning and adaptation bloc has emerged. While not a formal
alliance, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have developed a mesh of different agreements and
strategic partnerships that have allowed them to construct a connected knowledge market on 21st
century strategic competition and conflict. This forms the basis of a larger Adaptation War
against America. Investigating, understanding and responding to this Adaptation War should be
the highest priority for the Department of Defense.2
Characterizing the Adaptation War
Understanding the
character of the Adaptation War can provide insights into the strategic
strengths and vulnerabilities of potential adversaries. These insights can inform the prioritisation
of the kinds of learning and adaptation required by America and its allies. Like the character of
war, the character of the modern adaptation war will evolve over time. However, the current
character of the Adaptation War is described in the following paragraphs.Concurrency. Learning and adaptation are occurring at many different levels, in many different
organisations across multiple geographic regions concurrently. It is a multi-domain learning and
adaptation environment, with efforts underway in the ground, air, space, maritime, cyber and
information domains. This parallel learning and adaptation can complicate understanding the
entirety of all dimensions of the adaptation war. But the enormous complexity of concurrent
1 This insight was provided by the author’s interviews of multiple senior Ukrainian military personnel during visits to Ukraine in 2025 and
2024.
2
Offset-X: Closing the Deterrence Gap and Building the Future Joint Force, Special Competitive Strategies Project at 21-22 (2023).
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learning at multiple levels of organisations and nations, because of the human nature of learning
and adaptation, will also unveil many gaps and vulnerabilities in adversaries and in our allies.One Learns, All Can Learn. For the first time in human history, the adaptation war has spawned
the potential for a real-time, global knowledge market among authoritarians and potentially,
among America’s allies and security partners. In previous eras, learning took time to be absorbed
into organisations, and even longer to share between organisations and nations. Now, there is the
potential for all members of an adaptation community, regardless of their location, to access
lessons almost as soon as one member can collect and analyse them. This means that among
America’s competitors, when one learns a lesson about America’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities,
all of them can benefit from the lesson.Uneven Learning. Notwithstanding the potential for the global knowledge market in the
Adaptation War, learning and adaptation is ultimately a human endeavour. Organisations might
seek to automate collection, analysis and dissemination through AI, but this system still requires
humans at the point of learning and collection and for humans to accept and implement lessons
at different organisational levels and in different cultures and nations. This human dimension of
the adaptation war can be a strength but also provides many vulnerabilities.
Military institutions, and the different agencies in a nation’s security apparatus, rarely compromise
a monoculture. Individual services within each military organization possess their own cultures and
even sub-cultures.3 Different cultures arise within individual organisations and this can provide
targetable ‘seams’. As such, different learning cultures differ between adversary institutions and
nations is a vulnerability. Understanding this uneven learning underpins vulnerability assessments.Imperfect Insight. It is unlikely that full visibility is achievable about what the adversary learning
and adaptation bloc is doing, as individual nations or collectively. Just as war is full of uncertainty,
knowledge of adversary learning and adaptation endeavours will also be rife with uncertainty. The
efforts of military attaches, intelligence agencies, open-source collection, business intelligence
and luck will all provide insight into how adversaries learn and adapt, but there will always be gaps.Not a Technological but an Intellectual Competition. Learning and adaptation is a human trait.
While insights about technology play a role in learning and adaptation, human decision-making,
energy, and creativity are critical elements. Even if AI becomes more central to learning and
adaptation, the adaptation war will remain a largely human endeavour. Providing the right
purpose and incentives for learning and adaptation, and undertaking the right training,
educational and organization reform to improve friendly learning and adaptation is vital.
However, military institutions of all types experience bureaucratic inertia and other human factors
that impedes change. This has been observed and documented in all western military institutions
as well as in Russia and China. For example, obstacles to reform in the Russian military have been
assessed by some as the result of imbalances in civil-military relations and dysfunctional civilian
3 Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray,
The Culture of Military Organizations, Cambridge University Press at 457 (2019).
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control.4 Others have pointed to a highly centralised bureaucracy, widespread corruption and an
over-emphasis on theory over implementation.5
China too has experienced challenges in military reform. The historical dominance of the ground
forces and inter-service rivalry has impeded change.6 Other issues for the reform of the People’s
Liberation Army have been identified as corruption and distrust between the Chinese president
and his military forces.7 The imperative for political indoctrination and conformity in the People’s
Liberation Army may also conflict with the ability of commanders to lead the development of a
learning culture and military innovation.8 Therefore, while human agency plays a central role in
learning and adaptation, it can also lead to obstacles in the innovation process. This, like uneven
learning, provides targetable vulnerabilitiesSpeed. What makes this new global Adaptation War more challenging to respond to, is the speed
at which authoritarian actors are learning, adapting and sharing lessons among themselves. As
the British Future Operating Environment 2035 report notes, “the rate of technological change
will accelerate out to 2035, serving to highlight inadequacies in less adaptable procurement
processes within Defence. Civil companies will be able to raise revenue far more quickly, driving
technology development in new directions and at faster rates.”9 Since 2022, both Russia and
Ukraine have demonstrated the ability to learn how to learn better, and to do this learning and
adaptation at a faster pace over time. Recent examples include:
▪ Drone and counter-drone adaptation is accelerating.10
▪ The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Force and Russia’s Rubicon Centre of Advanced
Unmanned Systems is unifying drone and EW operations, learning and adaptation.11
▪ Battlefield tactics are changing frequently, especially on the Ukrainian eastern front.12
4 Kirill Shamiev, Brass Tacks: Why Russia’s Military Fails to Reform, European Council on Foreign Relations (2024).
5 Katherine Kjellstrom Elgin, More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military and its Ability to Change, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Analysis (2024).
6 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping, Institute for National Strategic Studies (2017).
7 K. Tristan Tang, Xi Struggles to Keep Military Construction Reform on Course at Two Sessions, The Jamestown Foundation (2025);
Masaaki Yatsuzuka, New Chinese reform addresses overlaps, reflects challenge of military control, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
(2024).
8 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Quest for Military Supremacy, Polity Books at 22-23, 29-30 (2025).
9 Future Operating Environment 2035, UK Ministry of Defence at 14-15 (2015).
10 David Hambling, Ukraine Deploying ‘Tens Of Thousands’ Of Interceptors To Stop Shaheds, Forbes (2025). Insights into timeframes
for change gained from author interviews with key Ukrainian military personnel in 2024 and 2025.
11 Dara Massicot, Rubicon Center, Twitter (2025); David Axe, Lying In Wait On The Ground, Russia’s Best Attack Drones Devastate
Ukrainian Convoys, Forbes (2025).
12 Insights into timeframes for change gained from author interviews with key Ukrainian military personnel in 2024 and 2025.
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▪ An increasing application of AI in military organisations, and its potential to significantly
accelerate learning and adaptation.13
America’s Response to the Adversary Learning and
Adaptation Bloc
There is an array of relationships between nations in the adversary learning and adaptation bloc.
But the nature of these linkages, between Russia and Iran, as well as between Russia and China,
can provide insight into the limitations of such relationships.14 This in turn permits the construction
of strategies to undermine such relationships. To aid in the development of these strategies, four
key findings about the Adaptation Ware are proposed, with each accompanied by
recommendations.
Finding 1: Ukraine and Russia have
learned to learn more quickly in the past three years, and
to proliferate lessons into their military and industrial systems with increasing speed.
Recommendation: The Department of Defense must embrace adaptation as an integral
aspect of its institutional culture. Senior leaders should nurture people and teams incentivised
and resourced to continuously learn and that are capable of adapting quickly.15 This culture
begins with clear statements about leadership tolerance for risk and new ideas. Appropriate
authorities are necessary for leaders to aggressively conduct decentralised, but linked,
adaptation.
Recommendation: Leadership selection plays a central role in rapidly closing the gap between
the emergence of new technology and its adoption by military institutions. The selection of all
military leaders should include assessments of their risk tolerance, and how they nurture
learning and innovation in subordinates. Service Chiefs and senior joint leaders must define the
range of acceptable failures, and leaders at all levels must make clear statements about their
willingness to absorb risk to permit subordinates learning and adaptation.16
Recommendation: The Department of Defense should increase investment in learning how
Ukrainian, Russian and other military organisations have learned how to learn.
Finding 2: Learning and adaptation in Ukraine, as well as in the Middle East, has
metastasised into an international learning and adaptation competition. A new adversary
13 See my exploration of how AI can improve learning and adaptation here: Mick Ryan, Supercharging Adaptation: AI and War in the
21st Century
, Australian National University (2025)
14 András Rácz and Alina Hrytsenko, Partnership Short of Alliance: Military Cooperation Between Russia and China
, CEPA (2025).
15 This senior advocacy is one of the essential elements of successful institutional learning and reform. For a useful case study involving
the massive transformation of the US Army in the wake of the Vietnam War, see Don Starry, To Change an Army, Military Review at
20-27 (1983).
16 This senior advocacy is one of the essential elements of successful institutional learning and reform. For a useful case study involving
the massive transformation of the US Army in the wake of the Vietnam War, see Don Starry, To Change an Army, Military Review at
20-27 (1983).
Adaptation War - Confronting the New Adversary Learning and Adaptation Bloc: summary, contents and background
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Adaptation War - Confronting the New Adversary Learning and Adaptation Bloc is a 7-page documentcredited to Bram D. Hollis. This Defense Paper Series discussion paper argues that the 2025 National Defense Strategy should prioritize a culture of learning and adaptation across the Department of Defense. Mick Ryan examines an emerging knowledge-sharing bloc involving China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, drawing on lessons from Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East. He characterizes the adaptation competition and recommends risk-tolerant leadership, faster implementation of battlefield lessons, closer allied learning networks, an Indo-Pacific lessons-learned center, and tailored analytical AI to strengthen U.S. and allied adaptation. It appears in the Politics & Government collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.
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Defense Paper Series
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National Defense Strategy
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Military Adaptation
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Organizational Learning
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