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Published in the Stanford Law Review, Volume 71, January 2019, this article reconstructs James Madison’s concept of constitutional liquidation: settling indeterminate constitutional meaning through deliberate historical practice. Baude identifies three requirements - textual indeterminacy, a course of deliberate practice, and settlement through acquiescence and public sanction. He examines the national bank and federal spending debates, connects liquidation to departmentalism, precedent, and tradition, and explores questions about its scope, permanence, and application.

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1 Volume 71 January 2019 Stanford Law Review ARTICLE Constitutional Liquidation William Baude* Abstract. James Madison wrote that the Constitution’s meaning could be “liquidated” and settled by practice. But the term “liquidation” is not widely known, and its precise meaning is not understood. This Article attempts to rediscover the concept of constitutional liquidation, and thereby provide a way to ground and understand the role of historical practice in constitutional law. Constitutional liquidation had three key elements. First, there had to be a textual indeterminacy. Clear provisions could not be liquidated, because practice could “expound” the Constitution but could not “alter” it. Second, there had to be a course of deliberate practice. This required repeated decisions that reflected constitutional reasoning. Third, that course of practice had to result in a constitutional settlement. This settlement was marked by two related ideas: acquiescence by the dissenting side, and “the public sanction”—a real or imputed popular ratification. While this Article does not provide a full account of liquidation’s legal status at or after the Founding, liquidation is deeply connected to shared constitutional values. It provides a structured way for understanding the practice of departmentalism. It is analogous to Founding-era precedent, and could provide a salutary improvement over the modern doctrine of stare decisis. It is consistent with the core arguments for adhering to tradition. And it is less susceptible to some of the key criticisms against the more capacious use of historical practice. * Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. This Article has been liquidated over time with the help of countless discussions with friends and colleagues, as well as indispensable research assistance from Nickolas Card, Margo Uhrman, Roberto Borgert, Douglas Gates, Kevin Keating, Martin Salvucci, and Natalie Peelish; and research support from the SNR Denton and Alumni Faculty Funds. This Article has benefitted as well from helpful comments by Akhil Amar, Judge Stephanos Bibas, Curt Bradley, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Josh Chafetz, Nathan Chapman, Andrew Coan, Ryan Doerfler, Justin Driver, Richard Epstein, Lee Fennell, Chad Flanders, Jonathan Gienapp, Dick Helmholz, Randy Kozel, Alison LaCroix, Marty Lederman, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Michael McConnell, Bernie Meyler, David Pozen, Saikrishna Prakash, Richard Primus, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Lawrence Solum, Lance Sorenson, David Strauss, Kevin Walsh, Garrett West, Adam White, and Christopher Yoo; by workshop participants at Harvard, Stanford, the University of Arizona, the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of San Diego’s Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference; and by Liz Klein, Jane Kessner, and other editors of the Stanford Law Review.

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Constitutional Liquidation 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) 2 Table of Contents Introduction................................................................................................................................................................. 3 I. Rediscovering Liquidation........................................................................................................................ 4 II. Understanding Liquidation ...................................................................................................................... 8 A. Groundwork........................................................................................................................................... 8 B. Theory...................................................................................................................................................... 13 1. Indeterminacy ........................................................................................................................... 13 2. Course of deliberate practice ............................................................................................. 16 3. Settlement .................................................................................................................................... 18 C. Examining Examples ....................................................................................................................... 21 1. The bank ....................................................................................................................................... 21 2. Federal spending ...................................................................................................................... 29 D. Beyond Madison? ............................................................................................................................... 32 III. Grounding Liquidation ............................................................................................................................. 35 A. Departmentalism ............................................................................................................................... 35 B. Precedent................................................................................................................................................. 36 1. Founding-era precedent ....................................................................................................... 37 2. Modern stare decisis ............................................................................................................... 39 3. Implications ................................................................................................................................ 42 C. Tradition ................................................................................................................................................. 44 D. Possible Shortcomings .................................................................................................................... 47 IV. Liquidating Liquidation? (Harder Questions) ............................................................................... 49 A. What Kinds of Provisions Can Be Liquidated? ................................................................. 49 B. What Does Liquidation Decide? ................................................................................................ 51 C. Is Liquidation Necessarily Permanent? .................................................................................. 53 D. Is Early Practice Privileged? ......................................................................................................... 59 E. Is Liquidation Meaningfully Distinct? ................................................................................... 63 F. How Is Indeterminancy Determined?..................................................................................... 66 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 69 Methodological Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 70

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Constitutional Liquidation 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) 3 Introduction Today’s constitutional law looks to the past. The central document, of course, is an old one whose age and origins cause constitutional debate. And day-to-day judicial adjudication is often dominated by precedent, the examination of past court decisions. But precedent and originalism do not exhaust the role of historical argument in constitutional law. Constitutional law is also rife with claims of authority by historical practice. Historical practice is not quite the same as precedent, because it expands well beyond judicial opinions. Historical practice is not quite the same as originalism, either, because it frequently looks to what has happened in the generations after a text was originally written. Yet theories of how exactly such practice works as a source of constitutional meaning are surprisingly scant, giving rise to the recent allegation that “there has been little sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in the context of separation of powers”1 and to the response that “[h]istorical practice is a slippery, unhelpfully capacious notion masquerading as a mid-twentieth-century neutral principle.”2 Meanwhile, the history of constitutional law has also looked to the future. Over decades, James Madison carefully revised his notes from the Constitutional Convention with an eye to eventual public consumption.3 After the Convention, Madison warned his new colleagues in Congress of the importance of their constitutional debates: “The decision that is at this time made will become the permanent exposition of the constitution; and on a permanent exposition of the constitution will depend the genius and character of the whole government.”4 He returned to these themes throughout his career, ever attentive to how political practice would set a precedent for tomorrow’s constitutional law. 1. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012). 2. Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77-78 (2013); see also Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 674-75 (2016) (calling “attention to a general, and surprising, lack of rigor in how historical branch practice is used in separation of powers interpretation”). 3. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 179-240 (2015). 4. The Congressional Register, Minutes of the House of Representatives (June 17, 1789), in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 904, 921 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS] (statement of Rep. Madison); see also The Daily Advertiser, Minutes of the House of Representatives (June 17, 1789), in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS, supra, at 895, 895 (statement of Rep. Madison).

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Constitutional Liquidation 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) 4 This Article attempts to unite that past and present. It reconstructs James Madison’s theory of postenactment historical practice, sometimes called “liquidation,” as in: “All new laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”5 Liquidation was a specific way of looking at post-Founding practice to settle constitutional disputes, and it can be used today to make historical practice in constitutional law less slippery, less capacious, and more precise. The problems of how to reconcile text and precedent, of how to mediate between fixation and contestation, of how to be an originalist in a fallen world—none of these are new. And none of them were lost on Madison. His articulation of liquidation over the course of his life can be seen as an attempt to solve these problems—to explain the role of precedent in a system of text, to allow stability without forfeiting constitutional faith, to allow constitutional updating while adhering to original meaning. This focus on Madison is expository and conceptual, not dictated either by history or constitutional law. Madison was not the only one to use the specific term liquidation, nor to avail himself of the general framework of settlement through constitutional practice.6 And constitutional law, even on originalist premises, is not limited to the views of James Madison. Rather, this Article examines the concept of liquidation through Madison because Madison had an unusually extensive, thorough, and systematic discussion of it. Having his theory of it in hand will let us decide whether it is normatively desirable and help us explore whether it was a widespread part of the law at the Founding, issues this Article will also begin to sketch out. But before we can proceed to those questions, we must know what liquidation is. This Article presents that concept of liquidation. Part I discusses modern attention to the concept. Part II breaks down the precise mechanics of Madison’s concept of liquidation, synthesizing Madison’s thought over the course of his career. Part III shows how liquidation is grounded in certain widely shared constitutional values. Part IV then attempts to work out some more detailed issues with liquidation on which Madison’s own views may sometimes appear ambiguous or incomplete. I. Rediscovering Liquidation Every time one turns around, a new law or official act is being assailed on grounds of being “unprecedented.” Perhaps it is a new comprehensive health 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 6. See infra Part II.D.

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Constitutional Liquidation 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) 5 care reform7 or the structure of a new independent agency.8 Perhaps it is the Senate’s failure to confirm (or even vote on) a Supreme Court nominee.9 Perhaps it is the rumored possibility that the President might pardon himself.10 The charge is supposed to sound not just in political norms but in constitutional law—to carry “a distinct whiff of impermissibility.”11 And on the other hand, in recent years longstanding practices have been charged with constitutional invalidity. Look, for instance, at Congress’s powers of contempt,12 the appointment of civil service officials,13 national injunctions by the federal courts,14 the civil forfeiture of tainted assets,15 or the designation of an “acting” cabinet official without Senate confirmation.16 Here, too, history has sometimes been said to sustain these practices. 7. See generally JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (2013). 8. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J.) (calling the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau “unprecedented in our constitutional history”), rev’d in part en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 9. See Josh Chafetz, Essay, Unprecedented?: Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 108-09 (2017); see also Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, Essay, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 60-82 (2016) (arguing that opposition to the elevation of Chief Judge Garland reflected “a major departure from more than two centuries of historical tradition”). 10. See S.M., Can Donald Trump Pardon Himself?, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY IN AM. (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/7LFT-B3GD (referring to the notion as an “unprecedented courtesy”). 11. Chafetz, supra note 9, at 96. 12. See, e.g., E. Garrett West, Revisiting Contempt of Congress 3-5 (June 25, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/QD58-HBBE. 13. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 545-58 (2018) (discussing various civil service officials who are arguably appointed in violation of the original meaning of the Constitution); see also Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (adopting Mascott’s analysis). 14. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419-20 (2017). 15. Compare Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849-50 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (offering historical criticism of civil forfeiture practices), with Caleb Nelson, Feature, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2456 (2016) (concluding that civil forfeiture laws “are consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution as liquidated over time”). 16. See Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 2018 WL 6131923 (Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Nov. 14, 2018); see also Will Baude, Who Is Lawfully the Attorney General Right Now?, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 10, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://perma.cc/P6VV-2GM2.

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Constitutional Liquidation is a 70-page documentcredited to Nadia Y. Ellwood. Published in the Stanford Law Review, Volume 71, January 2019, this article reconstructs James Madison’s concept of constitutional liquidation: settling indeterminate constitutional meaning through deliberate historical practice. Baude identifies three requirements - textual indeterminacy, a course of deliberate practice, and settlement through acquiescence and public sanction. He examines the national bank and federal spending debates, connects liquidation to departmentalism, precedent, and tradition, and explores questions about its scope, permanence, and application. It appears in the Law & Legal Studies collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.

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