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Law As Integrity and the Alien Tort Statute
Michael S. Cecil1
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is approaching a pivotal crossroads. For the first time
in its 40-year “modern line,” the Supreme Court has signaled the prospect of shutting
the door to ATS claims for good. This death knell stems from the muddied evolution of
ATS jurisprudence and the failure to resolve its fundamental debates. At its root, this
debate concerns two “Core Controversies”: (1) whether the ATS is strictly jurisdictional,
requiring a separate statute to establish a cause of action, or whether federal courts can
use their common law power to recognize causes of action under the ATS itself; and
(2) whether the ATS facilitates a form of “universal jurisdiction,” meaning claims
between foreign citizens, or whether it is limited to “sovereign-specific” claims between
a foreign citizen and U.S. citizens. Both controversies stem from a contradictory premise
set by the Supreme Court in 2004, where it held that the ATS is strictly jurisdictional
yet includes three “historical torts” within its meaning and the prospect of recognizing
new law of nations torts so long as they were “specific, universal, and obligatory” and
comparable to their 18th Century paradigms.
In an effort to defend the role of the ATS in the federal system, this Article presents a
jurisprudential approach to resolve these long-standing debates. “Law as integrity” is a
non-positivist theory which argues the ATS consists of rules, standards, and principles.
Critically, the foundational principle—ensuring that federal courts are available to for-
eign citizens who suffer international law violations for which other nations may expect
the United States to provide a forum for redress—provides the key to understanding the
limits and latitudes of the ATS from its original passage in 1789 up until present day.
Viewing the ATS through the lens of law as integrity resolves the two Core Contro-
versies. First, federal courts can use their common law power to recognize new causes of
action under the “tort . . . in violation of the law of nations” standard. This distin-
guishes the “Law of Nations” as a set of duties and responsibilities between states from
the “law of nations standard” within the text of the ATS itself. Second, the ATS is
limited to claims between an “alien” and a U.S. citizen (person or entity), satisfying the
1. Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. Much of my thanks goes to a
wide array of legal scholars spanning the federal courts, human rights, legislation, legal history, and
international law communities, all of whom devoted considerable time and energy to evaluating this
all-too-important statute. This Article is largely a response to a deep well of excellent work done before
me. Although my interest in the ATS predates this, my inspiration for this Article came while attending
oral arguments in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC at the Supreme Court. Heartfelt thanks must be given to all
of my colleagues in the Research Seminar for Future Academics at NYU School of Law and Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, whose insightful comments to prior drafts and during oral presentation sharpened
many of my early ideas on the Article. Additional thanks goes to several of my colleagues at Gonzaga
University School of Law, whose comments and encouragement throughout the writing process laid the
groundwork for later drafts and ideas. I am grateful for excellent research assistance from Lewis Beck and
Grace Harkins. All errors are my own.
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2 Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 38
strictures of “alienage jurisdiction” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. In
developing ATS jurisprudence, federal courts must fulfill their “dual role” of (1) looking
to sources of customary international law to determine whether a “tort . . . in violation
of the law of nations” has ripened into a justiciable cause of action; and (2) fashioning
rules of decision in secondary doctrines such as “aiding and abetting” liability. This
Article offers a jurisprudential analysis to the meaning and scope of the ATS, affirming
its capacity to embrace modern precepts of customary international law while remaining
faithful to its original text and objectives.
Introduction
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”2
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is the embattled centerpiece of transnational
human rights litigation in the United States. Few areas of law have the poten-
tial to touch upon issues as diverse as a U.S. technology corporation’s alleged
aiding and abetting of human rights violations against religious minorities
in China,3 a U.S. military contractor’s alleged facilitation of torture and war
crimes at Abu Ghraib prison,4 and a U.S. fruit corporation’s alleged facilitation
of death squads in Colombia.5
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
3. On January 31, 2025, Cisco Systems, Inc. filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme
Court of the United States. See Doe I v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 73 F.4th 700, 717 (9th Cir. 2023), petition for
cert. filed, No. 24-856 (Docketed Feb. 11, 2025) (15-16909). In its petition, Cisco included the following
questions relevant to this Article: (1) Whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows
a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting; (2) Whether, if ATS aiding-and-
abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than purpose suffices to show the requisite mens
rea. See id.
4. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 594 (E.D. Va. 2017) (holding that
claims for torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and war crimes can be brought under Alien
Tort Statute against private actors). But see Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. (Order of July 3, 2024,
scheduling a jury trial following the declaration of mistrial set for Oct. 28, 2024); c.f. Abu Ghraib Verdict:
Iraqi Torture Survivors Win Landmark Case as Jury Holds Private Contractor CACI Liable, Ctr. for Const.
Rts. (Nov. 15, 2024), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/abu-ghraib-verdict-iraqi-
torture-survivors-win-landmark-case-jury [https://perma.cc/LHY6-THF6]. On Nov. 12, 2024, a jury in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found CACI Premier Technology,
Inc. liable to three plaintiffs under the ATS. Id. Each plaintiff was awarded $3 million in compensatory
damages and $11 million in punitive damages. Id. The contractor’s total damage liability was assessed at
$42 million. Id. But see Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 1:08-cv-00827-LMB-JFA (E.D. Va. 2025)
(Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit).
5. Colombian victims win historic verdict over Chiquita: Jury finds banana company liable for financing death
squads, EarthRights Int’l (June 10, 2024), https://earthrights.org/media_release/colombian-victims-
win-historic-verdict-over-chiquita-jury-finds-banana-company-liable-for-financing-death-squads/
[https://perma.cc/CD2B-Z5A5]. In a landmark ruling in the fight for human rights, the jury found ba-
nana giant Chiquita Brands International liable for financing the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC), a brutal paramilitary death squad. Id. Although claims were brought under the ATS, liability
against Chiquita was ultimately based on a wrongful death theory. Id. But see Cardona v. Chiquita Brands
Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing the orders denying the motions to dismiss claims
under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims Protection Act and remanding the case for dismissal).
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Yet ATS jurisprudence faces the imminent risk of being foreclosed for good.
Many factors can explain this precarious state of affairs, but two unsettled
“Core Controversies” stand above the rest. First, is the ATS strictly jurisdictional,
requiring a separate statute to create a cause of action, or can federal courts rec-
ognize common law causes of action under the ATS itself? Second, does the ATS
facilitate a form of “universal jurisdiction,” meaning claims between foreign
citizens, or is it limited to “sovereign-specific” claims between a foreign citizen
and U.S. citizens? These two Core Controversies have provoked considerable and
longstanding disagreement, with one author declaring the cause of action de-
bate “simply frivolous,”6 a second deeming universal jurisdiction more consistent
with the original reading,7 and a third recognizing the ATS as a “self-executing,
fail-safe” measure permitting aliens to sue U.S. citizens for intentional torts in
federal court.8 These competing views are emblematic of a larger debate over
how best to understand the role of the ATS in the federal system.
Despite the underlying disagreement, transnational human rights litigation
arising under the ATS has persisted. This “modern line” of ATS jurisprudence
dates back to 1980 with the Second Circuit’s watershed decision in Filártiga
v. Peña-Irala, the first case in which a federal court recognized a common law
cause of action under the ATS itself.9 For the Supreme Court, this debate hark-
ens back to its seminal 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the case from
which the current ATS doctrine originates.10 The Sosa Court entrenched the
two Core Controversies by issuing a contradictory holding. First, it declared
the ATS to be a “jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action,”11
basing its conclusion on the fact the ATS was written in jurisdictional lan-
guage and originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.12 Yet the
Court then hedged, holding that the ATS was not meant to be “stillborn” or
a “jurisdictional convenience to be placed on a shelf” until a future Congress
authorized specific causes of action.13 Thus, under the “ambient law” of the era,
the Sosa Court further held that the First Congress would have understood a
“modest number of international law violations” to have been actionable under
the ATS.14 In one fell swoop, a fundamental contradiction was set: the ATS is
strictly jurisdictional while also enabling a narrow set of causes of action in the
form of judicially developed federal common law.15 In the twenty years after
Sosa the Supreme Court has yet to reconcile this contradictory guidance.
6. William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the
Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467, 480 (1986).
7. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the ‘Originalists’, 19
Hastings Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 221, 223 (1996).
8. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 445, 454 (2011).
9. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
11. Id. at 694.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 719.
14. Id. at 724.
15. Id.
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Few areas of law take such diametrically opposing views when it comes
to a statute’s central functions.16 Yet this is commonplace for the ATS in a
post-Sosa world. In fact, most ATS cases play out in a two-tiered manner:
the first-tier addressing the “merits” of the case at hand and the second-tier
addressing a “non-merits” debate about the meaning and scope of the ATS
itself. This results in a common cycle: an opinion and holding is rendered that
relies upon a secondary doctrine, dicta stokes the flame of uncertainty about
the two Core Controversies, and lower federal courts issue conflicting rulings
in their respective districts and circuits.
The Supreme Court’s 2021 ruling in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, its fourth and
most recent ATS decision, illustrates this point.17 There, the Nestlé Court relied
on the “presumption against extraterritoriality” to find that six Malian indi-
viduals who were allegedly trafficked into the Ivory Coast to harvest and pro-
duce cocoa could not assert ATS claims for aiding and abetting child slavery
against two of the largest cocoa producers in the world.18 Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, found that the ATS did not establish a clear indication
that it applies extraterritorially, and because the conduct alleged amounted to
no more than “general corporate activity-like decision making,” there was no
evidence from which an ATS claim could proceed.19 This opinion was emblem-
atic of a first-tier “merits” determination, in which the Nestlé Court utilized a
canon of statutory interpretation to resolve the specific case before it.
But true to form, the second-tier “non-merits” debate took place within the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. On one account, the majority
seemed willing to overrule Sosa altogether. As Justice Thomas wrote, “even
without reexamining Sosa, our existing precedents prohibit us from creating
a cause of action.”20 In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch took a firmer
line. “[T]he time has come,” he wrote, “to jettison the misguided notion that
courts have discretion to create new causes of action under the ATS . . . .”21 As
Justice Gorsuch explained, “[p]erhaps this language was originally understood
to furnish federal courts with authority to entertain a limited number of spe-
cific and existing intentional tort claims that, if left unremedied, could give
rise to reprisals or war. . . . But nothing in the statute’s terse terms obviously
authorizes federal courts to invent new causes of action on their own.”22
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor firmly disagreed. While she acknowledged
that respondents had failed to allege a domestic application of the ATS, she
16. For example, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. __ (2024), the Supreme Court held
that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in
deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, preventing courts from deferring to
an agency interpretation simply because a statute is ambiguous. Id. Despite the enormous consequences
of shifting the balance between administrative agencies and federal courts, there is no dispute over how
the APA works. Contrast this with the ATS where the two Core Controversies lack resolution over forty
years since Filártiga.
17. Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628 (2021).
18. Id. at 634.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 635.
21. Id. at 640 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 643 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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2025 / Law As Integrity and the Alien Tort Statute 5
would not overrule the Sosa doctrine for federal common law. “The First Con-
gress,” she wrote, “enacted the ATS to ensure that federal courts are available
to foreign citizens who suffer international law violations for which other na-
tions may expect the United States to provide a forum for redress.”23 As she
explained, the ATS was “enacted on the understanding that [federal] common
law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of international law
violations.”24 In challenging Justice Thomas’s view that federal courts should
refuse to recognize a cause of action under the ATS, Justice Sotomayor re-
sponded that this view was “unmoored from both history and precedent.”25
Because the First Congress did not pass “the ATS only to leave it lying fallow
indefinitely,” she wrote, “the statute ‘is best read as having been enacted on
the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action’ for
widely recognized torts in violation of the law of nations.”26
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Alito signaled the fraught position
in which current ATS jurisprudence finds itself.27 In addressing the “merits”
debate, Justice Alito wrote that “if a particular claim may be brought under
the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar
claim may be brought against a domestic corporation.”28 However, in likening
the outcome in Nestlé to an unconstitutional “advisory opinion,” Justice Alito
signaled that a reckoning with the ATS may be imminent. “A decision begins
to take on the flavor of an advisory opinion,” he wrote, “when it is necessary
to make so many important assumptions in order to reach the question that is
actually resolved.”29
Over forty years have passed since the Second Circuit’s ruling in Filártiga,
yet the two Core Controversies are no closer to being settled. Instead, the
Nestlé decision provided the clearest indication of the Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to cut its losses, avoid resolving these issues, and close the door to ATS
claims forevermore. But this pivot to a form of constitutional and statutory
avoidance—where a lack of analytical clarity combined with prudential dif-
ficulty results in the affirmative negation of ATS jurisprudence altogether—
cannot suffice in today’s interconnected world. With the fate of transnational
human rights litigation in U.S. courts hanging in the balance, the central
question must be asked: Is there a “correct” or “best” way to set the ATS on a
new course of clarity?
This Article answers in the affirmative, advancing a jurisprudential theory
to resolve the two Core Controversies. The “law as integrity” theory is a non-
positivist approach to understanding the ATS.30 Its central premise states that
23. Id. at 646 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
24. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724)).
25. Id. at 649 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 650 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719).
27. Id. at 657 (Alito, J., dissenting).
28. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 658 (Alito, J., dissenting).
30. The “law as integrity” theory of the ATS falls under the general rubric of “non-positivist” theories
of law, notably that of Ronald Dworkin, who in his later work argued that “integrity” is the outcome of
the proper balance of fit and moral value. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 12–18 (Harv. Univ. Press