This empirical finance article examines whether managers learn from private information embedded in stock prices when making corporate investment decisions. Using 68,277 firm-year observations from 1981 - 2001, it finds that price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN) are positively associated with investment sensitivity to stock price. The results remain robust to controls for managerial information, analyst coverage, financing constraints, firm size, and other characteristics. Both managerial learning and capital constraints appear to contribute to investment - price sensitivity. The authors caution that the learning interpretation depends on whether the information measures capture private information rather than other factors. Published in The Review of Financial Studies, volume 20, number 3 (2007), with advance online publication on July 6, 2006.
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Price Informativeness and Investment
Sensitivity to Stock Price
Qi Chen
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University
Itay Goldstein
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Wei Jiang
Columbia Business School
The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock
price—price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)—have a
strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. More-
over, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and
for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn
from the private information in stock price about their own firms’ fundamentals and
incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our
findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely
that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel
and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity. (JEL G14, G31)
One of the main roles of financial markets is the production and aggregation
of information. This occurs via the trading process that transmits informa-
tion produced by traders for their own speculative trading into market prices
[e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle
(1985)]. The markets’ remarkable ability to produce information that gen-
erates precise predictions about real variables has been demonstrated
empirically in several contexts. Roll (1984) showed that private information
of citrus futures traders regarding weather conditions gets impounded into
citrus futures’ prices, so that prices improve even public predictions of the
weather. Relatedly, the literature on prediction markets has shown that
We thank Brad Barber, Alon Brav, David Easley, Simon Gervais, Larry Glosten, John Graham,
Campbell Harvey, Florian Heider, Charlie Himmelberg, Laurie Hodrick, Burton Hollifield, Gur Huberman,
Soeren Hvidkjaer, Roni Michaely, Robert Neal, Jeremy Stein, Clara Vega, S. Viswanathan, Jeff Wurgler,
Yun Zhang, and, in particular, Maureen O’Hara (the editor), and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments and discussions. We also thank seminar participants at Duke University, the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Virginia, Columbia–NYU joint seminar, the University
of California at Davis, London Business School, and participants at the following conferences: The 14th
Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting at Indiana University; The 6th Texas Finance
Festival and the 1st conference of the Financial Intermediation Research Society. Address correspondence to
Itay Goldstein, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2300 Steinberg Hall - Dietrich Hall, 3620
Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, or e-mail: itayg@wharton.upenn.edu.
Ó The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights
reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl024 Advance Access publication July 6, 2006
Page 2
markets provide better predictions than polls and other devices [see
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)].
The theoretical literature in corporate finance has argued that managers
can learn from the information in stock price about the prospects of their
own firms. Two prominent examples of this theory are Dow and Gorton
(1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999).1 The idea behind the theory
is that stock prices aggregate information from many different participants
who do not have channels for communication with the firm outside the
trading process. Thus, stock prices may contain some information that
managers do not have.2 This information, in turn, can guide managers in
making corporate decisions, such as the decision on corporate investments.
This theory has far-reaching implications for the role of financial markets
as it implies that financial markets affect the real economy and are not just
a sideshow [see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Stein (2003)].
In this article, we empirically assess the hypothesis that managers learn
from the private information in stock price when they make corporate
investment decisions. We do so by examining the relation between measures
of the amount of private information in stock price and the sensitivity of
corporate investment to price. The learning hypothesis predicts a positive
relation based on the following reasoning. It is commonly believed that stock
prices reflect public information and private information about firms’ fun-
damentals. The private information gets into the price via speculators’
trading activities. If, at a given point in time, managers decide on the level
of investment attempting to maximize the expected value of the firm, they
will use all information available to them at that point. This includes both the
information in the stock price and other information that managers have and
that has not found its way to the price yet. In this environment, investment
will be more sensitive to stock price when the price provides more informa-
tion that is new to managers. Information that managers already had will
move the price but not affect the investment decision (as it already affected
past investments) and thus will decrease the sensitivity of investment to price.
Based on this reasoning, an empirical finding of a positive relation between
the investment sensitivity to stock price and the amount of private informa-
tion incorporated into the price by speculators would imply that the private
information in price is new to managers and that managers look at the price
to learn this information and use it in their investment decisions.
Key to our empirical analysis is determining when stock prices contain
more private information. In equilibrium, different stocks may have
different amounts of private information in their prices due, for example,
1 See also Dye and Sridhar (2002), Dow and Rahi (2003), and Goldstein and Guembel (2005).
2 This information is more likely to be about the demand for the firm’s products or about strategic issues,
such as competition with other firms. It is less likely to be about the technology used by the firm, because
the manager is expected to have an informational advantage about technological factors.
The Review of Financial Studies / v 20 n 3 2007
620
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to different costs of private information production [see Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980)]. While such costs are difficult to measure directly, two
strands of the finance literature have come up with measures to assess the
equilibrium level of private information in price based on the resulting
price and trading behaviors. We use two such measures for our empirical
analysis.
The first measure is price nonsynchronicity. This measure was first
proposed by Roll (1988) and recently developed by Morck, Yeung, and
Yu (2000), Durnev et al. (2003), and Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004).
It is computed on the basis of the correlation between the stock’s return
and the return of the corresponding industry and of the market. The idea
is that if a firm’s stock return is strongly correlated with the market and
industry returns, then the firm’s stock price is less likely to convey firm-
specific information, which is useful for managerial investment decisions.
Thus, the measure will be higher when the return on the stock is less
correlated with the market and industry returns. There is a large body of
empirical work demonstrating the information content captured by this
measure (a detailed review is provided in Section 1). Moreover, the
seminal paper by Roll (1988) showed unambiguously that this measure
has very little correlation with public news, and thus, it seems to capture
private information. In Roll’s own words, he suggests that, based on his
results, it seems that ‘‘the financial press misses a great deal of relevant
information generated privately.’’
The second measure, probability of informed trading ðPINÞ, utilizes
information from the trading process. The measure was developed in
Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996 1997a,b) and used in many other articles
(a detailed review is provided in Section 1). Based on a structural market
microstructure model, this measure directly captures the probability of
informed trading in a stock. Thus, the composition of information for
stocks with high PIN is coming more from private sources than from
public sources. This idea is consistent with the finding of Easley, Hvidk-
jaer, and O’Hara (2002) that stocks with high PIN earn higher returns that
compensate investors for the high risk of private information.
We find that both measures are strongly positively correlated with the
sensitivity of investment to price, consistent with the hypothesis that stock
prices with large content of private information provide managers with
more new information, which, in turn, affects managers’ investment
decisions. Two clarifications about this conclusion are in order. First,
we do not wish to imply that only the private information in stock price is
new to managers. Clearly, some public information—such as the realiza-
tion of GDP or the success or the failure of a patent application—get
reflected in stock price at the same time when it is revealed to managers
via public sources and thus is new to managers. Our results only suggest
that, on average, the private information of speculators increases the
Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price
621
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amount of information in price that is new to managers and thus the
extent to which managers rely on the price when they make their invest-
ment decisions. Second, our results do not imply that stock prices with
large content of private information are closer to fundamental value. The
distance of a price from fundamental value depends on the total amount
of information in the price, not just the amount of private information. In
fact, as the incorporation of private information into price is a process
that takes time, it might be that stock prices with more private and less
public information are farther away from fundamentals. Still, our results
suggest that the private information in price makes price more informa-
tive to managers, in the sense that it is new to managers and thus affects
their investment decisions.
We perform more tests to assess the validity of this conclusion. First, our
conclusion implies that price nonsynchronicity and PIN measure the private
information in price that is not otherwise available to managers. We assess
this more directly by controlling for the amount of managerial information
with two different proxies. The first proxy is firms’ insider trading activ-
ities. The idea is that on average, managers with more private information
are more likely to trade and thus greater activity represents more manage-
rial information. The second proxy is earnings surprises, measured as the
absolute abnormal return around earnings announcement dates. As man-
agers know the earnings before they are released to the public, this variable
captures information that managers have before it is reflected in the price.
We find that both insider trading and earnings surprises are negatively
correlated with the sensitivity of investment to price, consistent with the
idea that managers are expected to rely less strongly on the price in their
investment decision when they have more private information on their
own. More importantly, we find that the effects of price nonsynchronicity
and PIN on the investment-to-price sensitivity remain equally strong in the
presence of the proxies for managerial information. Thus, to the extent
that insider trading and earnings surprises are good proxies for managerial
private information, this result suggests that our measures of private
information in price reflect some information that is not already known
to managers and thus lends more support to the idea that managers learn
from prices. Second, we examine the relation between the amount of
private information in price and firms’ future operating performance. A
positive relation is expected if the private information in price helps
managers make better investment decisions. We find that our measures
of private information in price have significantly positive relations to firms’
ex post performance as measured by return on assets (ROA), sales growth
and assets turnover rate.
Another result that we find is related to the role of financial analysts.
We show that the sensitivity of investment to price decreases in the
amount of analyst coverage a firm gets. This implies that the information
The Review of Financial Studies / v 20 n 3 2007
622
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released by analysts and impounded in the stock price does not have
much effect on managers’ investment decisions. This result is consistent
with empirical evidence suggesting that a large fraction of the information
analysts have come from firm managers, especially for our sample period
which was before Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) took effect [see,
e.g., Bailey et al. (2003), Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006), Hutton
(2005), and others]. Thus, analyst information is expected to move price
and improve the overall information content of price. However, as man-
agers already know the information produced by analysts, they do not
adjust their investments to it when it gets reflected in the price, and this
results in a lower sensitivity of investment to price. On top of that, as
argued by Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman (1998), the presence of analysts
can attract more noise trading to the stock. This reduces the content of
private information in the stock price and thus decreases the sensitivity of
investment to price even further.
We relate our findings to the literature in economics and finance that
documents a strong positive correlation between stock prices and corpo-
rate investments. While many articles document this correlation [see
Barro (1990), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Blanchard, Rhee, and
Summers (1993)], the reasons behind it are still under debate. Our find-
ings suggest that an important factor contributing to the correlation
between stock price and corporate investment is that managers incorpo-
rate what they learn from the private information in price in their invest-
ment decisions. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) have shown that the
sensitivity of investment to price increases in the level of capital con-
straints faced by the firm. The idea is that financing constraints prevent
firms from pursuing their optimal investment plans and that an increase
in stock price may ease these constraints and thus enable firms to increase
investments. To relate our results to those reported by Baker, Stein, and
Wurgler (2003), we conduct our analysis on five quintile subsamples
sorted by the degree of capital constraints. We show that both the capital
constraints and the amount of private information in price have a role in
generating the investment-to-price sensitivity and that each factor affects
different firms to a different degree.
We consider several other robustness issues in the article. The most
important one concerns the effect of firm size. Both our measures of private
information in price are negatively correlated with firm size. Firm size, in
turn, may affect the sensitivity of investment to price for reasons unrelated to
the amount of private information reflected in the price. Thus, to ensure that
our results are not driven by firm size, we conduct our analysis on five
quintile subsamples sorted by firm size. We also control for size directly in
our main regressions by including it as an additional variable. In both these
tests, we find that private information in price remains important after size is
controlled for. We also control for other factors such as diversification and
Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price
623
Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price: summary, contents and background
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Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price is a 32-page documentcredited to Dara O. Alder. This empirical finance article examines whether managers learn from private information embedded in stock prices when making corporate investment decisions. Using 68,277 firm-year observations from 1981 - 2001, it finds that price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN) are positively associated with investment sensitivity to stock price. The results remain robust to controls for managerial information, analyst coverage, financing constraints, firm size, and other characteristics. Both managerial learning and capital constraints appear to contribute to investment - price sensitivity. The authors caution that the learning interpretation depends on whether the information measures capture private information rather than other factors. Published in The Review of Financial Studies, volume 20, number 3 (2007), with advance online publication on July 6, 2006. It appears in the Business & Economics collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.
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Part 1
Corporate finance
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Part 2
Stock price informativeness
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Part 3
Corporate investment
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Part 4
Private information
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Part 5
Managerial learning
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Part 6
Price nonsynchronicity
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Probability of informed trading
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Financing constraints
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