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When It Rains, It Pours: Cyber Vulnerability and Financial Conditions Thomas M. Eisenbach | Anna Kovner | Michael Junho Lee N O . 1 0 2 2 J U N E 2 0 2 2 R E V I S E D A U G U S T 2 0 2 3
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report no. 1022, published in June 2022 and revised in August 2023, examines how systemic cyber vulnerability varies with financial conditions. Using Fedwire payment data and hypothetical cyberattack scenarios, the authors find that financial stress increases the potential systemic impact of payment disruptions through greater payment activity, concentration, and intraday liquidity stress. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the estimated average impact of an attack on a top-five bank was approximately 50 percent greater than during the rest of 2020. The paper discusses how reserves, emergency liquidity, and emergency payment processing could mitigate disruptions, and argues that cyber resilience should be calibrated to adverse financial conditions.
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When It Rains, It Pours: Cyber Vulnerability and Financial Conditions Thomas M. Eisenbach | Anna Kovner | Michael Junho Lee N O . 1 0 2 2 J U N E 2 0 2 2 R E V I S E D A U G U S T 2 0 2 3
When It Rains, It Pours: Cyber Vulnerability and Financial Conditions Thomas M. Eisenbach, Anna Kovner, and Michael Junho Lee Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 1022 June 2022; revised August 2023 JEL classification: G12, G21, G28 Abstract We analyze how systemic cyber risk relates to the financial cycle and show that the potential impact of a cyber attack is systematically greater during stressed financial conditions. This is true over the past two decades and particularly at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when changes in payment activity increased vulnerability by approximately 50 percent relative to the rest of 2020 through more concentration and intraday liquidity stress. We evaluate the effectiveness of policy interventions used to stabilize markets at mitigating cyber vulnerability. We argue that cyber and other financial shocks cannot be treated as uncorrelated vulnerabilities and policy solutions for cyber need to be calibrated for adverse financial conditions. Keywords: cyber, banks, networks, payments, COVID-19 _________________ Eisenbach, Kovner, Lee: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (emails: thomas.eisenbach@ny.frb.org; anna.kovner@ny.frb.org; michael.j.lee@ny.frb.org). The authors thank Danny Brando, Victoria Ivashina, and Stacey Schreft, as well as audience participants at the New York Fed, the Columbia University Cyber Risk to Financial Stability Workshop, and the Bank of Canada Economics of Payments Conference for useful comments. They also thank Ryan Craver for outstanding research assistance. This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author(s). To view the authors’ disclosure statements, visit https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1022.html.
1 Introduction Much attention has been paid to the way in which cyber risk may be amplified by the financial system (e.g. Duffie and Younger, 2019; Kashyap and Wetherilt, 2019; Aldasoro et al., 2020a). Existing work tends to treat cyber incidents and financial conditions as in- dependent factors, or only considers how cyber incidents may negatively affect financial conditions. In this paper, we explore how systemic cyber risk varies over the financial cy- cle, and in particular, whether cyber should be viewed as uncorrelated to other financial vulnerabilities. In other words, when it rains and negative shocks lead to financial market dislocations, does it also pour by increasing the systemic vulnerability to a cyber attack? We find that cyber risk changes with financial conditions, and thus expand our un- derstanding of the systemic implications of cyber risk on two key dimensions. First, at an individual financial institution level, our paper provides an explicit framework to under- stand and quantify the implications of an attack over the financial cycle, as well as assess options to increase resiliency. Second, our analysis sheds light on externalities across fi- nancial institutions in financial stress. Given that individual institutions are unlikely to internalize externalities associated with shoring up defenses, we estimate that the cyber vulnerability of the financial system will likely be amplified when financial conditions are adverse. If cyber risk and its amplifications are unrelated to financial risks, financial institutions may gravitate towards considering modal outcomes in order to estimate potential costs. This would place cyber risk with other forms of operational risk unrelated to financial con- ditions, such as severe weather. However, if cyber risk and its systemic spillovers co-move with financial risks, then cyber resilience should be calibrated to a stressed environment. To the extent that the likelihood of government intervention is higher at a time of financial stress, this may present a further wedge between an individual firm’s cost of cyber risk and the societal cost of a significant cyber event. In this paper we examine how the consequences of a cyber attack evolve over the finan- cial cycle, and in particular, during periods of financial stress. We begin with cyber risk, the risk of loss from computer systems and digital technologies (Brando et al., 2022; Curti et al., 2023). This loss could arise from any of a number of attack methods, including denial of service (DoS) attacks, whereby a firm’s website access is impaired, ransomware attacks, whereby an attacker prevent access to data and/or systems, and firm email compromise for fraudulent requests, all of which were identified by the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) as potential threats.1 Another method by which 1See https://www.fsisac.com/hubfs/NavigatingCyber-2023/NavigatingCyber2023-Final.pdf 1
a cyber attack could affect the financial system is through an attack on components in the financial supply chain such as to key service providers, for example as seen in the 2023 attack on ION Markets which affected some customers’ ability to book and process derivatives trades. We find that the systemic consequences of a successful cyber attack are higher at times when markets are more volatile and when financial intermediary balance sheets are strained. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 offers a unique opportunity to study how cyber vulnerability is affected by financial markets volatility, because the shock is unrelated to financial institutions’ business models. This period is also unique because it marks the first economic downturn since the global financial crisis, and the first episode of extreme market turmoil in an ample reserves regime.2 The increased market volatility brought upon by the pandemic shock is also plausibly exogenous to the underlying cyber environment. Further, the episode is instructive with respect to the importance of techno- logical access and resiliency, as many financial institutions shifted to working from home, and have potentially increased the points at which cyber vulnerabilities can be exploited. In order to estimate the impact of a cyber attack we adapt the methodology of Eisen- bach, Kovner, and Lee (2022, hereafter EKL), using a scenario based approach to evaluate financial stability risks of cyber attacks amplified through the Fedwire Funds wholesale payment network. To date, there has not been a cyber event with truly systemic conse- quences on the U.S. financial system. In the absence of actual examples, the wholesale payment network is a natural setting to study cyber vulnerabilities in a financial system. Wholesale payment activity is intimately linked to broad financial system activity, pro- vides a holistic view of liquidity flows between key financial institutions, and offers high- frequency information on aggregate and institution-level liquidity stress. In this approach, we assume that an attack has occurred and then calculate the likely transmission of that attack to other participants in the U.S. financial system, thus quantifying the systemic ex- ternalities. Subsequent studies have applied the EKL methodology in other countries (e.g. Kosse and Lu, 2022) and confirmed that key dynamics implied by the methodology played out in an actual cyber attack on a U.S. financial service provider (Kotidis and Schreft, 2022). March 2020 was marked by sudden severe stress across asset classes and global finan- cial markets (e.g. Federal Reserve Board, 2020; Haddad, Moreira, and Muir, 2021). We show that wholesale payment activity increased along with financial market volatility, became more concentrated, and showed signs of intraday liquidity stress. The financial 2Under the ample reserves regime, the aggregate quantity of reserves is intended to be above what is needed for payment purposes, at least during normal times (e.g Logan, 2020). 2
market stresses in this time period were unusually large, and the speed of the market reaction as well as the global coordination of the financial market deterioration were un- precedented. However, we show that the three indicators of cyber vulnerability observed during this episode are generalizable features of financial market stresses. In particular, we find that the relationship between strains in wholesale payment activity and market uncertainty is a robust feature of the past two decades. We find that cyber vulnerability, defined as the likely amplification through the inter- ruption of payments flows, was elevated in late February and early March 2020, with the average impact of a cyber attack on one of the largest five banks about 50% greater than the impact of an attack would have been in the rest of 2020. In scenarios where banks hoard liquidity in response to irregular payment flows, forgone payment activity in March 2020 is nearly three times greater than levels outside of March, implying that an attack at a time when financial markets are dislocated would be particularly painful. This additional im- pact from hoarding emphasizes the way in which externalities could be further amplified by the U.S. payments system’s strategic complementaries.3 Further, we find that delayed recovery from an attack can significantly increase system-level impact: The liquidity short- fall of other banks in the system jumps from $160 billion to roughly $1.5 trillion if an attack lasts for five days instead of one.4 Increasing digitization is accompanied by increasing cyber risk which unconditionally raises financial stability risks. While there is substantial technical literature on cyber de- fenses and documenting attacks, this paper abstracts from consideration of the intensity or probability of an attack. That said, it is worth noting that cyber attacks in pursuit of geopolitical goals may coincide with financial volatility, for example as when Russia in- vaded Ukraine in 2022. To the extent that we document that there is more amplification when financial markets are also stressed, geopolitically motivated attacks timed for max- imum damage would also become more likely. In the case of a shock arising from geopo- litical conflict, accompanying cyber warfare can be destabilizing. The March 2020 period showed both increasing potential amplification from a cyber attack and increasing financial market volatility, offering a window for a cyber attack to inflict significant damage. However, we find that official sector interventions to stabilize markets had a mitigating effect on cyber vulnerability, with a decline in hypothetical net- work impact that starts in the second week of March. This timing corresponds to large 3For example, Afonso et al. (2022) find that persistent evidence of intraday strategic payment delays even in normal times. 4See Chen et al. (2020), who find strong evidence that payment disruptions could have long-term eco- nomic consequences. 3
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Adam Smith
Yusuf B. Northcote
Author not identified
Yusuf E. Oakfield
Soren K. Sandford