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This United States chapter assesses national cyber power through strategy and doctrine, governance and command structures, intelligence capabilities, digital economic strength, cyber security and resilience, international leadership, and offensive operations. It describes substantial US advantages in technology, intelligence partnerships and cyber capabilities while highlighting vulnerabilities arising from digital dependence, global supply chains and persistent threats. The assessment discusses defending forward, persistent engagement and the Cyber Deterrence Initiative, noting that the full potential of US offensive cyber capabilities remains largely undemonstrated.

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CYBER CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL POWER: A Net Assessment 15 1. United States Dominance in cyberspace has been a strategic goal of the United States since the mid-1990s. It is the only country with a heavy global footprint in both civil and military uses of cyberspace, although it now perceives itself as seriously threatened by China and Russia in that domain. In response, it is taking a robust and urgent approach to extending its capabilities for cyber operations, both for sys- tems security at home and for its ambitions abroad in the diplomatic, political, economic and military spheres. The US retains a clear superiority over all other countries in terms of its ICT empowerment, but this is not a monopoly position. At least six European or Asian countries command leadership positions in certain aspects of the ICT sector, though all but one (China) are close US allies or strategic partners. The US has moved more effec- tively than any other country to defend its critical national infrastructure in cyberspace but recog- nises that the task is extremely difficult and that major weaknesses remain. This is one reason why the country has for more than two decades taken a leading role in mobilising the global community to develop common security principles in cyberspace. The US capability for offensive cyber operations is probably more developed than that of any other country, although its full potential remains largely undemonstrated. List of acronyms CDI Cyber Deterrence Initiative CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency DHS Department of Homeland Security DNI Director of National Intelligence DoD Department of Defense ICT information and communications technology ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center ITU International Telecommunication Union NSA National Security Agency NSC National Security Council ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence Strategy and doctrine The United States has a series of well-developed national strategies for defence and security in cyberspace that has been maturing for more than 30 years. There are three broad directions: homeland defence, low-intensity con- flict and high-intensity war. These are captured in rel- evant sections of the 2017 ‘National Security Strategy of the United States’,1 the 2018 ‘Cyber Strategy of the United States’2 and the 2018 ‘Department of Defense Cyber Strategy’.3 These are supported by policy statements and doctrine manuals that run to several thousand pages. To complement and buttress the national-security strategies, the US has also been developing its civil-sector cyber-security policy since the mid-1990s, initially with a focus on countering cyber crime and preventing losses to the corporate sector. Its formal strategy of 2018 has been followed by a very large number of executive orders (including one on former president Donald Trump’s penultimate day in office),4 policy statements, action plans and other decisions. Throughout the last three decades there has been a sharp and intensifying concern

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16 The International Institute for Strategic Studies about protecting the country’s critical information infra- structure (the cyber aspects of what most other countries simply refer to as ‘critical infrastructure’ or, as in the United Kingdom, ‘critical national infrastructure’).5 Key stakeholders (business, academics, government, state authorities, defence interests, the National Guard and privacy-protection groups) have become highly mobi- lised around ensuring an integrated national response, covering the human as well as the technical challenges involved in improving cyber security. The concern has been to plug the gaps that had resulted in spectacular leaks of state secrets, theft of intellectual property, foreign interference through cyberspace in US politics, and the poor cyber-security performance of many sectors of the economy and society. In military affairs, the US aims to provide cyber- attack options in all phases of operations and at every level of command.6 On the defensive side, the aim is to ensure that cyber defences are wide-ranging, robust and highly resilient. In both regards the US has made more progress than any other country. However, in the event of a major conflict, it remains the case that the US – including its military – could be severely damaged by cyber attacks, given the coun- try’s high degree of digital dependence. Comprehensive defence in cyberspace would be difficult or perhaps impossible to ensure in wartime.7 The US international strategy for cyberspace in peace and war – as framed by the head of US Cyber Command, General Paul Nakasone – is to ‘achieve and maintain cyberspace superiority’.8 This formulation also precisely captures the intention of the country’s political leaders. The 2018 Department of Defense (DoD) strategy for cyberspace offers additional detail.9 In it, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff set near-term objectives that recognise the limitations of current cyberspace capabilities, both offensive and defensive, with a clear view that offensive cyber operations will be directed towards maximising existing advantages, whether kinetic or informational. Since the main positive impact of extensive and detailed planning for cyberspace operations is the potential for nationwide mobilisation of resources, both for daily operations and emergencies, the US is clearly in a highly advanced position in this regard. The strate- gies and policies are comprehensive, as well as widely and effectively disseminated. Significant sections of government, the armed forces, the business commu- nity, civil society and academia are engaged in develop- ing those strategies and executing them. The strategies also recognise how rapidly the circumstances of cyber- space are changing and the huge complexities that must be overcome in exploiting adversary weaknesses. The speed at which the cyber threat has continued to evolve has proven highly disruptive even to a policy process as advanced as that of the US. A key component of the 2018 cyber strategy is its Cyber Deterrence Initiative (CDI).10 This states that the US will work closely with allies in responding to cyber attacks (including through intelligence-sharing), attrib- uting attacks, formulating public statements of support for actions taken and jointly impos- ing consequences against those responsible. While the national cyber strategy makes it clear that there are many non-cyber ways to retaliate, the 2018 DoD strategy sets out the role US cyber operations are intended to play in assertively defending national interests. These include ‘defending forward’ on adversary networks in order to pre-empt attacks, and competing constantly with adversary cyber operators (‘persistent engagement’). Governance, command and control The US has been a world leader in promoting and practising multi-stakeholder governance of security in cyberspace, doing so in a way that owes much to its liberal political culture and institutions and to robust opposition by the corporate sector to regula- tion of private businesses. The latter factor is particu- larly relevant to the protection of critical infrastructure since most of it is in the hands of private businesses. The federal character of the national political system assigns to the 50 states, alongside other small politi- cal entities and administrations, significant roles in national cyber security, especially in countering cyber crime and in education. Cyber governance in the US is highly pluralistic. Cyber governance in the US is highly pluralistic

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CYBER CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL POWER: A Net Assessment 17 In US cyber policy there are many channels of execu- tive authority that flow from the president: the intel- ligence community, the armed forces, departments of state (Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Energy and Transport) and other agencies (such as National Laboratories). These are all coordinated through the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the president, and its Principals Committee, chaired by the national security advisor.11 For civil-sector cyber security, the federal govern- ment has had two main channels for its policymaking. The first is in the White House, through the cyber direc- tor on the staff of the NSC. The president is directly supported by the homeland security advisor (serv- ing under the national security advisor) and a deputy national security advisor for cyber security and emerg- ing technology.12 The second channel is outside the White House, through the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a full member of the NSC, and a new organisation set up in 2018 under DHS, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). These agencies rely on a long-standing policy of mobi- lising (or sometimes effectively co-opting) private-sector and public participation in their initiatives. One vehicle for this has been the president’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council, which brings together senior execu- tives from the private sector and state and local govern- ments to advise on how to reduce ‘physical and cyber risks and improve the security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors’.13 The agencies have introduced a range of strategic initiatives, including the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),14 the first of which was created during the presidency of Bill Clinton; the Cyber Risk and Resilience Review framework,15 jointly devised in 2009 by the DHS and Carnegie Mellon University; and the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, an organisation within the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the Department of Commerce. In the development of command and control for cyber operations, two main trends have been discern- ible: a filling of policy gaps through the creation of new organisations and/or posts for a wide range of missions and responsibilities, and a gradual decentralisation of authority for offensive operations. The unifying pur- pose has been to improve the capability and effective- ness of defence and offence in cyberspace. The US has invested heavily in these changes. For the 2021 fiscal year the government requested US$18.7 billion for spe- cific security initiatives.16 For national-security policy in cyberspace, there are many departments and agencies involved in authoris- ing, commanding and controlling cyber operations. In addition to the White House and DHS, the most important are the DoD, as it contains the National Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command; the State Department; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which coordinates all the intel- ligence agencies; and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which reports directly to the president while coordinating with the DNI. For military planning and operations, the command- and-control arrangements match those of all military activities. The president is the commander-in-chief, to whom the unified (theatre/domain) commands and the single-service chiefs (army, navy, air force and marines) report. The function of commander-in-chief is exercised through the secretary of defense, under a mechanism called the National Command Authority. In 2012, then- president Barack Obama ordered that offensive cyber operations conducted by the military required multi- agency agreement and presidential authorisation. In 2018, in response to sustained cyber attacks on the US below the threshold of armed conflict, then-president Trump approved the CDI and in a classified directive provided for the devolution of authority for offensive cyber operations to various agencies in certain cases. Within the DoD, the list of cyber agencies with oper- ational and capability-development roles is a long one, including single-service cyber commands and the DoD chief information officer, responsible for securing all DoD computerised systems (not including deployed weapons platforms, which are managed by the single- service cyber commands or combatant commands). Governance of cyber policy in the US is enriched by the diversity of talents and interests represented in the various powerful institutions that are involved. Policy is inevitably consensus-based and therefore perhaps less focused than in other, less pluralistic systems, but

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18 The International Institute for Strategic Studies there is larger buy-in by stakeholders throughout the US system. Since it is based on strict observance of the law, the US system is highly predictable, though there- fore more constrained than in countries where the law is less respected or more arbitrary. Command-and-control arrangements are worked out in exquisite detail, with high levels of redundancy built in, and with command nodes enjoying a high degree of intelligence support. Core cyber-intelligence capability There is copious public evidence indicating the world- leading sophistication, breadth and depth of US core cyber-intelligence capabilities. These are centred on the extensive military-led cyber capabilities of the NSA, the complementary civilian-led cyber capabilities of the CIA, with its covert overseas remit, and those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with its domestic-security remit. The director of the NSA also heads the US mili- tary’s Cyber Command, and both organisations have cyber-intelligence, cyber-security and offensive cyber functions so as to maximise the synergies across such closely related activities. Core US cyber-intelligence capabilities are enhanced further through many inter- national intelligence partnerships, with the long-estab- lished Five Eyes alliance as the centrepiece. The Five Eyes is arguably the most powerful international intelligence partnership in history. The US intelligence agencies collaborate exten- sively with private-sector firms and universities for the development and evaluation of key technologies.17 The extent of civil–military and private–public integration can be seen in the March 2019 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on the future directions the intelligence community could take in order to adapt to, or exploit, rapidly changing technologies.18 The very tight integration of govern- ment, industry and academia in shaping the US intel- ligence capability is unmatched in scale, focus and investment by any other country, including China. The country’s cyber-intelligence capability also benefits from the maturity and scope of the centralised process for all-source intelligence fusion and assessment. With an annual budget request of US$85bn for the 2021 fiscal year, and the involvement of multiple government departments in addition to the three core intelligence agencies, the size and complexity of the US intelligence- and-security community make it notoriously difficult to coordinate, even following the post-9/11 creation of the ODNI, which was designed to address the problem. Cyber empowerment and dependence The US remains the most powerful country in terms of ICT capability, whether gauged by the size of its digi- tal economy, its leading role in global innovation or the unrivalled partnership between industry, government and academia. Global consumer demand for US ICT has led to the unprecedented commercial success of com- panies such as Apple, Google and Microsoft, which has in turn stimulated their shaping of the future of cyber- space through their extensive investment in research and development (R&D). The result is a high degree of global dependence on US commercial products and intellectual property, with the technology involved in computer microchips, undersea communication cables, communication satellites and cloud computing being prime examples. The other side of the coin is that the US economy and civil infrastructure are more dependent on cyberspace than those of most other countries, and therefore more vulnerable in many respects.19 The US is a world leader in both personal and busi- ness use of the internet and mobile technology. The level of demand has contributed to domestic innova- tion, which has in turn fuelled even higher demand. The US digital economy is the biggest in the world. According to the standard methods used by the US government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, the digital economy contributed 9% of the country’s GDP in 2018.20 But this estimate excludes the output of sectors where large amounts of wealth are generated by ICT products and services, such as financial services. It is not possible to gauge the full strength of the US digital and cyber economy just by using the traditional ICT output data from the national accounts for the ICT sector.21 Other sectors of the US economy – such as agriculture, bank- ing and healthcare – leverage ICT goods and services to create their own innovations and wealth in ways that are not included in national statistics for the ICT sector.22 For example, every day in the US, trillions of dollars’ worth of financial transactions are conducted in ways that are only possible because of ICT systems.23 One of

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CYBER CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL POWER: A Net Assessment 19 the favoured techniques is algorithmic trading of stocks, derivatives and currency, where ICT systems are pre- set to buy and sell according to certain pre-determined parameters. This has resulted in a new form of auto- mated, high-speed wealth creation, making the US the global centre for ‘digital capitalism’.24 Using the broader measure of the digital economy adopted by the G20,25 the digital economy’s share of US GDP is about 60%.26 Overall, it is clear that the US enjoys a significant level of cyber empowerment compared with all other countries. Some countries, including China, aspire to emulate US achievements in this regard. In fact, between 2013 and 2016, according to an estimate by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), China was already one of the five countries – together with the US, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea – that together produced at least 70%, and in some cases almost 100%, of the patents for each of the 25 new technologies considered by the OECD to repre- sent the ‘digital technology frontier’.27 However, the US share of global production was greater than China’s for all but two of those technologies (control arrangements and organic-materials devices).28 The strength of US digital services lies largely in their culture of technical expertise and innovation-led investment. The US is home to 59 of the universities in the Times Higher Education list of the global top 200 (see Table 1.1, which includes only the countries that fea- ture in this report), and its tech and entrepreneurship ecosystem has no equal. According to one industry sur- vey, there were 65,321 start-ups listed in the US in 2019, which was approximately nine times the number in the second-placed country, India.29 Table 1.1. Universities in the Times Higher Education global top 200, 202130 US 59 UK 29 China (incl. Hong Kong) 12 Australia 12 Canada 8 France 5 Japan 2 Israel 1 Private investment in the US high-tech sector has been a central part of this dominance in a way not matched by any other country. In 2019, the available data suggested that total venture-capital investment in the US was more than three times greater than in China (US$135bn versus US$40bn).31 In the 2020 IMD World Competitiveness Ranking, which assesses a country’s ability to ‘adopt and explore digital tech- nologies’ across government, business and wider society, the US was in tenth place and China was in 20th.32 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the US accounts for 68% of the market-capitalisation value of the world’s 70 larg- est digital platforms, compared with China’s 22%.33 In terms of its share of total global spending on R&D, using a purchasing-power-parity estimate, the US was in first place in 2019, just ahead of China.34 Taking the last two decades as a whole, the gap between the two countries is much wider, with US R&D investment almost double that of China, and the impact of that ear- lier spending remains significant today. Taking investment in and outputs from research in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) as an important proxy indicator of cyber empowerment, we can see several trends. Between 2008 and 2017, US venture-capital invest- ments in AI outpaced those in China (US$694bn versus US$185bn).35 China overtook the US in 2018, but later that year its entire venture-capital sector suffered a col- lapse. In terms of research, in 2016 the 28 European Union member states and the US were responsible for the two greatest shares of highly cited AI-related publications, 23% and 15% respectively, but those shares declined to 17% and 12% in 2018.36 China overtook both, with a share of 28% in 2018, while India’s share skyrocketed to 11%. (Note, however, that this ranking demonstrates scientific achievement rather than economic power, since open- source publications are available to be used in any coun- try, not just the one in which they were produced. And in most cases the researchers producing such publications are likely to include some foreigners, so in that sense the scientific achievement does not belong entirely to the source country.) Overall, the statistics do not capture the quality and dynamism of the US AI sector, which was demonstrated in 2018, for example, by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s creation of a special school of

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Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment - 1. United States is a 13-page documentcredited to Gideon P. Oakfield. This United States chapter assesses national cyber power through strategy and doctrine, governance and command structures, intelligence capabilities, digital economic strength, cyber security and resilience, international leadership, and offensive operations. It describes substantial US advantages in technology, intelligence partnerships and cyber capabilities while highlighting vulnerabilities arising from digital dependence, global supply chains and persistent threats. The assessment discusses defending forward, persistent engagement and the Cyber Deterrence Initiative, noting that the full potential of US offensive cyber capabilities remains largely undemonstrated. It appears in the Politics & Government collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.

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    United States

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    Cyber power

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    National security

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    Cyber strategy

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    Cyber intelligence

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    Digital economy

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