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CYBER CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL POWER: A Net Assessment 15
1. United States
Dominance in cyberspace has been a strategic goal
of the United States since the mid-1990s. It is the
only country with a heavy global footprint in both
civil and military uses of cyberspace, although it
now perceives itself as seriously threatened by
China and Russia in that domain. In response, it is
taking a robust and urgent approach to extending
its capabilities for cyber operations, both for sys-
tems security at home and for its ambitions abroad
in the diplomatic, political, economic and military
spheres. The US retains a clear superiority over all
other countries in terms of its ICT empowerment,
but this is not a monopoly position. At least six
European or Asian countries command leadership
positions in certain aspects of the ICT sector,
though all but one (China) are close US allies or
strategic partners. The US has moved more effec-
tively than any other country to defend its critical
national infrastructure in cyberspace but recog-
nises that the task is extremely difficult and that
major weaknesses remain. This is one reason why
the country has for more than two decades taken a
leading role in mobilising the global community to
develop common security principles in cyberspace.
The US capability for offensive cyber operations is
probably more developed than that of any other
country, although its full potential remains largely
undemonstrated.
List of acronyms
CDI Cyber Deterrence Initiative
CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DoD Department of Defense
ICT information and communications technology
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
ITU International Telecommunication Union
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Strategy and doctrine
The United States has a series of well-developed national
strategies for defence and security in cyberspace that has
been maturing for more than 30 years. There are three
broad directions: homeland defence, low-intensity con-
flict and high-intensity war. These are captured in rel-
evant sections of the 2017 ‘National Security Strategy of
the United States’,1 the 2018 ‘Cyber Strategy of the United
States’2 and the 2018 ‘Department of Defense Cyber
Strategy’.3 These are supported by policy statements and
doctrine manuals that run to several thousand pages.
To complement and buttress the national-security
strategies, the US has also been developing its civil-sector
cyber-security policy since the mid-1990s, initially with a
focus on countering cyber crime and preventing losses to
the corporate sector. Its formal strategy of 2018 has been
followed by a very large number of executive orders
(including one on former president Donald Trump’s
penultimate day in office),4 policy statements, action
plans and other decisions. Throughout the last three
decades there has been a sharp and intensifying concern
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16 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
about protecting the country’s critical information infra-
structure (the cyber aspects of what most other countries
simply refer to as ‘critical infrastructure’ or, as in the
United Kingdom, ‘critical national infrastructure’).5 Key
stakeholders (business, academics, government, state
authorities, defence interests, the National Guard and
privacy-protection groups) have become highly mobi-
lised around ensuring an integrated national response,
covering the human as well as the technical challenges
involved in improving cyber security.
The concern has been to plug the gaps that had resulted
in spectacular leaks of state secrets, theft of intellectual
property, foreign interference through cyberspace in
US politics, and the poor cyber-security performance of
many sectors of the economy and society.
In military affairs, the US aims to provide cyber-
attack options in all phases of operations and at every
level of command.6 On the defensive
side, the aim is to ensure that cyber
defences are wide-ranging, robust and
highly resilient. In both regards the US
has made more progress than any other
country. However, in the event of a
major conflict, it remains the case that
the US – including its military – could
be severely damaged by cyber attacks, given the coun-
try’s high degree of digital dependence. Comprehensive
defence in cyberspace would be difficult or perhaps
impossible to ensure in wartime.7
The US international strategy for cyberspace in peace
and war – as framed by the head of US Cyber Command,
General Paul Nakasone – is to ‘achieve and maintain
cyberspace superiority’.8 This formulation also precisely
captures the intention of the country’s political leaders.
The 2018 Department of Defense (DoD) strategy for
cyberspace offers additional detail.9 In it, the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff set near-term objectives that recognise
the limitations of current cyberspace capabilities, both
offensive and defensive, with a clear view that offensive
cyber operations will be directed towards maximising
existing advantages, whether kinetic or informational.
Since the main positive impact of extensive and
detailed planning for cyberspace operations is the
potential for nationwide mobilisation of resources, both
for daily operations and emergencies, the US is clearly
in a highly advanced position in this regard. The strate-
gies and policies are comprehensive, as well as widely
and effectively disseminated. Significant sections of
government, the armed forces, the business commu-
nity, civil society and academia are engaged in develop-
ing those strategies and executing them. The strategies
also recognise how rapidly the circumstances of cyber-
space are changing and the huge complexities that must
be overcome in exploiting adversary weaknesses. The
speed at which the cyber threat has continued to evolve
has proven highly disruptive even to a policy process as
advanced as that of the US.
A key component of the 2018 cyber strategy is its
Cyber Deterrence Initiative (CDI).10 This states that the
US will work closely with allies in responding to cyber
attacks (including through intelligence-sharing), attrib-
uting attacks, formulating public statements of support
for actions taken and jointly impos-
ing consequences against those
responsible. While the national
cyber strategy makes it clear that
there are many non-cyber ways to
retaliate, the 2018 DoD strategy sets
out the role US cyber operations
are intended to play in assertively
defending national interests. These include ‘defending
forward’ on adversary networks in order to pre-empt
attacks, and competing constantly with adversary cyber
operators (‘persistent engagement’).
Governance, command and control
The US has been a world leader in promoting and
practising multi-stakeholder governance of security
in cyberspace, doing so in a way that owes much to
its liberal political culture and institutions and to
robust opposition by the corporate sector to regula-
tion of private businesses. The latter factor is particu-
larly relevant to the protection of critical infrastructure
since most of it is in the hands of private businesses.
The federal character of the national political system
assigns to the 50 states, alongside other small politi-
cal entities and administrations, significant roles in
national cyber security, especially in countering cyber
crime and in education. Cyber governance in the US is
highly pluralistic.
Cyber
governance in
the US is highly
pluralistic
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CYBER CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL POWER: A Net Assessment 17
In US cyber policy there are many channels of execu-
tive authority that flow from the president: the intel-
ligence community, the armed forces, departments of
state (Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Commerce,
Energy and Transport) and other agencies (such as
National Laboratories). These are all coordinated
through the National Security Council (NSC), chaired
by the president, and its Principals Committee, chaired
by the national security advisor.11
For civil-sector cyber security, the federal govern-
ment has had two main channels for its policymaking.
The first is in the White House, through the cyber direc-
tor on the staff of the NSC. The president is directly
supported by the homeland security advisor (serv-
ing under the national security advisor) and a deputy
national security advisor for cyber security and emerg-
ing technology.12 The second channel is outside the
White House, through the secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), a full member of the
NSC, and a new organisation set up in 2018 under
DHS, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA).
These agencies rely on a long-standing policy of mobi-
lising (or sometimes effectively co-opting) private-sector
and public participation in their initiatives. One vehicle
for this has been the president’s National Infrastructure
Advisory Council, which brings together senior execu-
tives from the private sector and state and local govern-
ments to advise on how to reduce ‘physical and cyber
risks and improve the security and resilience of the
nation’s critical infrastructure sectors’.13 The agencies
have introduced a range of strategic initiatives, including
the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),14
the first of which was created during the presidency
of Bill Clinton; the Cyber Risk and Resilience Review
framework,15 jointly devised in 2009 by the DHS and
Carnegie Mellon University; and the National Initiative
for Cybersecurity Education, an organisation within the
National Institute of Standards and Technology in the
Department of Commerce.
In the development of command and control for
cyber operations, two main trends have been discern-
ible: a filling of policy gaps through the creation of new
organisations and/or posts for a wide range of missions
and responsibilities, and a gradual decentralisation of
authority for offensive operations. The unifying pur-
pose has been to improve the capability and effective-
ness of defence and offence in cyberspace. The US has
invested heavily in these changes. For the 2021 fiscal
year the government requested US$18.7 billion for spe-
cific security initiatives.16
For national-security policy in cyberspace, there are
many departments and agencies involved in authoris-
ing, commanding and controlling cyber operations.
In addition to the White House and DHS, the most
important are the DoD, as it contains the National
Security Agency (NSA) and Cyber Command; the State
Department; the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), which coordinates all the intel-
ligence agencies; and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), which reports directly to the president while
coordinating with the DNI.
For military planning and operations, the command-
and-control arrangements match those of all military
activities. The president is the commander-in-chief, to
whom the unified (theatre/domain) commands and the
single-service chiefs (army, navy, air force and marines)
report. The function of commander-in-chief is exercised
through the secretary of defense, under a mechanism
called the National Command Authority. In 2012, then-
president Barack Obama ordered that offensive cyber
operations conducted by the military required multi-
agency agreement and presidential authorisation. In
2018, in response to sustained cyber attacks on the US
below the threshold of armed conflict, then-president
Trump approved the CDI and in a classified directive
provided for the devolution of authority for offensive
cyber operations to various agencies in certain cases.
Within the DoD, the list of cyber agencies with oper-
ational and capability-development roles is a long one,
including single-service cyber commands and the DoD
chief information officer, responsible for securing all
DoD computerised systems (not including deployed
weapons platforms, which are managed by the single-
service cyber commands or combatant commands).
Governance of cyber policy in the US is enriched by
the diversity of talents and interests represented in the
various powerful institutions that are involved. Policy
is inevitably consensus-based and therefore perhaps
less focused than in other, less pluralistic systems, but
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18 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
there is larger buy-in by stakeholders throughout the
US system. Since it is based on strict observance of the
law, the US system is highly predictable, though there-
fore more constrained than in countries where the law is
less respected or more arbitrary. Command-and-control
arrangements are worked out in exquisite detail, with
high levels of redundancy built in, and with command
nodes enjoying a high degree of intelligence support.
Core cyber-intelligence capability
There is copious public evidence indicating the world-
leading sophistication, breadth and depth of US core
cyber-intelligence capabilities. These are centred on the
extensive military-led cyber capabilities of the NSA, the
complementary civilian-led cyber capabilities of the CIA,
with its covert overseas remit, and those of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), with its domestic-security
remit. The director of the NSA also heads the US mili-
tary’s Cyber Command, and both organisations have
cyber-intelligence, cyber-security and offensive cyber
functions so as to maximise the synergies across such
closely related activities. Core US cyber-intelligence
capabilities are enhanced further through many inter-
national intelligence partnerships, with the long-estab-
lished Five Eyes alliance as the centrepiece. The Five Eyes
is arguably the most powerful international intelligence
partnership in history.
The US intelligence agencies collaborate exten-
sively with private-sector firms and universities for the
development and evaluation of key technologies.17 The
extent of civil–military and private–public integration
can be seen in the March 2019 report by the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on
the future directions the intelligence community could
take in order to adapt to, or exploit, rapidly changing
technologies.18 The very tight integration of govern-
ment, industry and academia in shaping the US intel-
ligence capability is unmatched in scale, focus and
investment by any other country, including China. The
country’s cyber-intelligence capability also benefits
from the maturity and scope of the centralised process
for all-source intelligence fusion and assessment.
With an annual budget request of US$85bn for the 2021
fiscal year, and the involvement of multiple government
departments in addition to the three core intelligence
agencies, the size and complexity of the US intelligence-
and-security community make it notoriously difficult to
coordinate, even following the post-9/11 creation of the
ODNI, which was designed to address the problem.
Cyber empowerment and dependence
The US remains the most powerful country in terms of
ICT capability, whether gauged by the size of its digi-
tal economy, its leading role in global innovation or the
unrivalled partnership between industry, government
and academia. Global consumer demand for US ICT has
led to the unprecedented commercial success of com-
panies such as Apple, Google and Microsoft, which has
in turn stimulated their shaping of the future of cyber-
space through their extensive investment in research
and development (R&D). The result is a high degree
of global dependence on US commercial products and
intellectual property, with the technology involved in
computer microchips, undersea communication cables,
communication satellites and cloud computing being
prime examples. The other side of the coin is that the US
economy and civil infrastructure are more dependent
on cyberspace than those of most other countries, and
therefore more vulnerable in many respects.19
The US is a world leader in both personal and busi-
ness use of the internet and mobile technology. The
level of demand has contributed to domestic innova-
tion, which has in turn fuelled even higher demand. The
US digital economy is the biggest in the world.
According to the standard methods used by the US
government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, the digital
economy contributed 9% of the country’s GDP in 2018.20
But this estimate excludes the output of sectors where
large amounts of wealth are generated by ICT products
and services, such as financial services. It is not possible
to gauge the full strength of the US digital and cyber
economy just by using the traditional ICT output data
from the national accounts for the ICT sector.21 Other
sectors of the US economy – such as agriculture, bank-
ing and healthcare – leverage ICT goods and services to
create their own innovations and wealth in ways that
are not included in national statistics for the ICT sector.22
For example, every day in the US, trillions of dollars’
worth of financial transactions are conducted in ways
that are only possible because of ICT systems.23 One of
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CYBER CAPABILITIES AND NATIONAL POWER: A Net Assessment 19
the favoured techniques is algorithmic trading of stocks,
derivatives and currency, where ICT systems are pre-
set to buy and sell according to certain pre-determined
parameters. This has resulted in a new form of auto-
mated, high-speed wealth creation, making the US the
global centre for ‘digital capitalism’.24 Using the broader
measure of the digital economy adopted by the G20,25
the digital economy’s share of US GDP is about 60%.26
Overall, it is clear that the US enjoys a significant
level of cyber empowerment compared with all other
countries. Some countries, including China, aspire
to emulate US achievements in this regard. In fact,
between 2013 and 2016, according to an estimate by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), China was already one of the
five countries – together with the US, Taiwan, Japan and
South Korea – that together produced at least 70%, and
in some cases almost 100%, of the patents for each of the
25 new technologies considered by the OECD to repre-
sent the ‘digital technology frontier’.27 However, the US
share of global production was greater than China’s for
all but two of those technologies (control arrangements
and organic-materials devices).28
The strength of US digital services lies largely in
their culture of technical expertise and innovation-led
investment. The US is home to 59 of the universities in
the Times Higher Education list of the global top 200 (see
Table 1.1, which includes only the countries that fea-
ture in this report), and its tech and entrepreneurship
ecosystem has no equal. According to one industry sur-
vey, there were 65,321 start-ups listed in the US in 2019,
which was approximately nine times the number in the
second-placed country, India.29
Table 1.1. Universities in the Times Higher Education global
top 200, 202130
US 59
UK 29
China (incl. Hong Kong) 12
Australia 12
Canada 8
France 5
Japan 2
Israel 1
Private investment in the US high-tech sector has
been a central part of this dominance in a way not
matched by any other country. In 2019, the available
data suggested that total venture-capital investment
in the US was more than three times greater than in
China (US$135bn versus US$40bn).31 In the 2020 IMD
World Competitiveness Ranking, which assesses a
country’s ability to ‘adopt and explore digital tech-
nologies’ across government, business and wider
society, the US was in tenth place and China was in
20th.32 According to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, the US accounts for 68% of
the market-capitalisation value of the world’s 70 larg-
est digital platforms, compared with China’s 22%.33
In terms of its share of total global spending on R&D,
using a purchasing-power-parity estimate, the US was
in first place in 2019, just ahead of China.34 Taking the
last two decades as a whole, the gap between the two
countries is much wider, with US R&D investment
almost double that of China, and the impact of that ear-
lier spending remains significant today.
Taking investment in and outputs from research in the
field of artificial intelligence (AI) as an important proxy
indicator of cyber empowerment, we can see several
trends. Between 2008 and 2017, US venture-capital invest-
ments in AI outpaced those in China (US$694bn versus
US$185bn).35 China overtook the US in 2018, but later
that year its entire venture-capital sector suffered a col-
lapse. In terms of research, in 2016 the 28 European Union
member states and the US were responsible for the two
greatest shares of highly cited AI-related publications,
23% and 15% respectively, but those shares declined to
17% and 12% in 2018.36 China overtook both, with a share
of 28% in 2018, while India’s share skyrocketed to 11%.
(Note, however, that this ranking demonstrates scientific
achievement rather than economic power, since open-
source publications are available to be used in any coun-
try, not just the one in which they were produced. And in
most cases the researchers producing such publications
are likely to include some foreigners, so in that sense the
scientific achievement does not belong entirely to the
source country.) Overall, the statistics do not capture the
quality and dynamism of the US AI sector, which was
demonstrated in 2018, for example, by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology’s creation of a special school of