In this 2017 Journal of Consciousness Studies article, R. Scott Bakker explores whether hypothetical aliens with cognitive biology convergent with humanity’s would face similar philosophical problems. He argues that these ‘Convergians’ would rely on ecologically adapted heuristics that enable practical reasoning while obscuring their own cognitive mechanisms. Misapplying these tools to theoretical questions about themselves could produce persistent problems of consciousness and meaning. This speculative account reframes human philosophical difficulties as possible consequences of bounded cognition, heuristic neglect, and limited metacognitive insight, rather than establishing that such aliens actually exist.
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Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, No. 1–2, 2017, pp. ?–?
R. Scott Bakker
On Alien Philosophy
Abstract: Given a sufficiently convergent cognitive biology, we might
suppose that aliens would likely find themselves perplexed by many of
the same kinds of problems that inform our traditional and con-
temporary philosophical debates. In particular, we can presume that
‘humanoid’ aliens would be profoundly stumped by themselves, and
that they would possess a philosophical tradition organized around
‘hard problems’ falling out of their inability to square their scientific
self-understanding with their traditional and/or intuitive self-under-
standing. As speculative as any such consideration of ‘alien philos-
ophy’ must be, it provides a striking, and perhaps important, way to
recontextualize contemporary human debates regarding cognition and
consciousness.
The highest species concept may be that of a terrestrial rational being;
however, we shall not be able to name its character because we have no
knowledge of non-terrestrial rational beings that would enable us to
indicate their characteristic property and so to characterize this terres-
trial being among rational beings in general. It seems, therefore, that the
problem of indicating the character of the human species is absolutely
insoluble, because the solution would have to be made through experi-
ence by means of the comparison of two species of rational being, but
experience does not offer us this. (Kant, 2006, p. 225)
Are there alien philosophers orbiting some faraway star, opining in
bursts of symbolically articulated smells, or parsing distinctions-
without-differences via the clasp of neural genitalia? Do the Greys
have their own version of Plato? Is there a little green Nietzsche out
there, somewhere, describing little green armies of little green
metaphors?
Correspondence:
Email: richard.scott.bakker@gmail.com
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2 R.S. BAKKER
And if so, what would their problems be? What kind of questions
would they ask? And what might this tell us about the biological basis
of philosophy as we know it?
Prima facie, at least, the prospect of answering questions like these
seems dim. As Kant notes in the epigraph, we have no way of
characterizing ourselves ‘among rational beings in general’ short of
actual contact with extraterrestrial intelligences. But thanks to science
— and to Darwin in particular — the problem is nowhere near so
‘absolutely insoluble’ for us as it must have appeared in the eighteenth
century. Unlike Kant, we now know enough cognitive biology to make
some educated guesses regarding rational beings other than ourselves.
Given the universality of evolutionary processes, ‘speculative xeno-
philosophy’ need not be mere science fiction.
What I want to show is how an intelligent alien species possessing a
sufficiently convergent cognitive biology — ‘Convergians’ — would
likely find themselves perplexed by many of the same kinds of prob-
lems that inform our traditional and contemporary philosophical
debates. Like us, they would have their own cognitive ‘crash spaces’,
discourses where their tools, though appearing to work, systematically
break down. In particular, I want to show why Convergians would be
profoundly stumped by themselves, why they would likely have their
own ‘hard problems’.
The point of this exercise, of course, isn’t so much to argue the
reality of Convergian philosophy as it is to argue the plausibility.
After some twenty-five centuries of explicit enquiry, we earthlings
still lack genuine theoretical knowledge of our experiential or
intentional nature. Millennia have passed and we cannot so much as
formulate our explananda, let alone explain things like meaning or
consciousness. Thus the attraction of alien philosophy. Any empiri-
cally plausible account of why aliens possessing an analogous
cognitive biology would find themselves in analogous cognitive straits
automatically doubles as an empirically plausible account of those
straits. Our enquiry into alien philosophy is at once an enquiry into
our own quite remarkable inability to comprehend ourselves.1
1 For a speculative account of possible artificial (as opposed to alien) psychological/
cognitive capacities, see Schwitzgebel (2014), where he investigates the kinds of
psychology we could plausibly attribute to a Matrioshka brain. See also Schneider
(2016).
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ON ALIEN PHILOSOPHY 3
Why do humans find themselves so perplexing? Why do meaning
and consciousness baffle us so? The likely answer becomes obvious, I
think, when viewed through the lens of alien philosophy: cognition is
ecological.
1. Aliens and Philosophy
Of course, the plausibility of humanoid aliens possessing any kind of
philosophy requires the plausibility of humanoid aliens. In popular
media, aliens are almost always exotic versions of ourselves, possess-
ing their own exotic versions of the capacities and institutions we
happen to have. This is no accident. Science fiction is always about
the here and now — about recontextualizations of what we know. As a
result, the aliens you tend to meet tend to seem suspiciously human-
oid, psychologically if not physically.2 No matter how alien the alien,
Spock always has some ‘mind’ with which to ‘meld’. To ask the
question of alien philosophy, one might complain, is to buy into this
‘humanoid conceit’, which, although flattering, is almost certainly not
true.
And yet the environmental filtration of mutations on earth has
produced innumerable examples of convergent evolution, different
species evolving similar morphologies and functions, the same solu-
tions to the same problems, using different DNA. In the case of earth,
at least, what Gould (1989) famously termed the ‘tape of life’ does
seem to replay (Bains and Schulze-Makuch, 2016). But it is by no
means clear as to why this is so (Matos et al., 2015) and, short of
some definitive account of the processes involved, we have no way of
generalizing convergence to the stars, let alone extending it to the
evolution of humanoid intelligence.3
All too often, ignorance of alternatives dupes us into making ‘only
game in town assumptions’, so confusing mere possibility with
necessity. Supposing the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence is
one thing — cognition is almost certainly integral to complex life
elsewhere in the universe — but we know nothing about the kinds of
2 Literary science fiction, of course, is rife with exceptions to this rule. Many works, such
as Stanislaw Lem’s (2002) classic Solaris, or, more recently, Peter Watts’ (2006)
Blindsight, take the ‘unthinkable alien’ as their major foil and/or theme.
3 As Simon Conway Morris (2003) believes counter Gould’s (1989) account of evolu-
tionary contingency.
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4 R.S. BAKKER
possible biological intelligences nature permits.4 Short of actual con-
tact with intelligent aliens, we have no way of gauging how far we can
extrapolate from our case (Rescher, 2009, pp. 21–39).
But this debate need not worry us here. Perhaps the cluster of
characteristics we identify with ‘humanoid’ expresses a high-
probability recipe for evolving intelligence — perhaps not. Either
way, our existence proves that our particular recipe is on file, that
aliens we might describe as ‘humanoid’, no matter how unlikely, are
entirely possible.
So we have our humanoid aliens, at least as far as we need them.
But the question of what alien philosophy looks like also presupposes
we know what human philosophy looks like. Wilfred Sellars famously
defines the aim of philosophy as comprehending ‘how things in the
broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest
possible sense of the term’ (Sellars, 1963, p. 35). Philosophy attempts
to comprehend the ‘big picture’. The problem with this definition is
that it overlooks the special relationship between philosophy and
ignorance, and so fails to decisively distinguish philosophical enquiry
from, say, scientific or religious enquiry. Philosophy is invested in a
specific kind of ‘big picture’, one that acknowledges the theoretical
nature of its claims, while remaining beyond the pale of scientific
arbitration. Philosophy is perhaps better defined, then, as the attempt
to comprehend how things in general hang together in general absent
conclusive evidence.
All too often philosophy is conceived in positive terms, either as an
archive of theoretical claims, or as a capacity to ‘see beyond’ or ‘peer
into’. On this definition, however, philosophy characterizes a certain
relationship to the unknown, one where enquiry eschews supernatural
authority, and yet lacks the methodological, technical, and institu-
tional resources of science.5 Philosophy is the attempt to theoretically
explain in the absence of decisive warrant, to argue general claims that
cannot, for whatever reason, be presently arbitrated. This is why
4 Let alone postbiological intelligences. Assuming that the acceleration of technological
power we are presently experiencing is universal to exocivilizations, it follows that any
alien intelligence we encounter will be some kind of machine intelligence (Schneider,
2016). Even still, that machine intelligence would have a history that reaches back to a
possibly humanoid biological intelligence.
5 In keeping with Firestein’s (2012, p. 29) characterization of science as also ‘about the
unknown’, you could characterize the distinction between science and philosophy as the
distinction between edible versus inedible ignorance.
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ON ALIEN PHILOSOPHY 5
questions serve as the basic organizing principles of the institution, the
shared boughs from which various approaches branch and twig in
endless disputation. Philosophy is where we ponder the general
questions we cannot decisively answer, where we grapple with
ignorances we cannot readily overcome.6
This is why the presence of philosophers in the scientific thick of
things generally indicates controversy, and why their absence
generally indicates consensus. It’s not so much the generality that
draws them as the attendant confusion.
2. Convergian Nature
It might seem innocuous enough defining philosophy in privative
terms as the attempt to cognize in conditions of information scarcity,
but it turns out to be crucial to our ability to make guesses regarding
potential alien analogues. This is because it transforms the question of
alien philosophy into a question of alien ignorance. If we can guess at
the kinds of ignorance a biological intelligence would suffer, then we
can guess at the kinds of questions it would ask, as well as the kinds of
answers that might occur to them. And this is not quite as difficult as
one might suppose.
The reason is evolution. Thanks to evolution, we know that alien
cognition would be bounded cognition, that it would consist of ‘good
enough’ capacities adapted to multifarious reproductive impediments
(Simon, 1957). Taking this ecological view of cognition, it turns out,
allows us to make a good number of educated guesses. (And recall,
plausibility is all that we’re aiming for here.)
So for instance, we can assume tight symmetries between the
sensory information accessed, the behavioural resources developed,
and the impediments overcome. If gamma rays made no difference to
their survival, they would not perceive them. Gamma rays, for
Convergians, would be unknown unknowns, at least pending the
development of alien science. The same can be said for evolution,
planetary physics — pretty much any instance of theoretical cognition
you can adduce. Evolution assures that cognitive expenditures, the
ability to intuit this or that, will always be bound in some manner to
some set of ancestral environments. Our sensitivities and our capacity
6 Given the importance the production of conscious ignorance plays in research contexts
(Otero and Ishiwa, 2014), philosophy certainly has an important positive role to play in
the quest for knowledge. Questions that are never asked, after all, never get answered.
On Alien Philosophy: summary, contents and background
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On Alien Philosophy is a 22-page documentcredited to Juno D. Thackery. In this 2017 Journal of Consciousness Studies article, R. Scott Bakker explores whether hypothetical aliens with cognitive biology convergent with humanity’s would face similar philosophical problems. He argues that these ‘Convergians’ would rely on ecologically adapted heuristics that enable practical reasoning while obscuring their own cognitive mechanisms. Misapplying these tools to theoretical questions about themselves could produce persistent problems of consciousness and meaning. This speculative account reframes human philosophical difficulties as possible consequences of bounded cognition, heuristic neglect, and limited metacognitive insight, rather than establishing that such aliens actually exist. It appears in the Science & Engineering collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.
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Philosophy of mind
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Consciousness
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Xenophilosophy
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Cognitive biology
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Convergent evolution
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Heuristic cognition
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Metacognition
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Ecological cognition
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