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Published in the American Journal of Political Science, volume 51, issue 4 (October 2007), pages 755 - 771, this article develops a complete-information bargaining model explaining how war begins and ends through credible commitment problems. Opportunities for future peace undermine threats to prolong fighting, weakening mutual deterrence against surprise attacks. Fighting destroys resources and reduces the gains from further aggression, eventually enabling credible deterrence and negotiated settlement. Peace becomes possible only at specific windows of opportunity, and rational escalation can leave both sides worse off at settlement than immediate concession would have.

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The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War Bahar Levento ˘glu Duke University Branislav L. Slantchev University of California, San Diego According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power causes a credible commitment problem. This mechanism does not specify how inefficient fighting can resolve this cause, so it is an incomplete explanation of war. We present a complete information model of war as a sequence of battles and show that although opportunities for a negotiated settlement arise throughout, the very desirability of peace creates a commitment problem that undermines its likelihood. Because players have incentives to settle as soon as possible, they cannot credibly threaten to fight long enough if an opponent launches a surprise attack. This decreases the expected duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to fail. Fighting’s destructiveness improves the credibility of these threats by decreasing the benefits from continuing the war and can eventually lead to peace. In equilibrium players can only terminate war at specific windows of opportunity and fighting results in escalating costs that can leave both players worse off at the time peace is negotiated than a full concession would have before the war began. To understand why wars begin, we have to know why they end—the termination of war must in- volve the resolution of its causes (Blainey 1988, x). In one of the two major rationalist accounts, war oc- curs when actors have private information about their expected value of war and crisis bargaining fails because they are unable to reveal this information credibly (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999). Fighting then resolves the cause of war by providing additional information that enables ac- tors to coordinate their expectations and negotiate peace (Slantchev 2003). Whereas this constitutes a complete ex- planation of war in Blainey’s sense, there are very good substantive reasons to insist on a theory that does not rely on incomplete information (Powell 2006). The prime candidate is the other major rationalist account: the com- mitment problem. In general, in order to avoid bargaining failure one or both actors must commit to certain courses Bahar Levento˘glu is assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Duke University, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708-0097 (bl38@duke.edu). Branislav L. Slantchev is assistant professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521. We thank Bob Powell for helping frame the issues discussed in the article much more clearly. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (grants SES-0518222 to Slantchev and SES-0518185 to Levento˘glu). We are grateful to Ken Schultz, Jim Fearon, and participants of seminars at Stanford University, Dartmouth College, Texas A&M University, Columbia University, the Conflict and Cooperation Conference at the Kellogg School (Northwestern University), the Olin Institute (Harvard University), and the Watson Center (University of Rochester) for comments. This article was also presented at the 2005 meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington), the 2006 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, the 2006 meeting of the Project on Polarization and Conflict (C ´ordoba, Spain), and the 2007 workshop of the Center for the Study of Civil War (New York University). of action in the future. The problem arises when these promises or threats are not credible because when the contingency arises the actors have no incentives to abide by them. Such commitments are unbelievable, and as a result cannot achieve peace in the present. Although usu- ally couched in terms of preventive war (a rising challenger cannot promise to deliver future benefits to a declining state in quantity sufficient to offset the latter’s gain from waging war while still relatively strong), the mechanism is much more general (Powell 2004). For instance, imagine a situation in which there are first-strike advantages: one’s expected payoff from war is strictly higher when one is the first to attack than when one must absorb an attack before retaliating. As Fearon (1995) shows, if this advantage is sufficiently high, then bargaining will break down because at least one of the actors will not be able to credibly promise not to attack American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4, October 2007, Pp. 755–771 C©2007, Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853 755

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756 BAHAR LEVENTO ˘GLU AND BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV when the other is holding back. Powell (2006) demon- strates that in this scenario, actors face the equivalent of a large, rapid power shift: one can either strike first or permit the advantage to shift to the opponent by allowing him to achieve first strike. As Powell explains, this makes the mechanism strategically equivalent to the usual preven- tive war explanation that relies on shifts in power resulting from differential rates of economic or military growth (Organski 1968). Unfortunately, none of the different specifications of the commitment problem as it currently stands meets Blainey’s requirement: the theory does not explain how inefficient fighting can resolve the commitment problem short of the total obliteration of one of the warring states. Because outcomes of such finality are very rare, the theory does not provide a satisfactory answer to this puzzle. But if fighting does not resolve the commitment problem, it is pointless to bear its costs and risks in this context: in the end, the commitment problem will still exist and both states would have suffered tremendously. Moreover, if the opponents can terminate the war without resolv- ing the commitment problem, then what does it mean to say that the war was caused by this problem in the first place? We have several goals in this article. First, we elu- cidate Blainey’s requirement and explain why it is im- perative that our explanations of war are complete and coherent. We then discuss how the commitment prob- lem mechanism fails these requirements and why. This leads us to a model with a stylized representation of war that simultaneously addresses our objections to the tra- ditional approach and allows the commitment problem to arise. Our second goal is to demonstrate using this model that large, rapid shifts of power are not sufficient to cause war. Instead, peace fails when states cannot cred- ibly threaten to impose large enough costs to deter each other from trying to exploit the advantages of surprise attack. The credibility problem arises from the very desir- ability of peace; states cannot threaten to prolong fighting more than absolutely necessary. However, through its very destructiveness, fighting may enable them to commit to deterrent threats that terminate the war. We show that the size of the power shift is determined by the strategies the actors choose. This implies that an account of war as a commitment problem must explain why actors fail to use strategies that reduce the power shift and avoid fighting. We then use these results to show how rational actors can escalate and incur costs far out of proportion to the gains and how by the time war is settled both actors are likely to be worse off in the resulting settlement than just conced- ing the prize from the outset without fighting, why wars tend to be settled when actors are nearing exhaustion, and why peace is only possible at specific junctures during the conflict. The Credible Commitment Problem The bargaining model of war posits a fundamental puzzle that any rationalist theory of war must be able to answer. Because fighting destroys resources, the benefits that play- ers can divide after a war are always less than the bene- fits they could have divided prior to it. This means that it should be possible to locate ex ante agreements that would leave both players better off compared to what they can expect to get from fighting. The inefficiency puzzle is why actors are unable to reach such an agreement even when their existence is common knowledge (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999). While most of the recent work has focused on infor- mational asymmetries as a cause of war, there are com- pelling reasons to consider causal mechanisms that do not depend on incomplete information (Powell 2006). First, uncertainty is ubiquitous and is present in almost all crises, and yet only a few of these escalate into war. Sec- ond, the information revelation mechanism cannot deal very well with long wars: to think that it takes many years of near constant interaction for opponents to learn enough about each other is surely stretching the theory. Third, Levento˘glu and Tarar (2005) show that private informa- tion by itself often merely leads to delay in reaching a ne- gotiated settlement preferable to war, and for bargaining to break down in war requires that players are impatient enough. Fourth, Fey and Ramsay (2007) demonstrate that mutual optimism, which is often at the core of informa- tional explanations such as Blainey’s (1988), cannot be the cause of war if both parties must agree to fight for war to occur. This means that we need an approach that does not rely exclusively on incomplete information. The major explanation of war under complete information that has emerged in the bargaining model of war is the credible commitment problem (CCP) caused by large, rapid shifts of power. Powell (2004) derives a condition that ensures that such power shifts will be sufficient to cause war in a wide class of models. Powell (2006) further demon- strates that bargaining indivisibilities, first-strike advan- tages (Fearon 1995), and bargaining over objects that are sources of military power (Fearon 1996) also turn out to be manifestations of this fundamental mechanism. To illustrate the CCP, imagine an environment in which an actor, S1, expects a significant advantage from initiating war while his opponent, S2, is unprepared for fighting. To achieve peace, S2 must be able to reduce the

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THE ARMED PEACE 757 temptation to S1 either by promising future compensa- tion through peaceful transfers or by threatening to wage war that will be sufficiently costly to S1. In other words, to avoid war today, S2 must commit to providing bene- fits or inflicting costs on S1 in the future. However, this commitment will not be credible if S2 has no incentives to follow through on it. If S2 becomes strong tomorrow, she will not want to provide the promised compensation. If fighting is very costly to S2 as well, then she will not want to fight with the ferocity necessary to inflict the re- quired costs on S1. In either case, the future commitment becomes unbelievable and S1 cannot be induced to forego war in the present. For the mechanism to work, the power shift must be sufficiently large. That is, the difference in the ex- pected payoffs from war when fighting from a position of strength and fighting from a position of weakness must be so large that it (a) makes war tempting to the strong and (b) makes it impossible for the weak to commit cred- ibly to deliver enough benefits or impose enough costs to offset that difference. The shift must also be sufficiently rapid. That is, no negotiation can occur before the ad- vantage shifts from one actor to the other. If actors can adjust piecemeal while the shift is happening, then the declining actor is vulnerable to salami tactics, through which the rising opponent extracts small concessions in a series of steps, avoiding war altogether (Fearon 1996). In the first-strike environment, the power shift is essentially instantaneous: when one decides to forego striking first, one is immediately vulnerable to a first strike by the op- ponent. This further implies that peace must make both actors simultaneously unwilling to exploit the temporary advantage a first strike would accord them. Although the CCP mechanism seems to provide an adequate explanation of the outbreak of war, it raises an- other fundamental puzzle: how does fighting resolve the commitment problem? To see why this is important, note that any rationalist explanation of war must meet two minimalist criteria. It must be complete, which means it must account for war’s outbreak and termination; and it must be coherent, which means that its account of termi- nation must explain how fighting has resolved the cause. In other words, a theory of war is complete and coherent if it can identify a cause of war that fighting then resolves. Whereas it can be shown that the asymmetric informa- tion explanation is both coherent and complete, the CCP is neither because it is silent on how inefficient fighting can resolve the commitment problem. One trivial answer is that it does so by eliminating one of the opponents. However, this is empirically un- tenable: many wars end in negotiated settlements. For example, out of 104 interstate wars between 1816 and 1991, 67 (or 64%) ended short of total military victory for one side.1 Most wars end because both sides agree to cease hostilities while both could fight on. That is, they strike a bargain where previously they have been unable to do so. Furthermore, if we are to sustain CCP as a cause of war, then it must be the case that when players agree to settle, this problem is resolved. If this were not true, then peace would be possible even in the presence of the commitment problem, which would then imply that this problem could not have been the cause of fighting in the first place. Gartzke (1999, 571–72) notes this shortcoming of CCP and even goes on to argue that because it cannot be overcome, any rationalist explanation of war necessar- ily requires incomplete information. We want to contest this claim by showing at least one way in which war can resolve the commitment problem. We develop a model where the power shift arises from first-strike advantages but since the underlying mechanism is shared by the other ways to generate large, rapid power shifts, the results have broader implications. We now enumerate several minimal features that the model must have to address the puzzle we have identified. First, we must represent war as a sequence of costly en- gagements rather than a game-ending costly lottery over exogenous outcomes because we wish to trace the effect of fighting. We must allow for negotiations during fight- ing, and we must allow for the game to end with a mil- itary victory in addition to a peace settlement. Second, we must incorporate large, rapid shifts of power to create an environment where the original CCP can manifest it- self. Third, contrary to most existing bargaining models, we should not assume that an agreement automatically ends the game with the division of benefits. Rather, we must allow for the possibility that actors can renege on the agreement and attempt to use the newly acquired re- sources to extract further concessions. In other words, peace, if it happens, must be endogenous to the model. Finally, ideally we would not want our results to be de- pendent on a particular choice of a bargaining protocol, and the model must have complete information. The Model Two players, each initially endowed with some capital K i > 0, dispute a prize worth v ≥ 0.2 Each period t (t = 1, 2, . . .) consists of two rounds: bargaining and fighting. Let S(t) denote the entire surplus at the 1Our calculations use Slantchev’s (2004) data set, which separates war outcomes into those where one side is unable to continue the military contest and those where both sides agree to a settlement while still physically able to continue fighting (Kecskemeti 1958). 2We refer to player 1 (or a generic player i) as “he,” and player 2 as “she.”

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758 BAHAR LEVENTO ˘GLU AND BRANISLAV L. SLANTCHEV beginning of period t. If players reach an agreement (x 1, x 2) such that xi ∈ [0, S(t)] and x 1 + x 2 = S(t) in the bar- gaining round, they implement it and resources become immediately available for fighting. If they fail to reach an agreement, they keep whatever resources they had at the beginning of the period. After the bargaining round, play- ers simultaneously choose whether to fight. If both choose not to fight, the game ends and the negotiated distribu- tion of resources remains. If at least one player chooses to fight the other, a battle occurs and each loses c i ≥ 1 units of his resources, with C = c 1 + c 2 being the total cost. The game transits to the next period with probability (1 − p), or one of the players collapses with probability p < 1. How this probability is distributed between the two players depends on their actions during the period: if they both choose to fight, then either player 1 collapses with probability p2 or player 2 collapses with probability p1 = p − p2; if i chooses to fight but j chooses not to, then j col- lapses with probability p, and i collapses with probability 0 (that is, if there is going to be a battle, it pays to partic- ipate in it). Since the game can reach period t only after t − 1 fights, the total surplus at the beginning of period t is given by S(t) = K 1 + K 2 + v − (t − 1)C for every history of the game that leads to t. How long players can survive fighting depends on their resource endowment. Because capital stocks are finite, the game ends in a finite number of periods. Payoffs. A player who collapses fighting in period t derives utility 0, and the surviving player gets S(t) − C; that is, the victor absorbs the loser’s remaining resources. If player i’s capital stock falls below c i in t, then i collapses automatically without an additional battle with a payoff of 0, and j’s payoff is S(t). If both players run out of resources at the same time, they collapse simultaneously and split the total surplus equally, each obtaining S(t)/2. If both players choose not to fight at time t, the game ends in peace and each keeps his share as agreed upon. Since there is no confrontation in this case, there is no capital loss. Strategies. A history of the game is the list of accep- tance/rejection decisions and the decisions to fight. For- mally, let ht denote the history of the game at the begin- ning of period t, and set h0 = ∅. A bargaining protocol x(ht) = (x 1(ht), x 2(ht)) ∈ [0, S(t)]2 determines a pro- posal in the bargaining round of period t after every his- tory ht, where any x 1(ht) + x 2(ht) > S(t) is not feasible, therefore rejected automatically.3 This formalization al- lows for any bargaining protocol that distributes all avail- able resources in finite time in each bargaining round. Let 3A more elaborate notation for a proposal calls for a time index on x i , e.g., (x t 1(ht ), x t 2(ht )). In order to simplify the exposition, we drop the time index on our functions when the time index in its argument suffices. ki (ht) denote player i’s capital stock at the beginning of period t after history ht, so ki (h1) = K i . A strategy, i , for player i determines i’s actions in the bargaining and fighting rounds after every possible history. Formally, given a history ht, players decide in the bargaining round of period t whether to agree to the divi- sion x(ht). Let a t i ∈ {accept, reject} denote i’s decision to agree to the division x(ht). Given decisions a t = (a t 1, a t 2), let ki′(ht, a t) denote player i’s capital stock at the begin- ning of the fighting round in period t. Then ki′(ht, a t) = xi (ht) if a t = (accept, accept), and ki′(ht, a t) = ki (ht) oth- erwise. That is, if players agree on a distribution x(ht), it is implemented and resources become immediately avail- able for fighting, and if at least one player disagrees, they keep the resources they had at the beginning of the period. After observing ht, x(ht), and a t, players simultaneously decide whether to fight or not. Let f t i ∈ {fight, do not fight} denote i’s decision in the fighting round. If players play a t and f t in period t and the game transits to period t + 1, the history at the beginning of period t + 1 be- comes ht+1 = (ht, a t, f t). In this case, the capital stocks at the beginning of period t + 1 are given by ki (ht+1) = xi (ht) − c i if a t = (accept, accept) and ki (ht+1) = ki (ht) − c i otherwise. The game ends when peace is reached or one of the players collapses, either militarily or through attrition. The terminal histories comprise outcomes where (i) play- ers agree to peace—any history such that f t = (do not fight, do not fight); (ii) player i collapses from attrition— any history such that ki (ht) < c i for some player i; or (iii) a player achieves military battlefield victory—any history with f t i = fight for at least one player and in which the realization of the costly fighting lottery is the collapse of a player. Equilibrium Solution Concept. Given a bargaining protocol, a strategy profile  = (1, 2) is a Nash equi- librium if i is a best response to  j for i , j ∈ {1, 2} and i = j. Given a bargaining protocol, a Nash equi- librium is subgame-perfect (SPE) if the subgame strate- gies induced by  constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Subgame perfection eliminates incredible threats in the sense that no player would unilaterally deviate from the actions prescribed by the strategy when he is called to carry out a threat. However, this notion of credibility is too weak. For example, given a bargaining protocol, players may look for an alternative SPE that Pareto-dominates the one induced by the original strategies. They may even look for a different bargaining protocol that allows them to achieve another such SPE. In any case, we should expect players to renegotiate their original positions and switch to the new equilibrium. But if such alternatives exist, then the credibility of the original SPE is undermined and the

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THE ARMED PEACE 759 threats that sustain it become incredible: there is no reason players should expect to remain in this SPE if they can always go back to the negotiation table and find a better one. We should look for SPE that are immune to such renegotiations because these are the only ones that actors can reasonably expect to play. Hence, we focus on SPE that are renegotiation-proof in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989) as the only plausible candidates for solutions to our model. Formally, a bargaining protocol and an induced SPE pair (x, ) is renegotiable if there exists a subgame, a bar- gaining protocol x′ starting at that subgame, and an SPE ′ induced by x′ in that subgame that is weakly preferred by each player and strictly preferred by at least one player to the SPE induced by (x, ) in that subgame. We say that a bargaining protocol and an induced SPE pair, (x, ), is renegotiation-proof (RPSPE) if it is not renegotiable. For the rest of the article, we will explicitly refer to SPE when we rely on SPE; otherwise, all references to an equilibrium will implicitly refer to RPSPE. Discussion. It is worth discussing briefly some of the assumptions in this model and how they relate to the requirements we outlined in the previous section. First, war is a sequence of engagements rather than a one-shot event. We shall refer to these engagements as battles with the understanding that we mean any period of time dur- ing which fighting occurs and actors do not negotiate (e.g., campaigns). Military victory can be achieved in two ways: either by causing the military collapse of the op- ponent during a campaign or by exhausting the oppo- nent’s resource base. However, the war can end as soon as both actors agree to a division of the benefits and as long as neither then engages in additional fighting af- ter the distribution. The model thus allows for negotiated outcomes without assuming away the commitment to up- hold the resulting distribution in peace. In addition, we have assumed that when actors bargain, they can use their resources for side-payments too. We allow for a general bargaining protocol as long as it ends in finite time and does not artificially preclude settlement (we explain later what we mean by that). Furthermore, by allowing actors to turn around and use the resources obtained by nego- tiation for further war, we have effectively endogenized peace: any equilibrium that involves a successful negoti- ated settlement will necessarily incorporate disincentives to renege from it. Second, we have created an environment where the original CCP can arise by allowing for large, rapid shifts of power when an actor surprises its opponent by attack- ing when the other is not. The shift of power arises from the increased probability of military collapse of the actor caught by surprise. This is very similar to the first-strike advantage notion that Fearon (1995) uses. The difference is that instead of conferring an advantage for the entire war, it only does so temporarily on the tactical level. We find this assumption much more tenable for two reasons. Strategic surprise, although possible to achieve, is often indecisive for the entire war (the two most famous exam- ples are the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Egyptian/Syrian attack on Israel in 1973). On the other hand, tactical surprise often is decisive for the particular engagement, and such an engagement could end the war. For example, the surprise Spartan destruction of the Athe- nian fleet at Aegospotami ended the Peloponnesian War, the surprise Soviet invasion of Manchuria coupled with the dropping of the American atomic bombs ended the War in the Pacific, and the surprise Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal with the resulting encirclement of the Egyptian army in the Sinai ended the Yom Kippur War. The assump- tion that the side which achieves surprise has zero proba- bility of collapse in that engagement is made for simplicity and does not affect the results as long as that probability is well below the one for the surprised opponent. Finally, it is worth stressing that the costs are per engagement, not for the entire war. This makes the model a bit more attractive on substantive grounds: we do not have to assume, like most models do, that war costs are relatively small. Indeed, as we shall find, cumulative war costs here can be gargan- tuan, far exceeding the value of the prize actors are fighting over. Total War Total war occurs when players fight until one of them collapses from exhaustion. In this section, we establish the conditions for such an equilibrium. (All proofs are in the appendix.) We first show that if there exists a period from which players will fight at least one battle, then they will also fight in all previous periods provided S is large enough. We then prove that players will fight to the end if at least one of them is sure to collapse after one battle. Together, these results imply that if S is large enough, total war will be inevitable: in any SPE, players will fight without redistributing resources until one of them collapses from exhaustion. Lemma 1. If players fight for T ≥ 1 periods when the resources are (k1, k2; S), then they fight T + 1 periods when the resources are (k1 + c 1, k2 + c 2, S + C ) provided that S and p are large enough. It is worth elaborating what this lemma means. We are not claiming that if players fight for some (k1, k2; S), then they would fight for an arbitrary distribution (ˆk1, ˆk2; S + C ) where ˆki = ki + c i . Rather, we prove that

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The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War is a 17-page documentcredited to Ivo O. Sandford. Published in the American Journal of Political Science, volume 51, issue 4 (October 2007), pages 755 - 771, this article develops a complete-information bargaining model explaining how war begins and ends through credible commitment problems. Opportunities for future peace undermine threats to prolong fighting, weakening mutual deterrence against surprise attacks. Fighting destroys resources and reduces the gains from further aggression, eventually enabling credible deterrence and negotiated settlement. Peace becomes possible only at specific windows of opportunity, and rational escalation can leave both sides worse off at settlement than immediate concession would have. It appears in the Politics & Government collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.

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A second set of questions concerns relevance today. Which parts remain durable, which depend on their historical or institutional setting, and what would need confirmation from a newer source? Following the tags and the Politics & Government collection can reveal useful comparisons. Agreement between sources can strengthen confidence, while disagreement can point to changing definitions, methods, evidence or priorities.

Finally, decide what you need from the item: background knowledge, a quotation, a worked example, a model, a visual explanation or a starting bibliography. That purpose should guide the depth of reading and the notes you keep. Doxxly helps locate and navigate the source; careful interpretation remains the reader's responsibility.

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