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Page 1
The
.
Matthew Effect 0
m Science
The reward and communication systems
of science are considered.
Robert K. Mcrton
, This paper develops a conception of\
\ ways in which certain psychosociai
., processes affect the allocation of re-
wards to scientists for their contribu-\ tjons- an allocation which in turn af-
fwts the flow of ideas and findings
th&gh the communication networks
of s&,nce. The conception is based
upon ah, analysis of the compotite of
experienc; ,,reported in Harriet Zucker-
man’s intemiews with Nobel laureates
in the United @ates (1) and upon data
drawn from the diaries, letters, note-
books. scientific &pen, and biographies
of other scientists.
The Reward System and bceaparats
of the Forty-First chair” ’
We might best begin with s&me gen-
erai observations on the reward system
in science, basing these on eariier ibex-
reticai formulations and empirical ‘in-
vestigations. Some time ago (2) it wad
A number of workers, in empiricai
studies, have investigated various as-
pects of the reward system of science
as thus conceived. Gtaser (3) has found.
for example, that some degree of rcc-
o&ion is required to stabiiizc the
careen of scientists. In a case study
Crane (4) used the quantity of publica-
tion (apart from quality) as a measure
of scientific productivity and found that
highly productive scientists at a major
university gained recognition more of-
ten than equally productive scientists
‘at a lesser university. Hagstrom (5) has
developed and partly tested the hypoth-
esis that matcriai rewards in science
function primarily to reinforce the op-
eration of a reward system in which
noted that graded rewards in the realm ”
the primary reward of recognition for
, scientific contributions is exchanged for
of science arc distributed principally in
the coin of recognition accorded re- +cess to scientific information. Storer
search by feUow-scientists. This recog-
(6) ,has analyzed the ambivalence of
nition is stratified for varying grades
the @cntist’s response to recognition
Of scientific accompiishment, as judged
“as a qase in which the norm of dis-
hv the scientist’s peen. Both the self-
intereste+ss operates to make scien-
. tists deny‘ ,thc vaiue to them of in-
image and the pubiic image of scien-
tists arc iargeiy shaped by the corn-
munaily validating testimony of sign&
cant others that they have variously
lived up to the exacting institutional
requirements of their roies.
The author is Giddings Professor of Sociology
at Columbia University, IJew York 10027. Thi8
fluence and kvthority in science.” Zuck-
article is brKd on a papw read before the erman (7) and S,he Coics (8) have found
Amctican Sociolo@icrJ Association in San Fran- that scientists ~$0 receive recognition
cisco. August 1967. for research done early in their ca-
1
Copyright
Amencan @ 1968 by the
Association for the Advancement of Science
rcers are more productive later on fhnn
those who do not. And the Cola &WC
ato found that. at least in the B
of contemporary American phys& the
reward system operates iargciy in a*
cord with institutional valua of the
s&l- inasmuch as quality of d,
is more often and more su-9
rewarded than mere quantity. **
In science as in other ins&u&d
f&n& a special problem in &8 w&-
inlp of the reward system tums up
when individuals or organizations take
on the job of gauging and suitably
mVaKiing lofty performance on behalf
of a large community. TIiw M uiti-
m accolade in ZOth*eattay sciatc&
the Nobel prize, is often- asshed to
mark off its recipients from ail the
other scbtists of the time. Yet. tbis
assumption is at odds with the- well-
known fact that a good number of
scientists who have not recdved the
prize and wiil not receive it ham con-
tributed as much to the advrrrrccnrtnl
of science as some of the iedpients.
or more. This can be desctibed a the
phenomenon of “the 4lst ChaiP The
derivation of this tag is citar enough.
The French Academy, it M be rc-
membered. decided early that oniy a
cohort of 40 couid qualify as m-0
hen and so emerge as immo& This
limitation of numbers ma& inevitable,
of course, the exciusi6n through the
centuries of many talented individrrallr
who have won their own immortality.
The familiar list of occupants Of this
41st chair inciudes Descartes, Pd.
Moli&rt, Bayle, Rousseau, Saint&non,
Didcrot, Stendahl, FIaubert, 204 and
Proust (9).
What holds for the French Academy
holds in varying degree for every bther
institution designed to identify and re-
ward talent. i’n all of them there arc
occupants of the 4lst chair, mea out-
side the Academy having at least the
same order of talent as those inside it.
In part, this circumstance results from
emrs of judgment that lead to inclu-
sion of the less talented at the expense
of the more talented. History serves
Reprinted from
SCIENCE
Januuy 5, 1968. Vol. 159, No. 3810. pages 56-63
Page 2
Y
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as an appellate court, ready to reverse
the judgments of the lower courts,
which are limited by the myopia of
contemporaneity. But in greater part,
the phenomenon of the 41st chair is
an artifact of having a fixed number
of places available at the summit of
recognition. Moreover, when a particu-
lar generation is rich in achievements
of a high order, it follows from the
rule of fixed numbers that some men
whose accomplishments rank as high
as those actually given the award will
be excluded from the honorific ranks. ’
Indeed, their accomplishments some-
times far outrank those which, in a time
of less creativity, proved enough to
qualify men for .&is high order of
rccognitioa
The Nobel prize retains its luster be-
cause errors of the first kind-where
scientic work of dubious or inferior
worth has been mistakenly honored
-are uncommonly few. Yet limitations
of the second kind cannot be avoided.
The small number of awards means
that, particularly in times of great
scientific advance, there will be many
occupants of the 41st chair (and, since
the terms governing the award of the
prize do not provide for Posthumous
recognition, permanent occupants of
that chair). This gap in the award of
the ultimate prize is only partly filfed
by other awards for scientific accom-
plishrnent since these do not carry the
same prestige either inside the scientific
community or outside it. Furthermore,
i*what has been noted about the artifact
of fixed numbers producing occupants
of the 41st chair in the case of the
Nobei prize holds in principle for other
awards providing less prestige (though
sometimes, nowadays, more cash).
Scientists reflecting on the stratifica-
tion of honor and esteem in the world
o&&&e know all this; the Nobel
*‘laureates themselves know and empha-
size it, and the members of the Swcd-
ish Royal Academy of Science and the
Royal Caroline Institute who face the
unenviable task of making the tial
decisions know it. The latter testify
to the phenomenon of the 41st chair
whenever they allude to work of “prize-
winning calibre” which, under the con-
ditions of+ the scarcity of prizes, could
not be given the award. And so it is
that, in the case of the Nobel prize, oc-
cupants of the 41st chair comprise an
illustrious company that includes such
names as Josiah Willard Gibbs, Mende-
Ieev, W. B. Cannon, H. Quincke, J.
Barcroft, F. d’H&elle, H. De Vries,
Jacques Loeb, W. M. Bayiiss, E. H.
Starling, G. N. Lewis, 0. T. Avery,
and Selig Hecht, to say nothing of the
long list of still-living uncrowned Nobel
laureates (IO).
In the stratification system of honor
in science, there may also be a “ratchet
effect” (II) operating in the careers
of scientists such that, once having
achieved a particular degree of emi-’
nence, they do not later fall much be-
low that level (although they .may be
outdistanced by newcomers and so suf-
fer a relarive decline in prestige). Once
a Nobel laureate, always a Nobel lau-
reate. Yet the reward system based on
recognition for work accomplished tends
to induce continued effort, which serves
both to validate the judgment that the
scientist has’ unusual capacities and to
testify that these capacities have con-
tinuing potential. What appears from
below to be the summit becomes, in
the experience of those who have
reached it, only another way station.
The scientist’s ,peers and other ass00
ciates regard each of his scientific
achievements as only the prelude to
new and greater achievements. Such so-
cial pressures do not often permit those
who have climbed the rugged mouno
tains of scientific achievement to re-
main content. It is not necessarily the
fact that their own Faustian aspirations
are ever escalating that keeps eminent
scientists at work More and more is
expected of them, and this creates its
own measure of motivation and stress.
Less often than might be imagined is
there repose at the top in science
(see 12).
The recognition accorded scientific
achievement by the scientist’s peers is
a reward in the strict sense identified
by Parsons (13). As we shall see, such
recognition can be converted into an
instrumental asset as enlarged facilities
are made available to the honored scien-
tist for further work. Without deiiber-
ate intent on the part of any group.
the reward system thus influences the
“class structure” of science by provid-
ing a stratied distribution of chances,
among scientists, for enlarging their
role as investigators. The process pro-
vides differential access to the means
of scientific production. This becomes
alf the more important in the current
*historical shift from little science to big
science, with its expensive and often
centralized equipment needed for re-
search. There is thus a continuing inter-
play between the status system, based
on honor and esteem, and the class
system, based . on differential iife-
chances, which locates scientists in dif-
fering positions within the opportunity
structure of science (14).
The Matthew Effectin the
RewardSystem
The social structure of science pro-
vides the context for this inquiry into
a complex psychosocial process that
affects both the reward system and
the communication system of science.
We start by noting a. theme that runs
through the interviews with the Nobel
laureates. They repeatedly observe that
eminent scientists get dispmportionate-
ly great credit for their contributions
to science while reiativeiy unknown
scientists tend to get disproportionately
little credit for comparable contribu-
tions. As one laureate in physics put
it (25): “The world is peculiar in this
matter of how it gives credit. It tends
to give the credit to [already] famous
people?
As we examine the experiences re-
ported by eminent scientists we find
that this pattern of recognition, skewed
in favor of the established scientist, ap-
pears principally (i) in cases of co10
laboration and (ii) in cases of inde-
pendcnt multiple discoveries made by
scientists of distinctly different rank
(Ia)
1; papers coauthored by men of de-
cidedly unequal reputation, another
laureate in physics reports, “the man
who’s best known gets more credit, an
inordinate amount of CrcdW In the
words of a laureate in chemistry:
“When people see my name on a paper,
they are apt to remember it and not to
remember the other names.” And -‘a
laureate in physiology and medicine
describes his awn pattern of response
to jointly authored-papers. ,
You usually notice the name that you’re
familiar with. Even if it’s fast. it wilf be the
one that sticks. In some cases, all the
names are unfamiliar to you, and they’re
virtually anonymous. But what you note
is the acknowledgement at the end of the
paper to the senior person for his “advice
and encouragement.” So you wiil say:
“This came out of Greene’s lab, or se
and-so’s lab.” You remember that, rather
than the long list of authors,
Almost as though he had been listen-
ing to this . account, another laureate
in medicine explains why he will often
not put his name on the published re-
port of a collaborative piece of work:
“People are more or less tempted to
2
Page 3
say: ‘Oh yes, so-and-so is working on
such-and-such in C’s laboratory. It’s
C’s idea.’ I try to cut that down.” Still
another laureate in medicine alludes to
this pattern and goes on to observe
how it might prejudice the career of
the junior investigator:
If someone is being conside=d for a job
by people who have not had much ex-
perience with him, if he hw published
only together with some known name+
weii, it detracts. It naturally makes people
ask: “How much is really his own con-
tribution. how much [the senior author’s].
How will he work out once he goes out
of that laboratory?” .
Under certain conditions this adverse
effect on recognition of the junior au-
thor of papers written in collaboration
with prominent scientists can apparent-
.- ly be countered and even converted
into an asset. Shouid the younger scien-
tist .move ahead to do autonomous and
significant work, this work rerroactivciy
affects the appraisals of his role in ear-
lier collaboration. In the words of the
laureate in medicine who referred to
the virtual anonymity of junior au-
thors of coauthored papets: “People who
have been identified with such joint
work and who then go on to do good
work later on, [do] get the -proper
amount of recognition.” Indeed, as an-
other laureate implies, this retroactive
judgment may actuaily heighten recog-
nition for later accomplishments: “The
junior person is sometimes iost sight of,
but only temporariiy if he continues.
In many cases, he actually gains in ac-
ceptance of his work and in generai
acceptance, by having once had such
association.” Awareness of this pattern
of retroactive recognition may account
in part for the preference. described by
another laureate of some “young fei-
lows [,who] feel that to have a better-
known name on the paper wiil be of
help to them.” But this is an expressive
as weii as a merely instrumental prefer-
ence, as we see also in the pride with
which laureates themselves speak of
having worked, say, with Fermi, G. N.
Lewis, Meycrhof, or Niels Bohr.
So much for the misallocation of
credit in this reward system in the case
of collaborative work. Such misaiioca-
tion also occurs in the case of inde-
pendent multiple discoveries. When ap-
proximately the same ideas or findings
are independently communicated by a
scientist of great repute and by one
not yet widely known, it is the first,
we are told, who ordinarily receives
prime recognition. An approximation
. .
to this pattern is reported by a iau-
reate who observes:
It does happen that two men have the
same idea and one becomes better known
for it. F-+ who had the idea, went cir-
cling round to try to get an experiment
for. . l . Nobody wouid do it and so it
was forgotten, practically. Finally, L
and B- and c‘,, did it, became famous.
and got the Nobel Prize. . . . If things
had gone just a little differently; if somc-
body had been willing to try the txpcri-
ment when E suggested it, they proba-
bly couid have published it jointly and he
would have &en a famous man. As it is,
he’s a footnote.
The workings of this process at the
expense of the young scientist and to
the benefit of the famous one is re-
markably summarized in the life his-
tory of a laureate in physics, who has
experienced both phases at diRerent
times in his career.
When you’re not recognized, he recalls,
it’s a little bit irritating to have somebody
come along and figure out the obvious
which you’ve also figured out, and every-
body gives him credit just because he’s a
famous physicist or a famous man in his
field.
Here he is viewing the case he re-
ports from the perspective of one who
had this happen to him before he had
become famous. The conversation takes
a new turn as he notes that his own
position has greatly changed. Shifting
from the perspective of his earlier days,
when he felt victimized by the pattern.
to the perspective of his present high
status, he goes on to say:
This often happens, and I’m probably
getting credit now, if I don’t watch myself,
for things other people figured out. Be-
cause I’m notorious and when I say it,
people say: “Well, he’s the one that
thought this out.” Well. I may just be
saying things that other people have
thought out before.
In the end, then, a sort of rough-hewn
justice has been done by the compound-
ing of two compensating injustices. His
earlier ~accomplishments have been un-
derestimated; his later ones, overesti-
mated (I 7).
This complex pattern of the mis-
aiiocation of credit for scientific work
must quite evidently be described as
“the Matthew effect,” for, as will be
remembered, the Gospel According to
St. Matthew puts it this way:
For unto every one that hath shall be
given, and he shail have abundance: but
from him that hath not shall be taken
away even that which he hath.
Put in less stately language, the Mat-
thew effect consists in the accruing of
greater increments of recognition for
particuiar scientific contributions to sci-
entists of considerable repute and the
withholding of such recognition from
scientists who have not yet made their
mark. Nobel laureates provide presump-
tive evidence of the effect. since they
testify to its occurrence, not as victims
-which might make their testimony
suspect-but as unwitting beneficiaries.
The laureates and other eminent
men of science are sufficiently aware
of this aspect of the Matthew effect
to make apeciai efforts to counteract
it. At the extreme, they sometimes rc-
fuse to coauthor a paper reporting rem
search on which they have coilabootcd
in order not to diminish the-.ra%gni-
tion accorded their less-well-known as-
sociates. An& as Harriet Zuckcrman
has found (28), they tend to give fint
place in jointly authored papers to one
of their collaborators. She discovered,
moreover, that the iaureates who have
attained eminence before receiving the
Nobei prize begin to transfer fint-
authorship to associates earlier than
less eminent laureates-to-be do, and
that both sets of laureate-he pre-
viousiy eminent and not-so-eminent-
greatly increase this practice a@r re-
ceiving the prize. Yet the latter effort
is probably more expressive of the lau-
reates’ good intentions than it is &cc-
tive in redressing the imbalance of
credit attributable to the Matthew ef-
fect. As the laureate quoted by Har-
riet Zuckerman acknowledges: “If I
publish my name first, then everyone
thinks the others are just techni-
cians. . . . If my name is last, people
will credit me anyway for the whole
thing, so I want the others to have a bit
more glory.”
The problem of achieving a public
identity in science may be deepened
by the great increase in the number
of papers with several authors (2, chap.
3; 19; 20, p. 87) in which the -role of
young collaborators becomes obscured
by the brilliance that surrounds their
illustrious co-authors. So great is this
problem that we are tempted to turn
again to the Scriptures to designate
the status-enhancement and status-sup-
pression components of the Matthew
effect. We can describe it as “the Ec-
clesiasticus component,” from the famil-
iar injunction “Let us now praise fa-
mous men,” in the noncanonical book
of that name.
It will surely have been noted that .
the laureates perceive the Matthew tf-
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Page 4
feet primarily as a problem in the
just allocation of credit for scientific
accomplishment. They see it largely in
terms of its action in enhancing rank
or suppressing recognition. They see
it as leading to an unintended double
injustice, in which unknown scientists
are unjustifiably victimized and famous
ones, unjustifiably benefited. In short,
they see the Matthew effect in terms
of a basic inequity in the reward
system that affects the careers of in-
dividual scientists. But it has other im-
plications for the development of sci-
ence, and we must shift our angle of
theoreticai vision in order to identify
them.
The Matthew Effect
in the Commtutication System
We now look at the same social
phenomena from another perspective-
not from the standpoint of individual
careers and the workings of the re-
ward system but from the standpoint
of science conceived of as a system
of communication. This perspective
yields a further set of inferences. It
leads us to propose the hypothesis that
a scientific contribution will have great-
er visibiIity in the community of scien-
tists when it is introduced by a scien-
tist of high rank than when it is intro-
duced by one who has not yet made
his mark. In other words, considered
in its implications for the reward sys-
tem, the Matthew effect is dysfunction-
al for the careers of individual scien-
tists who are penaiized in the early
stages of their development, but con-
sidered in its implications for the com-
munication system, the Matthew effect.
in cases of collaboration and multiple
discoveries, may operate to heighten
the visibility of new scientific commu-
nications. This is not the first instance
of a social pattern’s being functional
for certain *aspects of a social system
and dysfunctional for certain individ-
uals within that system. That, indeed,
is a principal theme of classical
tragedy (21).
Several laureates have sensed this so-
cial function of the Matthew effect,
Speaking of the diiemma that con-
fronts the famous man of science who
directs the work of a junior associate,
one of them observes:
It raises the question of what you are to
, do. You have a studentt shouid you put
your name on that paper or not? You’ve
contributed to it, but is it better that you
shouldn’t or should? There are two sides
to it. If you don’t [and here comes the
decisive point on visibility], if you don’t,
there’s the possibility that the paper may
go quite unrecognized. Nobody reads it. If
you do, it might be recognized, but then
the student doesn’t get enough credit.
Studies gf the reading practices of
scientists indicate that the suggested
possibility-“Nobody reads it”“is
something less than sheer hyperbole. It
has been found, for example, that oniy
about half of 1 percent of the articles
published in journals of chemistry are
read by any one chemist (22). And
much the same pattern has been found
to hold in psychology (23, p. 9):
The data on current readership (i.e., within
a couple [of] months after distribution of
the journal) suggested that about one-half
of the research reports in “co&* joumais
wiil be read [or skimmed) by 1% or less
of a random sample of psychologists. At
the highest end of the current readership
distribution, no research report is likeiy to
be read by more than about 7% of such
a safnpie.
Several of the Coles’s findings (24)
bear tangentially on the hypothesis
about the communication function of
the Matthew effect. The evidence is
tangential rather than centrai to the
hypothesis since their data deal with
the degree of visibility of the entrre
corpus of each physicist’s work in the
national community of physicists rather
than with the visibility of particular
papers within it. Still, in gross terms,
their findings are at least consistent with
the hypothesis. The h&her the rank_
of physicists (as measured by the pres-
tige of the awards they have received
for scientific work), the higher their
visibility in the national community
of physicists. Nobel Iaureates have a
visibility score (25) of 85; other mem-
bers of the National Academy of Sci-
ences, a score of 72; recipients of
awards *having less prestige, a score
of 38; and physicists who have re-
ceived no awards, a visibility score of
17. The Coles also find (24) that the
visibility of physicists producing work
of high quality is heightened by their
attaining honorific awards more pres-
tigious than those they have previous-
ly received. Further investigation is
needed to discover whether these same
patterns hold for differences in the vis-
ibility (as measured by readership) of
individual papers published by s&n-
tists of differing rank.
There is reason to assume that the
communication function of the Mat-
thew effect is increasing in frequency
and intensity with the exponential in-
crease (20, chaps. 1 and 2; 26) in the
volume of scientific publications, which
makes it increasingly difficult for scien-
tists to keep UP with work in their
field. Bentley Glass (27) is only one
among many to conciude that “per-
haps no problem facing the individual
scientist today is more defeating than
the effort to cope with the flood of
published scientific research, even with=
in one’s own narrow specialty.” Stud-
ies of the communication behavior of
scientists (28) have shown that, con-
fronted with the growing task of idea&
fying significant work pubiished in their
field, scientists search for cues to what
they should attend to. One such a js’
the professional reputation 6f the” au-
thors. The problem of locating the per-
tinent research literature and the prob,
lem of authors’ wanting their work to
be noticed and used are symmetricai:
the vastly increased bulk of publica-
tion stiffens the competition he-n
papers for such notice. The American
Psychological Association study (23,
pp. 252, 254; 29) found that from 15 to
23 percent of the psychologist-readers’
behaviors in selecting articles were
based on &he identity of the authors.
The workings of the Matthew eflect
in the communication system require
us to draw out and emphasize certain
implications about the character of sci-
ence. They remind us that science is
not composed of a series of priv>te
experiences of discovery by many. S&
entists, as sometimes seems to be as-
sumed in inquiries centered exclusively
on the psychological processes involved
in discovery. Science is public, not
private. True, the making of a dis-
covery is a complex personal experi=+
ence. And since the making of the dis-
covery necessarily precedes its fate, the
nature of the experience is the same
whether the discovery temporarily fails
to become part of the socially shared
culture of science or quickly becomes
a functionally significant part Of that
culture. But, for science to be ad-
vanced, it is not enough that fnribful
ideas be originated or new experiments
developed or new problems formulated
or new methods instituted. The innova-
tions must be effectively communicated
to others. That, after all, is what we
mean by a contribution to science-
wmething given to the common fund
of knowledge. In the end, then, science
is a socially shared and socially vaii-
dated body of knowledge. For the de=
velopment of science, only work that
Page 5
js effectiveiy perceived and utilized by
other scientists, then and there, matters.
In investigating the processes that
shape the development of science, it is
therefore important to consider the so-
cial mechanisms that curb or facilitate
the incorporation of would-be contri-
butions into the domain of science.
Looking at the Matthew effect from
this perspective, we have noted the dis-
tinct possibility that contributions made
by scientists of considerable standing
are the most likely to enter promptly
and widely into the communication
networks df science, and so to acceler-
ate its development. .
The Matthew Effect and
the Functions of Redundancy
Construed in this way, the Matthew
effect links up with my previous stud-
ies of the functions of redundancy in
science (30). When similar discoveries
are made by two or more scientists work-
ing independently (“multiple discover-
ies”), the probability that they will be
promply incorporated into the cur-
rent body of scientific knowledge is in-
creased. The more often .a discovery
has been made independently, the bet-
ter are its prospects of being identified
and used. If one published version of
the discovery is obscured by “noise”
in the communication system of sci-
ence, then another vemion may be-
come visible. This leaves us with an
unresolved question: How can one esti-
mate what amount of redundancy in
independent efforts to solve a scientific
problem wiil give maximum probability
of solution without entailing so much
replication of effort that the last incre-
ments wiil not appreciably increase the
probability? (See 31.)
In examining the functions of the
Matthew effect for communication in
science. we can now refine this concep-
tion further. It is not only the number
of times a discovery has been inde-
pendently made and published that af-
fects its visibility but also the standing,
within the stratification system of sci-
ence, of the scientists who have made
it. To put the matter with undue sim-
plicity, a single discovery introduced
by a scientist of established reputation
may have as good a chance of achieving
high visibility as a multiple discovery
variously introduced by several scien-
tists no one of whom has yet achieved
a substantial reputation. Although the
general idea is, at this writing, tenta-
tive, it does have the not inconsiderable
virtue of lending itself to approximate
test. One can examine citation indexes
to find whether in multiple discoveries
by scientists of markedly unequal rank
it is indeed the case that work pub-
lished by the scientists of higher rank
is the more promptly and more widely
cited (32). To the extent that it is, the
findings will shed some light on the un-
planned consequences of the strat@a-
tion system for the development of sci-
ence. Interviews with working scientists
about their reading practices can also
supply data bearing on the hypothesis.
So much for the link between the
Matthew effect and the functions of
multiple discoveries in increasing both
the probability and the speed of dif-
fusion of significant new contributions
to - science. The Matthew effect aIs0
links up with the finding, reported clse-
where (33). that great talents in science
are .typicaily involved in many multiple
discoveries. This statement holds for
Galileo and Newton: for Faraday and
CIerk Maxwell; for Hooke, Cavendish,
and Stensen: for Gauss and Laplace; for
Lavoisier, Priestley, and Scheele: and
for most Nobel laureates. It holds, in
short, for all those whose place in the
pantheon of science is largely assured.
however much they may differ in the
scale of their total accomplishment.
The greatness of these scientists rests
in their having individually contributed
a body of ideas, methods, and results
which, in the case of multiple discov-
eries, has also been contributed by a
sizable aggregate of lem talented men.
For example, we have found that Kel-
vin had a part in 32 or more multiple
discoveries, and that it took 30 other
men to contribute what Kelvin him-
seif contributed.
By-examining the interviews with the
laureates, we can now detect some
underlying ,psychosocial mechanisms
that make for the greater visibility of
contributions reported by scientists of
established reputation. This greater vis-
ibility is not merely the result of a
halo effect such that their personal
prestige nibs off on their separate con-
tributions. Rather, certain aspects of
their socialization, their scheme of val-
ues, and their social character account
in part for the visibility of their work.
Social and Psychologicai Bases
of the Matthew Ukct
Even when some of his contributions
have been independently made by an
aggregate of other scientists, the great
man of science serves distinctive func-
tions. It makes a diEerence, and.aftcrr
a decisive difference, for the advance-
ment of science whether a composite
of ideas and findings is heavily con-
centrated in the work of one man or
one research group or is thinly dis-
persed among a great number of m
and organizations. Such a wmposi~
tends to take on a structure sooner in
the first instance than in the second.
It required Al Freud, for instan- to
focus the attention of many psychoi+
gisti upon a tide array of idela which,
as has been shown elsewhere (30), had
in large part also been hit upon by
various other scientists. Such focJidna
may turn out to be a distinctiVe*fUSiC-
tian of eminent men of science (36. _
A Freud, a Fermi, and a Q&r&
play a charismatic role in t SC&U
They excite intelIectual en&&am
among others who ascribe cm
q&i& to them. Not only do thw
themselves achieve excellence, they brvr,
the capacity for evoking exccllEnm in
othen. In the compelling phrase of W
laureate, they provide a “bright am&
ancc.” It Is not so much tha8 thr-rr
great men of science pass on’their te&
niqum methods, information, and the-
ory to novices working with thsoa,
More consequentially, they cm to
their associates the norms and vahaes
that govern significant research. oiben
in their later years, or after their dti
this personal influence becomes e
ized, in the fashion described by Mm
Weber for other fields of hm a&~-
ity. Charisma becomes institutionriized,
in the form of schools of thought and
research establishments.
The role of outstanding men of sci-
encc in influencing younger as34ktes
is repeatedly emphasized in the in--
views with laureates. Almost to a m
they lay great emphasis on the impor-
tance of problem-finding, not onfy prob,
lem-solving. They uniformly exprus the
stmng conviction that what rm@tcrs
most in their work is a d-g
sense of taste, of judgment, in tig
upon problems that *areof fundamtntai
importance. And, typically, they rcpart
that they acquired this sense f the
significant problem during their y-
of training in evocative environmmts.
Reflecting on his years as a novice in
the laboratory of a chemist of the first
rank, one laureate reports that he “led
me to look for important things, when-
ever possible, rather th& to work on
endless detail or to work just to im-
prove accuracy rather than malting a
basic new contribution.” Another de-