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James Conant examines the possibility of illogical thought through Descartes, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, and Hilary Putnam. He contrasts a Cartesian conception of logical necessity with a tradition that treats logic as constitutive of thought itself. Through an analysis of Frege’s hypothetical logical aliens, Conant develops a reading of the Tractatus as an elucidatory activity that dissolves illusions of sense rather than communicates ineffable truths. The article appears in Philosophical Topics, volume 20, number 1, labeled Fall 1991.

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PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS VOL. 20 NO. 1, FALL 1991 The Search Jor Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the Tractatus1 James Conant University of Pittsburgh [I]n order to draw a limit to thought we should have to be able to think both sides ofthis limit (we should there- fore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be sim- ply nonsense. -Ludwig Wittgenstein2 The only proper way to break an egg is from the inside. -Parva Gallina Rubra3 This essay is about three things: Wittgenstein's ideas conceming the question of the possibility of illogical thought, the sources of those ideas (especially in Kant and Frege), and Putnam's recent interest in both of these matters. Along the way, this paper briefly sketches the broad outlines of two almost parallel traditions of thought about the laws of logic: one rather long and complicated tradition called the History of Modem Philosophy, and one rather short and complicated one called Hilary Putnam. Here is a thumb- nail version of how these two traditions align: Descartes thought the laws of logic were only contingently necessary; not so recent Putnam agreed. 8t. Thomas Aquinas believed that they were necessarily necessary; relatively recent Putnam agreed (this is only confusing if you think Aquinas should not 115

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be a step ahead of Descartes). Kant thought they were simply necessary. Frege wanted to agree-but his manner of doing so raised the worry that there was no way in which to express his agreement that made sense. Wittgenstein agreed with the worry. He concluded that sense had not (yet) been made of the question to which our two traditions sought an answer; very recent Putnam agreed. HISTORICAL PREAMBLE: A DIFFERENT KIND OF CARTESIANISM What is the status of the laws of logic, the most basic laws of thought? Wherein does their necessity lie? In what sense does the negation of a basic law of logic represent an impossibility? The Scholastics were forced to think hard about these questions since they believed in the existence of an omnipotent God for whom all things are possible. If God is omnipotent does that mean that He has the power to abrogate the laws of logic? The Scholastics, on the whole, were quite reluc- tant to draw this conclusion. But does that then mean that God is not all- powerful, that there is a limit to his power, that there is something he can- not do? That is a conclusion that the Scholastics were, on the whole, at least equally as reluctant to draw. Posed here in a theological guise is aversion of a question that has continued to haunt philosophy up until the present: do the laws of logic impose a limit which we ron up against in our thinking? If so, what kind of a limit is this? Do their negations represent something that we cannot do or that cannot be? If so, what sort of "cannot" is this? Here is Aquinas's attempt to reconcile the omnipotence of the Divine Being with the inexorability of the basic principles of Reason: All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists. For there may be a doubt as to the precise meaning of the word "all" when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now ... a thing is said to be pos- sible in two ways. First, in relation to some power ... If, how- ever, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent because He can do all that He is able to do. It remains, therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the 116

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second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another: possible, if the pred- icate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is an ass. . . . Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradic- tion in terms is numbered among those possibles in respect of which God is called omnipotent; whereas whatever implies con- tradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipo- tence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: No word shall be impossible with God (Luke i.37). For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.4 Aquinas is caught here between the Charybdis of asserting a mere tau- tology (God can do everything within His power) and the Scylla of implic- itly ascribing a substantive limit to God' s power (by declaring God can do all those sorts of things which fall under a certain general description X, and hence apparently implicitly declaring: He cannot do those things which do not fall under X). One way out-a way out which, as we shall see, is grad- ually refined in the course of these two traditions of thought about logic- would be for this description (of those things which God cannot do) to turn out not to be a genuine description at all. Aquinas, indeed, tries to argue that those things which fall under the (apparent) description things which God cannot do are not, properly speaking, things which can be done at all. These are things which "cannot have the aspect of possibility." Of these, Aquinas says, "it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them." But the worry arises: hasn't Aquinas just offered us a redescription of what kind of a thing a logically impossible sort of a thing is? It would seem that we still have here to deal with a certain (albeit remark- able) kind 0/ a thing. If so, the question remains: what sort of a thing is this and is it something not even God can do? Even ifwe concede to Aquinas that perhaps, strictly speaking, we should not speak of it as if it were a doable kind of a thing, nevertheless, there certainly still appears to be an "it" here that our words are straining after and which has formed the subject of our thought throughout the preceding paragraph. Aquinas appears to be on his strongest ground when he tries to make out that the "it" which falls under these descriptions-"that which is logically impossible," "that which even God cannot do"-is not a kind of a thing at all. What we have here instead is an attempt to conceive of a kind of a thing which "no intellect [i.e., not just a human intellect] can possibly conceive;" 117

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it is an attempt to speak a word "which cannot be a word." In order to set up this way of dissolving the appearance of an "it" (which not even God can do), Aquinas invokes Aristotle' s distinction between those things which are impossible in relation to some power and those things which are impossible absolutely. It is not clear, however, that this distinction really helps. It threat- ens to recreate the appearance that we have to do here with two different kinds of things, belonging to two distinct orders of impossibility: the merely impossible and the absolutely impossible. Just as it is natural to picture that which is possible for a finite being (such as man) as contained within the space of that which is possible for God, it can seem natural to take Aristotle' s distinction as marking an analogous boundary, only at a higher level. One pictures the distinction in terms of two degrees of impossibility: things belonging to the second degree (the absolutely impossible) are situated on the far side of the outer limit which encompasses things belonging to the first degree (the merely impossible). So now it seems that although God never chafes against anything which lies within the circumference of this exterior circle, nonetheless, Great as He is, that is as far as He can go--even He must remain within this circle. This picture of a circle (circumscribing the limits of that which is absolutely possible) lying within a wider space (the space of the absolutely impossible) inevitably leaves us with the feeling that we have, after all, succeeded in describing a genuine limit to His power. The existence of this outer space of absolute impossibility seems to settle the question in precisely the contrary direction from the one in which Aquinas had hoped to lead uso The apparently innocent step of picturing the space of absolute pos- sibility as bounded by a limit seems to have led us to the opposite conclu- sion about God's omnipotence.5 What sort of a thing lies beyond the limit of God' s power? Answer: the sort which is absolutely impossible. And now it becomes irresistible to add: even for Hirn. Descartes concluded that Aquinas, along with most of the rest of medieval theology, had wandered into blasphemy.6 "If men really understood the sense of their words,"7 they would never speak as they do. For their mode of speech clearly implies a limit to God' s power. The only way to avoid such blasphenlY is to refrain from ascribing any limits to what the Divinity is able to bring about: 1 turn to the difficulty of conceiving how God would have been acting freely and indifferently if he had nlade it false ... in general that contradictories could not be true together. It is easy to dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of God can- not have any linlits, and that our nlind is finite and so created as to be able to conceive as possible the things which God has wished to be in fact possible, but not be able to conceive as possible things which God could have nlade possible, but whlch 118

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he has nevertheless wished to make impossible. The first consideration shows us that God cannot have been determined to make it true that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that he could have done the opposite. The second con- sideration assures us that even if this be true, we should not try to comprehend it, since our nature is incapable of doing SO.8 Descartes positively asserts here that God could have made contradic- tories true together.9 He further asserts that this means that God can bring about things which our minds are incapable of comprehending. If only that which is comprehensible to minds such as ours were possible for God-if fundamental truths (such as that contradictories cannot be true together) were external and prior to God's will-then He would not be omnipotent. For His will would not be free with respect to such truths, but rather subject to their determination. But this would be to deny the infinitude and incom- prehensibility of God's power. 10 The only way to avoid such an unworthy blasphemy is to acknowledge that such lruths do depend upon the will of God and that it lies within His power to bring about the negations of such truthS. 11 The sense in which they are nonetheless necessary or etemallies in the fact that God has decreed them to be true: hence they are necessary for uso But, from a Divine point ofview, they are only contingently necessary. For we must allow that there is some sense in which God could have done otherwise: [E]ven if God has willed that some truths should be neces- sary, this does not mean that He has willed them necessarily; for it is one thing to will that they be necessary, and quite another to will this necessarily, or to be necessitated to will it. 12 If God had not been free to choose such laws as he did, if He were by necessity constrained to will the truth of the laws of logic, then there would be a necessity that binds even Hirn. God would be inexorably subject to those laws, just as we are subject to His decrees. There would be afatum that binds even the Divinity, making a mockery of his alleged omnipotence. So we must say that God freely willed the laws of logic to be true. Descartes is very careful, however, to insist that, although these laws do not bind God, this does not make them any less binding for uso The hubris lies in our thinking that because we cannot comprehend how the negations of such laws could be true-for example, how it could be true that "He could have made con- tradictories true together"-we are therefore in a position to conclude that it cannot be done, even by Hirn. It is hubris to think that the limits of our pow- ers of comprehension enable us to specify something He cannot do: In general we can assert that God can do everything that is within our grasp but not that He cannot do what is beyond our grasp. It would be rash to think that our imagination reaches as far as his power. 13 119

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The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the Tractatus: summary, contents and background

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The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the Tractatus is a 66-page documentcredited to Dara B. Vance. James Conant examines the possibility of illogical thought through Descartes, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, and Hilary Putnam. He contrasts a Cartesian conception of logical necessity with a tradition that treats logic as constitutive of thought itself. Through an analysis of Frege’s hypothetical logical aliens, Conant develops a reading of the Tractatus as an elucidatory activity that dissolves illusions of sense rather than communicates ineffable truths. The article appears in Philosophical Topics, volume 20, number 1, labeled Fall 1991. It appears in the Science & Engineering collection, which groups it with other material that readers may use for comparison and further study.

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    Logically alien thought

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