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Scientific
Issues and Perspectives
Why Should we Promote the Public
Understanding of Science?
G E O F F R E Y THOMAS and J O H N DURANT
Introduction
The public understanding of science is widely regarded as A Good Thing.
that it is difficult to argue against the greater comprehension of almost anything
by almost anybody, this is not particularly surprising. For the most part,
however, such support as exists for the promotion of public understanding of
science is largely tacit; certainly, it often escapes close examination. Yet such
examination is the more necessary at a time when greater public awareness of
matters scientific is being actively encouraged by Government agencies, leading
representatives of the scientific community, and many others. What, exactly, do
we mean by the public understanding of science; and why, exactly, should we be
concerned to promote it?
This paper is offered as a contribution to the current debate on these and
related questions. The first half of the paper rehearses a of different
arguments that are commonly deployed in favour of promoting the public
understanding of science. On the basis of this review, second half of the paper
critically a number of assumptions that embodied in of these
arguments. This examination paves the way for a discussion of the notion of
literacy, which provides at least preliminary criteria according to
which the nature and extent of public understanding of science may be assessed.
Before turning to these topics, we must say something about the phrase
"public understanding ofscience" itself. many ways, it is regrettable that this
phrase has come to stand for a concern wider perceptions of science in
society. For one thing, public of science may be taken to
is certainly false, namely that there exists in society a single and/or a
stable outlook on matters scientific; and for another, i t is at least triply
ambiguous. As will become obvious in our review of arguments in favour of
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GEOFFREY THOMAS AND JOHN D U R A N T
promoting public understanding of science, different authors mean different
things by the terms public, understanding, and science. For this reason, at least, it
may be helpful at the outset to say what intend by these terms.
By may be meant anyone and everyone from legislators and civil
servants, at one end of the spectrum, to private individuals at the other. For
present purposes, we shall take the public to be the people as a whole other than
those acting in their professional capacity as expert representatives of the
scientific community. (An alternative term for the public thus defined is "lay
people"). is an even trickier notion than public. In popular
parlance, on the one hand, it is commonly used to mean anything and everything
from knowledge to sympathy; and in dictionaries, on the other hand, it is
generally defined as: to grasp mentally; to perceive the nature or significance of;
or to know how to deal with. In each case, conventional usage is rather too
extensive for present purposes. Later on, we shall offer a somewhat more
restricted interpretation of the notion of understanding with reference to the
concept of scientific literacy.
Finally, there is the term science itself. While the root meaning of science is
knowledge, this is clearly too broad a definition to be of much use. For our
purposes, scientific knowledge is knowledge that is produced by and in some
sense bears the seal of approval of the scientific community. (The scientific
community, in turn, is simply that group of people who are recognized as the
professional knowledge-producers in our culture.) This sociological definition
has the great advantage that it presupposes nothing about the nature or the
significance of science,. other than that it is an authoritative or officially
recognized form of knowledge. We are concerned here with scientific knowledge
of all kinds, embracing not only what are generally termed the natural sciences
but also the scientific aspects of medicine and technology.
Nine Arguments for Promoting the Public Understanding of Science
The literature on our subject is extensive and diverse. Calls for the promotion of
the public understanding of science have come from many and varied quarters
and have been motivated by many and varied concerns. We shall rehearse briefly
no fewer than nine different arguments, distinguished according to the nature of
the benefits which they see as stemming from greater public understanding of
science. The alleged benefits are to: science itself; national prosperity; national
power and influence; individuals; democratic government; society as a whole;
intellectual life; aesthetic appreciation; and morality. This classification has its
weaknesses: it represents a complex picture somewhat simplistically; it may be
taken as exhaustive, when almost certainly it is not; and it may conceal the
overlap which can and does exist between different arguments. Despite these
weaknesses, the classification is offered both as a convenient guide to a complex
literature and as a basis for discussion.
1. Benefits to Science
It is quite common for advocates of greater public understanding of science to
suggest that such understanding benefits science itself. Quite apart from the need
to attract new recruits into the scientific community, it is often argued that public
support for science depends upon at least a minimal level of public awareness of
the processes and products of scientific research. The prolific science writer Isaac
Asimov, for example, has claimed that "Without an informed public, scientists
will not only be no longer supported financially,they will be actively persecuted".
The difference between understanding and non-understanding, Asimov suggests,
is "the difference between respect and admiration on the one side, and hate and
fear on the other".'
Whether or not they share somewhat dramatic view of the matter,
many practising scientists are inclined to respond to perceived threats to the well-
being of their disciplines by trying to promote greater public understanding of
them. In the early Paul Couderc saw the roots of public opposition to
science in "widespread lack of knowledge on the part of the general populace of
the concepts of science, its objectives, its capabilities, its promise", and he went
on to advocate knowledge itself as an "antidote for anti-science".? Similarly, in
the early 1980s American biologists responded to the growth of
motivated opposition to evolution by entering the public arena to expound their
views on Here, once again, the assumption appears to have been that
public understanding would bring public consent to the findings of science.
There is another way in which science itselfmay benefit from the promotion of
greater publicunderstanding. Given the kind ofhyperbole that from time to time
attaches to particular scientific and technological developments it would not be
surprising if sections of the public were to acquire unrealistic and unrealizable
expectations of science. Wherever this occurs, it is arguable that there is a risk of
loss of confidence, cynicism, and eventual withdrawal of support. (Could it be,
perhaps, that there is something of this in contemporary public disenchantment
with civil nuclear technologies?) In a recent work, the sociologist ofscience Harry
Collins has defended his own discipline's concern to analyse science as a form of
human, and therefore fallible, expertise in precisely this way. Professional
scientists, he notes, are the experts to whom we must turn when we want to know
about the natural world. However, they can offer only"the best advice that there
is to be had". To ask for more than this, Collins suggests, is to risk "widespread
disillusion with science with all its devastating
2. Benefits to National Economies
It is not difficultto see a connection between public understanding of science and
the economic wealth of nations. Let us suppose that national wealth is
determined in part by success in competition for the sale of goods and services in
international markets, and that success in such markets is based in part upon the
possession of vigorous research and development programmes for the generation
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of new goods and services. Vigorous research and development programmes
depend in part upon a steady supply of scientifically and technically trained
personnel; and it seems clear that only nations whose peoples possess a generally
high level of scientific and technical understanding will be able to sustain this
.. .
supply, and hence maintain their ground in the international competition for
economic wealth.
This argument was given due prominence in a report of the Royal Society on
The Understanding of Science in 1985:
Improvements in existing technologies demand some degree of scientific and/or
technical understanding from all concerned-the designer, the the manager
and the The new technologies, such as those involved in electronics,
synthetic materials, or biotechnology, have developed from the
underlying science. Their successful exploitation requires those responsible for the
nation's industries, as well as a supportive government, to be aware of science and
technology, to recognize their potential value and to accept the opportunities they can
generate.'
This is certainly not the only kind of economic argument in favour of
promoting public understanding of science. For example, it can be argued that a
certain familiarity with science and technology is necessary in order to sustain
consumer demand for science- and technology-based products. In recent years,
however, it appears that the argument based on has had
particularly wide currency, at least in the English-speaking world.
3. to National Power and Influence
Over and above any purely economic benefits, greater public understanding of
science has been claimed t o bring wider political benefits in its wake. For
example, such benefits were widely touted in the debates on scientific education
which took place in the United States in the post-Sputnik years. Le
Corbeiller, Professor of Applied Physics and General Education at Harvard,
suggested that the problem facing the United States was"to bring the American
public to know what science is". For one thing, the country needed many more
scientists and engineers, not only to sustain its expanding civil and military
industries, but also to help spread American influence to the rest of the world.
"Our adversary", he wrote, "has taken full advantage of the progress of science,
not only on the interior front but also in his external propaganda, where he
presents himself to the world as the champion ofscience, the bourgeois countries
as sunk in Le message was clear: scientific
education for young people and adults alike was a national necessity if the United
States was to maintain its position of intellectual and ideological leadership in the
world. Of course, similar reasoning has been employed outside the sphere of
"Cold War" politics; but the sharpness of that particular conflict has generated
perhaps the clearest examples of this particular argument in the literature.
PROMOTE P U B L I C UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE?
4. Benefits to Individuals
It has often been suggested that improved understanding of science and
technology is useful to anyone living in a scientifically and technologically
sophisticated society. The claim here is that more knowledgeable citizens are able
to negotiate their way more effectively through the social world: that they are
better-equipped to take decisions about diet, health-care, and personal safety;
and that they are better-placed to make a wide range of consumer choices in the
face of conflicting (and often spuriously "scientific") promotional claims on
behalf of products. The Royal Society Report outlined part of this particular
argument as follows:
Ignorance of elementary science cuts off the individual from understandingmanyof the
tools and services used every day. Same basic understanding of how they function should
make the world a more interesting and less threatening place. It is obviously not necessary,
and hardly possible, for an individual to understand the functioning of everythingfrom a
bus to a ball point pen or a television set, But those who have never been stimulated to
enquire about how things work and who lack the basic knowledge to pursue such an
enquiry are surely at a disadvantage in the modern world.
Another crucial area of benefits to individual citizens relates to employment.
Clearly, individuals who lack basic information about and understanding of
science and technology may be either cut offfrom job opportunities altogether or
prevented from taking full advantage of technical developments in their place of
work. Here, of course, the interests of individuals and those of national
economies may overlap to a significant degree.
5. Benefits to Democratic Government
Much of the literature on the public understanding of science is concerned with
the politics of decision-making about science. The issues at stake here are easily
summarized (but perhaps not so easily resolved, as the article by Robert
Fullinwider in this volume makes clear). In democratic societies, citizens possess
the right to influence decisions that are taken on a wide variety of matters in
which they have an interest. Fairly obviously, modern science is far more than a
purely private pursuit: for one thing, a great deal of scientific research is funded
from the public purse; and for another, the results of this research exert a
profound influence over many aspects of public and private life. Clearly,
therefore, citizens have legitimate interests in science, and there is a case to be
made that they possess the right to influence the science policy-making process.
The bridge from these preliminary points to our theme is now easily made. If
science is to be controlled by the people, then the people had better know
something about science. It is worth observing that two distinct benefits are at
stake here. Greater public understanding of science may be thought to promote
more democratic decision-making (by encouraging people to exercise their
democratic rights), which may be regarded as good in and of itself; but in
addition, it may be thought to promote more effective decision-making (by
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encouraging people to exercise their democratic rights former benefit
has been widely discussed in the literature on public participaton in science,' and
the latter appears to be embodied in the Royal Society Report's contention that
"wider understanding of the scientific aspects of a given issue will- not
automatically lead to a consensus about the best answer, but it will at least lead to
informed, and therefore better, decision-making".
6. Benefits to Society as a Whole
The last section was concerned with public understanding of science as an aid to
democratic decision-making. Also operating at the level of relationships within
society, but this time not concerned with specifically political processes, is the
argument that the general health of a nation in which science is practised depends
upon the effective integration of science into wider culture. Understandably,
perhaps, this is an argument that has found favour with some social anthropolo-
gists. Writing at the end of the for example, the American anthropologist
Margaret Mead noted with concern the growing alienation of lay from the
worlds of science and technology. She suggested that a "schismogenic process"
was under way in western and that this could and should be stopped
by the discovery of 'new educational and communication devices" capable of
bridging the gulf between "the specialized practitioners of a scientific or humane
discipline and those who are laymen in each particular field"."
This last quotation makes it clear that the problem of divisions within culture
is not confined to sciencealone. All sorts of activities may cut themselves off from
the common weal by becoming specialized and highly technical. However,
science is the paradigm of specialization and technicality, and it presents us with
the problem of fragmentation in a particularly acute form. As long ago as 1961
the historian of science A. Hunter Dupree warned that the isolation of science
from the rest of American culture was producing a scientific"cargo cult". Many
of the media-generated symbols of science in the public mind, he asserted, were
"no more functional parts of the scientific enterprise than are the bamboo
antennas of the Melanesians". Failing to understand science properly, the public
responded with a mixture of fear and adulation; and it was thus the "positive
duty" of the Universities to set about destroying the "cultic" images upon which
such unproductive responses were
The problem of the gulf between science and the wider culture has been
addressed in an interesting way by the science policy analyst Maurice Goldsmith.
In several publications, Goldsmith has developed the notion of the "science
critic" by analogy with the more familiar ideas of literary or music His
suggestion is that each person should become his or her own science critic; but it
is some measure of the of the problem that the whole notion seems lightly
odd. Science broadcaster, yes; science journalist, certainly; science popularizer,
of course; but science critic? The very notion seems slightly odd, conjuring up
vague images of indignant protests against the laws of nature. Yet it is precisely
the sense of detachment underlying this reaction that Mead, Dupree and many
others have seen as such a powerful argument in favour of the promotion of the
public understanding of science.
7. Intellectual Benefits
No review of this kind would be complete without reference to the place of
science in our intellectual culture, where by intellectual culture we mean the
attributes of an educated and cultivated mind. This notion of culture as
cultivated intellect may be traced from the writings of Victorian educationalist
and man of letters Arnold in the middle of the nineteenth century to
those of the physicist and novelist C. P. Snow in the middle of the twentieth
century. For Arnold, culture was the sum of the very best human intellectual
achievements, with the emphasis upon the classics and humanities. The
Darwinian biologist Thomas Huxley challenged Arnold's emphasis champion-
ing the place of science in intellectual culture, and boldly asserting that,
"the man who should know the history of a bit of chalk which every carpenter carries
about in his breeches pocket, though ignorant of other history, is likely, if he will think his
knowledge out to its ultimate results, to have a true and therefore a better conception of
this wonderful universe and of man's relation to i t than the most learned student who is
deep-read in the records of humanity and ignorant of those of nature"."
Repeatedly from Huxley's time to our own, the argument has been put that
science is an intellectually enabling and ennobling enterprise. For Snow, the
scientific edifice of the physical world was "in its intellectual depth, complexity
and articulation the most wonderful collective work of the mind of
Snow's advocacy of a common culture, in which (for example) molecular biology
would be a requisite, was part of a long-standing attempt to broaden the notion
of what it is to be an educated person. If the need for such broadening is accepted,
then the promotion of public understanding of science becomes part and parcel
of the promotion of intellectual culture itself.
8. Aesthetic Benefits
Closely linked to the intellectual argument outlined above is an aesthetic
argument that would make science as central to a truly cultivated mind as
literature, music, and the performing arts. This argument suggests that science is
the distinctively creative activity of the modern mind. T o one American scientist
and writer, for example, science is this century's cathedral while to
another it is this century's art-"the most interesting, difficult, pitiless,
exhilarating and beautiful pursuit we have yet T o many scientific
humanists, in particular, it has seemed that the Romantics had it quite the wrong
way round; so far from degrading the mind with its arid, soulless conceptions,
science has been portrayed as continually expanding what the historian ofscience
Glass called "the area of beauty and meaning" which it reveals."
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GEOFFREY THOMAS AN D JOHN DURANT
The American advocate of science Warren Weaver has eloquently captured
both the intellectual and the aesthetic arguments in favour of the promotion of
the public understanding of science:
The capacity of science progressively to reveal the order and beauty of the universe,
from the most evanescent elementary particle up through the atom, the molecule, the cell,
man, our earth with all its teeming life, the solar system, the metagalaxy, and the vastness
of the universe itself, all this constitutes the real reason, the incontrovertiblereason, why
science is important, and why its interpretation to all men is a task of such
urgency, significance and
Here, therefore, are arguments to the effect that we should promote public
understanding of science for the same sorts of reasons that we preserve rare
books, conserve beautiful buildings, and promote the arts. Without knowledge
of science, it is suggested, life would be that much less worth living.
9. Moral Benefits
Finally, there are ethical arguments for promoting the public understanding of
science. According to a number of authors, of whom perhaps the scientist and
broadcaster Jacob Bronowski is best-known in the recent past, the internal
norms or values of science are so far above those of everyday life that their
transfer into wider culture would signal a major advance in human civilization. If
science could convince us, for example, that many social evils stem from
ignorance or neglect of the scientific spirit itself, then according to the biologist
Paul it would have given us, "another noble gift: a basis for responsible
and judicious self-direction as a design for living"."
The mathematical biologist Anatol Rapoport has suggested that the following
ethical principles are inherent in scientific practice:
the conviction that there exists objective truth; that there exist rules of evidence for
discovering it; that, on the of this objective truth, unanimity is both possible and
desirable; and that unanimity must be achieved by independent arrivals at convictions,
that is, by examination of evidence, not through coercion, personal argument, or appeal to
authority.
Rapoport argues that this list represents a substantial part o f a superior ethical
system which might, with considerable benefit, be much more widely adopted in
human affairs.
Minimally, at least, this ethical argument depends upon science providing
especially powerful illustrations of moral precepts whose ultimate justification
lies elsewhere. However, it is possible to go further by claiming that science can
establish as well as exemplify moral precepts. This was the position adopted by
the nineteenth-century English philosopher Herbert Spencer, who looked to
scientific laws as the basis not only for the understanding of nature but also for
the organization and regulation of society. Spencer's evolutionary ethics was but
one (albeit particularly influential) version of a more general philosophy,
traceable at least as far back as the Enlightenment, which holds that scientific
understanding makes people not merely wiser but better.
In recent years, ethical arguments for the promotion of the public understand-
ing of science have become rather unfashionable. Partly, at least, this may be
because they have attracted a great deal of critical attention from moral and
social philosophers; but partly, also, it is because the scientific humanism upon
which they commonly rest has gradually withered in the face of growing public
concern about what have come to be seen as the totally unwelcome social
implications of much scientific research. To take only the most dramatic
example, our generation has become accustomed to the idea that a substantial
fraction of scientific research and development is devoted to sustaining the
international race; and in this situation, Bronowski's sweeping claim that
"every machine has been a has come to seem not so much
complacent as utterly fantastic.
Scientific Understanding and Scientific Literacy
We have now rehearsed nine distinct kinds of argument in favour of promoting
the public understanding of science. We d o not intend to assess and criticize each
of them in turn. Inevitably, individuals will differ in their attitudes t o each.
Practising scientists may perhaps find themselves drawn to some version of the
scientificargument; other academics may perhaps incline towards the intellectual
and the aesthetic arguments; cabinet ministers and civil servants may perhaps
find one or more of the economic and the political arguments to their taste; and
so on. We happen to be working in the field of continuing education, and in
general we find ourselves drawn to arguments based on the enhancement of the
lives of individuals (nos. 4,7 and 8) and the welfare of society as a whole (nos. 2,5
and 6). We are less attracted to the arguments based on benefits to national
power and influence (no. 3) or to morality (no. 9), since such benefits appear to us
either illusory or undesirable (or both). We say more about the argument based
on benefits to science below.
Having rehearsed so many different arguments, we have felt obliged to
summarize our own view of them in this way. This, however, is not our main
object. To repeat what was said at the outset, most people who have taken the
trouble to comment on the question at all appear to be agreed that the promotion
of the public understanding of science is "A Good Thing"; but what the nine
arguments reveal is the fact that beneath this superficial consensus there lie
profound differences of orientation, of outlook, and of aim, That these
differences are not more obvious is due chiefly to the deceptive simplicity of the
notion of public understanding of science. Take, for example, the first of the
arguments outlined above. The scientific argument rests upon the key assump-
tion that greater public understanding of science brings greater public approval
of science in its wake; but what is meant by understanding and approval here? By
understanding, do we mean a grasp of the aims of science, the norms of science,
the processes of science, the products of science, or a combination of some or all
of these? And by regard, d o we mean approval of the practice of science, the
principles of science, the expert judgments of science, the research priorities of